



**National Network
For Safe Communities
at JOHN JAY COLLEGE**

September 30, 2024

Royal Commission into Domestic, Family, and Sexual Violence
by electronic transmission

To whom it may concern:

I am writing with respect to your important inquiry into addressing intimate partner violence in Australia. I am a professor of criminal justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, in the United States of America. I am the faculty chair at the college of the National Network for Safe Communities, an action-research center devoted to developing evidence-based approaches to violence and other serious public safety issues, and working with government and communities to implement those approaches and take them to scale. One of my own personal commitments, and that of my organization, has been to addressing intimate partner violence. Our intimate partner violence intervention (IPVI) has been designed to stop the most dangerous abusers, shift the burden of addressing abuse from the victim to the state, reduce recidivism beginning at the earliest stage of an abuser's behavior, and provide safety and supportive services to victims, with particular attention to the situations and needs of the most vulnerable victims in the most dangerous situations. Field experience and formal evaluation has shown that all of this is possible and that safety can be provided to victims in ways that neither traditional prevention nor traditional enforcement can provide. I am attaching several key documents, including an excellent paper by the Australian Institute of Criminology assessing – positively – the prospects for adapting this approach to Australia.

Please let me know of any way in which I can support your efforts.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
David M. Kennedy
Faculty Chair
National Network for Safe Communities
[REDACTED]



Australian Government

Australian Institute of Criminology

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice

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Abstract | Focused deterrence approaches to domestic violence have been developed in the US to increase offender accountability and ensure appropriately targeted responses to victims.

While innovative, the model has strong theoretical and empirical foundations. It is based on a set of fundamental principles and detailed analysis of domestic violence patterns and responses.

This paper uses recent Australian research to explore the feasibility of adapting this model to an Australian context. Arguments in favour of the model, and possible barriers to implementation, are described.

Based on an extensive body of Australian research on patterns of domestic violence offending and reoffending, and in light of recent developments in responses to domestic violence, this paper recommends trialling focused deterrence and ‘pulling levers’ to reduce domestic violence reoffending in an Australian pilot site.

Policing repeat domestic violence: Would focused deterrence work in Australia?

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Despite significant investment by government in new methods of preventing domestic violence reoffending, levels of violence experienced by victims remain unacceptably high. In 2017–18, around one in five offenders proceeded against by police had at least one domestic or family violence related offence (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019), while rates of self-reported domestic violence victimisation—which are less susceptible to changes in reporting—have remained relatively stable since 2005 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017).

There is widespread agreement that achieving a long-term, sustainable, population-level reduction in domestic violence requires investment in primary prevention (Department of Social Services 2019), and there is early evidence of success in changing attitudes (Webster et al. 2018). However, with one woman killed every nine days and one man killed every 29 days by an intimate partner (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019), more than 320,000 victims of domestic violence a year (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017) and police attending a domestic violence incident every two minutes (Blumer 2016), effective short-term responses are critical to ensure the safety of current and future generations of victims.

Unfortunately, interventions designed to reduce domestic violence in the short term have been found to have limited effectiveness. Programs that provide effective support for victims do not necessarily reduce repeat offending or even victimisation (Dowling et al. 2018a; Mazerolle et al. 2018). Men's behaviour change programs have moderate success (Babcock et al. 2016). And police responses to domestic violence can reduce offending, but not in all circumstances, and there is little rigorous evidence from Australia (Dowling et al. 2018b; Mazerolle et al. 2018).

There is now growing support overseas for programs applying a focused deterrence model to reduce different forms of violence (Abt 2019). Briefly, this approach involves strategically applying law enforcement, providing social services and mobilising the community's moral voice, informed by detailed problem analysis (Braga, Weisburd & Turchan 2018). Recently, the Intimate Partner Violence Intervention (IPVI) has applied a focused deterrence approach in several US communities to address domestic violence. Early pilots have shown evidence of its effectiveness in reducing the most severe forms of domestic violence reported to the police (Sechrist & Weil 2018; Sechrist, Weil & Shelton 2016).

In response to recent well-publicised calls to seriously consider the potential of intervention models based on focused deterrence (Hill 2019), this paper draws on the latest Australian research to examine if and how this approach could be incorporated into policing methods used in Australia. For the purpose of this paper, domestic violence is defined as physical and non-physical forms of violence and abuse (eg psychological, financial and verbal) targeted at current or former intimate partners.

Focused deterrence and 'pulling levers': Strong theoretical and empirical foundations

Originally conceived as a project to reduce youth gun homicides in Boston, widely known as Operation Ceasefire (Braga et al. 2001), the focused deterrence framework has been implemented in dozens of cities across the United States. It has been used to address 'gang' violence, gun violence, drug market violence, prison violence and, most recently, domestic violence.

Program components and underlying theory

There are several program components that underpin the focused deterrence approach to violence, irrespective of the setting. These are:

- identifying a specific crime problem to be prioritised for action;
- establishing an inter-agency group involving local agencies such as police, corrections and social services;
- undertaking detailed analyses of data on offenders and groups;
- communicating directly with targeted individuals and groups to notify them that they are being closely monitored, inform them of the consequences of their behaviour and highlight action taken against other offenders;
- improving victim and offender access to support services and offering support to offenders to help them change their behaviour; and
- drawing on the full suite of legal actions available to law enforcement and other agencies to stop the offending behaviour of the most prolific and serious offenders (the 'pulling levers' component).

Although focused deterrence models are led by local law enforcement agencies, in close collaboration with partner agencies, this approach extends beyond traditional notions of deterrence within criminal justice settings. While deterrence traditionally relies on formal detection, prosecution and punishment to deter offenders, focused deterrence relies on sanctions perceived as swift and certain—factors that influence behaviour more than punishment severity (Kennedy, Kleiman & Braga 2017). Importantly, while the focus is on holding offenders accountable, procedural justice and increasing the perceived legitimacy of authorities are seen as integral to encouraging compliance (Dai, Frank & Sun 2011; Epstein 2002; Nagin & Telep 2017). Further, community voices are mobilised to oppose violence as a means of informal social control. Finally, the focused deterrence model requires the provision of support services before legal action is taken, rather than post-charge or conviction, as is often the case with criminal justice interventions.

Evidence of effectiveness

There is compelling evidence that focused deterrence approaches are effective in reducing a range of violent crime types (Braga et al. 2001; Braga, Weisburd & Turchan 2018; Sechrist, Weil & Shelton 2016). Early results from Operation Ceasefire demonstrated a reduction of more than 60 percent in youth homicide (Braga et al. 2001). A recent systematic review of focused deterrence approaches observed a positive result in 19 out of 24 included studies, while the meta-analysis, which pooled the results from multiple studies, revealed a statistically significant, moderate effect on crime (Braga, Weisburd & Turchan 2018). It was particularly effective in reducing serious violence among persistent reoffenders, including those involved in group violence.

In their meta-review of community violence prevention strategies, Abt and Winship (2016) concluded that focused deterrence strategies had the largest direct impact on crime and violence of any of the interventions they reviewed. Recently, Abt (2019: 87–88) argued:

...nothing works as well to reduce urban violence as focused deterrence...It does not work perfectly, it does not work every time, but it works better, on average, than anything else out there.


Applying focused deterrence to domestic violence: The Intimate Partner Violence Intervention strategy

Kennedy (2004) examined whether the focused deterrence/pulling levers approach to street group violence could be adapted to the problem of domestic violence. He argued that traditional approaches to domestic violence placed too great a burden on the victim while demonstrating little evidence of effectiveness. Further, there was evidence that, as with other forms of violence, a small group of domestic violence offenders were responsible for a disproportionate number of incidents and the most serious offending. The most prolific domestic violence offenders also tended to be generalist offenders, also committing other types of crime. Kennedy (2004) therefore argued in favour of developing a focused deterrence and pulling levers strategy specifically for domestic violence.

This led to the development of the IPVI. Detailed descriptions of the model are available elsewhere (see National Network for Safe Communities 2017; Sechrist, Weil & Shelton 2016). Briefly, the IPVI draws upon the same focused deterrence model used for other types of violence, but with some specific adaptations that ensure its relevance to domestic violence. This includes a ‘parallel affirmative outreach’ response to victims, while still focusing on offender accountability. The direct, face-to-face communication with offenders that is central to the focused deterrence model remains a major part of the strategy; however, this is supported by direct communication with victims as well. When action is taken against the offender, immediate outreach is provided to victims, both to assess their safety and to offer support services.

Underpinning this approach is an offender hierarchy—a set of criteria for determining the nature and intensity of responses to be targeted at an offender and victim (Figure 1). More prolific or more serious offenders are prioritised for action and receive more intensive responses. The most dangerous offenders may be incapacitated through any legal means possible, whether for domestic violence offences or other actionable offences, such as breaching community-based orders or weapons offences (the ‘pulling levers’ approach). Other offenders receive a less intensive response. Figure 1 shows the IPVI hierarchy adapted using Australian data on patterns of repeat offending reported to the police. For comparison, it also illustrates the more traditional response, whereby high-risk offenders receive a high intensity response, while other domestic violence offenders receive a standard legal response.

Examples of actions that may be taken by law enforcement are presented in Table 1. Note that these examples—which, once again, may be tailored to the local setting—are not unique to the IPVI. The unique feature of the IPVI is the highly structured and parallel delivery of intervention and support services for both the offender and the victim.



Source: Adapted from Teicher & Ott 2019

Note: Criteria are examples only; criteria should be developed based on detailed analysis of offender and offending patterns within local areas

Table 1: Law enforcement actions and parallel victim outreach protocol (example only)

Level	Law enforcement action	Victim outreach protocol
A	Legal action by any means available. Law enforcement may employ ‘pulling levers’ non-domestic-violence actions that do not require victim cooperation or that produce more effective sanctions than domestic violence options.	Victims assessed on-scene for emergency needs and offered all available support and services.
B	Offender must attend ‘call-in’ meeting where they receive moral and legal message against domestic violence as well as offer of help. Law enforcement message includes an explicit warning about enhanced agency attention offenders are now exposed to, including ‘pulling lever’ actions mentioned above.	Victim receives notice before offender is called in. Victim advocates conduct risk assessment and safety planning.
C	Police meet with offender face-to-face to communicate deterrence message explaining IPVI and legal consequences of further offending such as increased bail conditions (or revoking bail), enhanced prosecution, and tightened probation conditions.	Victim notified of available services. Victim advocates make in-person visits to offer services.
D	Offender receives letter from the police detailing close police monitoring, community moral message against domestic violence and personal legal consequences of further offending.	Victim receives letter from the police explaining IPVI and available services. Victim advocates conduct outreach.

Note: This protocol is based on the IPVI offender hierarchy reported by the National Network of Safe Communities (2017), rather than the modified hierarchy reported in Figure 1

Source: National Network for Safe Communities 2017: 3

Although the level of intervention that offenders and victims receive is dictated by the offender’s assessed likelihood of reoffending, it is important to note that all domestic violence offenders and victims are subject to some level of response. This means that all offenders, even first-time or low-level offenders, are the subject of legal and community sanctions, and all victims receive some level of support. In this way, focused deterrence represents a shift in the way we respond to all domestic violence incidents that come to the attention of the police, not just those involving the most prolific and dangerous offenders and the most vulnerable victims.

The actions undertaken as part of a focused deterrence model, such as those described below, are in addition to any criminal justice responses to recorded violence, such as arrest and prosecution for physically assaulting a partner. Focused deterrence models are not intended to replace formal legal proceedings.

Consistent with the focused deterrence model, the intended actions of police and partner agencies are directly communicated to offenders and victims. Offenders are told what to expect if the behaviour continues and, critically, police and their partners follow through on the promised course of action.

A central feature of the IPVI, and focused deterrence models more generally, is the ‘call-in’. This forum gives all partners involved in the project, including prominent community representatives (eg victims of crime advocates), an opportunity to confront offenders about their behaviour, explain what will happen if it continues and offer support to help them change their behaviour. Call-ins also allow representatives to communicate strong community norms that persistent abusive behaviour will not be tolerated. Specifically, community representatives tell offenders:

- domestic violence affects everyone, not just you and your partner;
- violence and abuse is wrong and is not consistent with our community values—the community condemns your behaviour in the strongest terms;
- the community cares about what happens to you and wants to help you; but
- if you reoffend, the community stands behind the police and supports them to protect victims from further violence.

Outside of the call-in, contact between the police and partner agencies with offenders and victims occurs on an ad-hoc basis, particularly when risk of violence increases. Lower-risk offenders and victims may not be required to attend in-person meetings with the IPVI partners. Instead, the core messages of call-ins (including community norms against domestic violence) are communicated through letters, or in-person contact with police officers.

The IPVI remains a relatively new intervention approach, and there has been limited evaluation of its impact. Results from the pilot site in High Point, North Carolina indicate a significant reduction in serious domestic violence—most notably, a substantial fall in intimate partner homicide (Sechrist, Weil & Shelton 2016). Moreover, there was a reduction in calls to police for domestic violence, a decrease in arrests, and a decrease in victim injuries related to domestic violence arrests (Sechrist & Weil 2018). Based on these early results, the IPVI has been identified as a promising approach to reducing domestic violence offending and related harms, and the US Office on Violence Against Women has provided funding to replicate the High Point model in other locations (Office on Violence Against Women 2018).

Would this work in Australia?

The section that follows draws on contemporary Australian research exploring both patterns of domestic violence offending and reoffending reported to the police, and the efficacy of police responses to domestic violence, to describe the arguments in favour of piloting a focused deterrence model in a local context. It also considers potential barriers to implementation.

Arguments in support of the focused deterrence approach

Repeat domestic violence offending is concentrated among certain offenders and places

Australian research shows that a relatively small proportion of domestic violence offenders are responsible for a disproportionate number of incidents (Hulme, Morgan & Boxall 2019; Kerr, Whyte and Strang 2017; Millstead 2016). For example, Millstead (2016) found that over a five-year period, seven percent of offenders in Victoria were responsible for 31 percent of all reported domestic violence incidents. Meanwhile, in the Northern Territory, eight percent of couples accounted for 35 percent of all reported incidents over a four-year period (Kerr, Whyte & Strang 2017). A relatively small number of perpetrators also appear to be responsible for the majority of domestic violence related harm. Sherman and colleagues (2016) found that two percent of domestic violence offenders reported to the police in Western Australia were responsible for 50 percent of the associated harm.

Likewise, although it impacts all communities in Australia, repeat domestic violence offending is concentrated in certain places (Di Bartolo 2001; Fitzgerald & Graham 2016; Rahman 2018). Victims in the most disadvantaged communities are significantly more likely to experience repeat domestic violence than those living in the least disadvantaged communities, based on studies of both officially reported and self-reported violence (Fitzgerald & Graham 2016; Rahman 2018). Di Bartolo (2001) found that the average number of police domestic violence calls was higher in areas characterised by lower levels of employment and family income and higher measures of multiple disadvantage. This may reflect a broader issue of structural disadvantage and the lack of informal resources and support (Voce and Boxall 2018), meaning police contact provides an important opportunity to intervene and improve access to vital support services.

This research suggests that more intensive interventions should be directed at more prolific offenders and offenders in communities where harm is concentrated to generate the most significant reductions in violence.

Repeat domestic violence offending rates are persistently high

A recent review of Australian domestic violence offending studies (Hulme, Morgan & Boxall 2019) showed that estimates of domestic violence reoffending are remarkably consistent. When measured using police apprehension data, around half of offenders committed a further domestic violence offence within four years (Kerr, Whyte & Strang 2017; Millsteed & Coghlan 2016). Studies using court conviction data reported general offending rates (ie not limited to domestic violence offending) as high as 60 percent within three years (Hulme, Morgan & Boxall 2019; Trevena & Poynton 2016). Further, the re-analysis of Tasmanian data reported by Morgan, Boxall and Brown (2018) showed that more than half of all police-recorded domestic violence incidents (54%) in 12 months involved a recidivist offender. Therefore, it is vital to develop interventions that hold perpetrators accountable and break the cycle of abuse experienced by many victims.

Risk of repeat offending and threat to victim safety is highest in the short term

While rates of repeat offending are high, they are not evenly distributed over time (Boxall & Morgan 2020; Kerr, Whyte & Strang 2017; Morgan, Boxall & Brown 2018; Poynton et al. 2016). Australian research conducted by Morgan, Boxall and Brown (2018) showed that the risk of repeat offending peaks in the weeks and months immediately following an offence. More specifically, the probability of reoffending peaked at around four weeks following the index incident. Similar results were found in a larger sample of adolescent domestic and family violence offenders (Boxall and Morgan 2020). This evidence suggests that swift responses that protect victims during this highest risk period offer the best opportunity to reduce repeat victimisation.

Indeed, over the past 10 years, government strategies have reinforced the importance of timely responses to hold perpetrators accountable (NSW Department of Attorney-General and Justice 2012). Police-issued protection orders (Australian Law Reform Commission 2010) and the Fast-Tracking Initiative of the Magistrates Court of Victoria, in which criminal proceedings for family violence matters are finalised within 16 weeks (Magistrates Court of Victoria 2014), are examples of practices introduced to provide a rapid response to domestic violence to protect victims from further harm.

Risk increases with each repeat offence

Much of the research into the risk of repeat offending has based the assessment of risk on a single event, taking into account prior history, situational factors, and offender, victim and relationship characteristics (see, for example, Fitzgerald & Graham 2016). What is evident, however, from recent research is that risk is not static. Instead, the risk of repeat domestic violence offending increases with every incident of violence. This pattern has been observed among both adult domestic violence offenders and young people who use family violence, and in different jurisdictions (Boxall & Morgan 2020; Morgan, Boxall & Brown 2018). The intensity of responses therefore needs to increase with each reoffence, and in response to escalating violence (eg non-fatal strangulation, threats to harm children), which is consistent with the approach taken by the IPVI.

Prior violence is a strong predictor of future violence

The maxim 'past behaviour is the best predictor of future behaviour' is as true for domestic violence offending as it is for offending more generally (Bulbeck et al. 1997; Fitzgerald & Graham 2016; Millstead & Coghlan 2016; Trimboli 2015). Two recent Australian studies have found that the frequency of prior offending is a strong predictor of reoffending within six months (Boxall & Morgan 2020; Morgan, Boxall & Brown 2018). Even when other factors are controlled for, prior offending is an important risk factor for reoffending, as shown in several studies of the predictive validity of risk assessment tools used in Australia (Dowling & Morgan 2019; Mason & Julian 2009; Millstead & Coghlan 2016; Ringland 2018). Prior breaches of protection orders are also a clear risk factor for future violence (Mason & Julian 2009).

Domestic violence offenders are often generalist offenders

There are undoubtedly factors that contribute to domestic violence that are unique to this type of offending (Fulu et al. 2013). These include attitudes towards violence against women (and women more generally), the power imbalance between male and female partners (particularly financial) and adherence to gender stereotypes (Fulu et al. 2013; Heise 1998). However, many of the risk factors for domestic violence are similar to those for other forms of violence and for crime more generally (Capaldi et al. 2012). It is unsurprising, therefore, that many domestic violence offenders are 'generalist' offenders, meaning they commit a wide range of offences (Boxall, Payne & Rosevear 2015; Millstead & Coghlan 2016; Ringland & Fitzgerald 2010). Weatherburn and Rahman (2018) found that two-thirds of domestic violence offenders in New South Wales had a conviction for a non-domestic violence offence. Meanwhile, Dowling, Boxall and Morgan (forthcoming) found that more than nine in 10 male domestic violence offenders proceeded against by the NSW Police Force had been proceeded against for other types of offences.

While Weatherburn and Rahman (2018) concluded that strategies designed to deter or incapacitate domestic violence offenders might help to reduce other forms of crime, it is also possible that policing strategies targeting other types of criminal offending might help to reduce domestic violence. This is part of the rationale for the pulling levers component of the focused deterrence approach, where other legal sanctions are used to deter or incapacitate offenders, particularly when there are barriers to the successful prosecution of domestic violence offences.

Traditional legal responses to domestic violence do not always reduce short-term violence

Police perform a vital role as frontline responders to domestic violence incidents, and act as the gateway to the criminal justice system. Police have at their disposal a number of legal responses that may help to reduce the short-term risk of repeat offending. The most obvious of these is arrest and removal of the offender from the home. They can also detain an offender in custody for a period of time, release them on bail, or oppose bail when they appear in court. Police may also perform targeted patrols or compliance checks in relation to protection orders and bail conditions.

Despite the important role of police as first-responders, there is limited Australian research on the impact of police practices on domestic violence offending (Dowling et al. 2018a). Further, the international research on police responses has produced mixed results. We know that mandatory arrest practices (common in the US) can be harmful to victims (Sherman & Harris 2013) and that the impact of arrest is variable (Mazerolle et al. 2018). Conversely, victim reporting to police and police attendance at domestic violence scenes may be effective in reducing repeat violence (Dowling et al. 2018a).

Protection orders are a common legal response to domestic violence in Australia, and the number of orders granted by courts in several jurisdictions over the past few years has increased (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 2019; Crime Statistics Agency 2020). They are intended to act as a specific deterrent to further abuse, particularly during high-risk periods (eg during separation, post-arrest and prior to court). Overall, only a minority of protection orders are breached by offenders (Poynton et al. 2016). A recent systematic review found that protection orders can reduce the prevalence and severity of repeat domestic violence (Dowling et al. 2018b). However, the same study found that orders are less effective in certain circumstances, including where offenders have a history of violence, or when victims have ongoing ties to the offender (eg shared children or ongoing relationships).

Taken together, these findings suggest that traditional criminal justice sanctions for domestic violence may not prevent repeat domestic violence, at least not in all circumstances. Criminal justice sanctions like protection orders, arrest and incarceration remain an important component of the focused deterrence approach, particularly given the emphasis on offender accountability; however, these sanctions are supported by clear deterrent messages, a tailored response to both offenders and victims, and strong community messaging.

A focus on procedural justice leads to better outcomes

A key concept underpinning the focused deterrence approach is procedural justice, which emphasises the importance of neutrality, respect, fairness and giving people a voice during police encounters with offenders, victims and members of the public (Tyler 2011). International evidence on the importance of procedural justice is growing, with a clear relationship between citizen perceptions of police legitimacy, trust and confidence, and satisfaction with police and with outcomes from interactions with police (Donner et al. 2015). There also appears to be an association with increased legal compliance (Nagin & Telep 2017). There is evidence that these findings also apply to domestic violence matters, with some research showing an association between procedural justice and increased satisfaction with legal outcomes among both victims and offenders (Gover, Brank & MacDonald 2007). There is even evidence that, when police act in a procedurally fair manner when arresting domestic violence perpetrators, rates of subsequent violence decrease (Maxwell et al. 2019; Paternoster et al. 1997). These findings even extend to domestic violence offenders who have been incarcerated as a result of their violence (Maxwell et al. 2019).

Focused deterrence is consistent with contemporary Australian responses to domestic violence

To the best of our knowledge, focused deterrence and pulling levers approaches have not been implemented in Australia in response to any type of crime. However, similar programs have been implemented.

In the early 2000s, South Australia Police trialled a new approach targeted at reducing repeat domestic violence victimisation. The model was adapted from work undertaken by West Yorkshire Police in the United Kingdom (Hanmer, Griffiths & Jerwood 1999; Lloyd, Farrell & Pease 1994) and involved classifying victims into a three-tier system, primarily using the number of prior incidents. An evaluation of the program found that repeat victimisation decreased, and there was an overall eight percent reduction in the rate of domestic violence (Morgan 2004).

More recently, the NSW Police Force implemented Operation Solidarity in Bourke as part of the larger Maranguka Justice Reinvestment Project, a major focus of Hill's (2019) recent argument in favour of short-term responses to domestic violence. Operation Solidarity involves a combination of home visits, proactive enforcement of protection orders, and engagement with support agencies to provide offenders and victims with access to services. Early evaluation results suggest a reduction in short-term repeat victimisation (Moore 2018), while the impact assessment of the overall Maranguka Justice Reinvestment Project conducted by KPMG (2018) revealed that both the number of domestic violence incidents and the reoffending rate among domestic violence offenders had fallen significantly since Operation Solidarity was implemented.

These are not the only examples of proactive policing models targeting high-risk offenders currently operating in Australia. Several jurisdictions have now implemented high-risk offender targeting teams or case prioritisation that allows for more proactive and intensive responses to prolific and serious offenders. These jurisdictions include New South Wales (Family and Community Services 2019), Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women 2019), and Victoria (Victoria Police 2019).

Similarly, integrated responses to domestic violence—involving two or more agencies, including police, working together to deliver a coordinated service to victims of domestic and family violence—are well established in Australia. They have been subjected to extensive evaluation, with some promising results (Breckenridge et al. 2016). This includes second responder programs, in which police and victim advocates visit victims after the initial police response to provide information and support. Second responder programs are effective in increasing victim disclosure of violence and use of support services; however, there is mixed evidence on whether they reduce repeat violence (Dowling et al. 2018a; Mazerolle et al. 2018).

What distinguishes these current practices from focused deterrence is the latter's highly structured approach to targeting both offenders and victims, the deliberate and direct communication of risk and social norms as a way of deterring repeat offending, and the parallel delivery of graduated interventions to offenders and victims as part of a single response model. Further, focused deterrence models ensure that all domestic violence offenders are subject to some level of legal and community sanctions and messages—not just those at highest risk.

Limitations of the model and issues to consider

Relevance of a model developed in the United States

Context is important. What works in the United States may not work in Australia, or it may need to be changed to suit the local context.

Different actors would need to be involved in delivering an Australian model, which may vary between states and territories and communities. Consideration will also need to be given to community representatives, and how a call-in process might operate. These are all vital issues to consider to ensure that a focused deterrence model could motivate behaviour change among offenders.

The offender hierarchy—including the thresholds for moving between categories and the information that is included when making these assessments—would have to incorporate risk assessment tools and frameworks used by local police agencies (Dowling & Morgan 2019; Mason & Julian 2009; Millsteed & Coghlan 2016; Ringland 2018), and state and territory and national risk assessment principles and guidelines (Toivonen & Backhouse 2018). It is important that different systems are not in conflict with one another. This is particularly important given the significant investment in the development and refinement of risk assessment tools across the country. It is imperative that this hierarchy be developed to suit the local context using local data, particularly as there is evidence of geographic variation in rates of repeat offending (Hulme, Morgan & Boxall 2019).

Balancing certainty with complexity

In a focused deterrence model, the nature and intensity of the response to both offenders and victims is based on the offender hierarchy and the likelihood of further violence. This hierarchy is also central to the deterrence messages for offenders; they are told explicitly that if they continue to offend they will be subject to increasingly serious sanctions.

This highly structured approach, and the emphasis on swift and certain responses, is critical to offender accountability and changing the behaviour of perpetrators. And, as this paper has outlined, it is well supported by evidence regarding patterns of repeat offending.

However, there is also growing recognition of the complex dynamics within abusive relationships. Relying on simple models of reoffending may risk undermining efforts to protect victims from further harm. Like most risk assessment tools, the offender hierarchy is based primarily on the likelihood of further reoffending; however, it does not identify those offenders whose violence is escalating in severity. Both dimensions of risk need to be considered. For example, an integrated risk assessment tool developed by Dowling and Morgan (2019) for ACT Policing includes 10 items for predicting repeat domestic violence within six months, and a series of 'red flags'—factors associated with more severe violence. These 'red flags' include strangulation, coercive controlling behaviour, alcohol/drug use and mental health problems. Police can use these items to prioritise cases for immediate, intensive intervention, regardless of the offender's risk rating.

Further, there is increasing recognition that desistance from offending, including domestic violence, does not happen over a short period. Most offenders do not just stop offending; rather, desistance is a process involving periods of de-escalation and relapse (Maruna 2001). There has been limited consideration as to how this desistance process should be accommodated within the offender hierarchy, or how interventions designed to reduce domestic violence should respond to violence that decreases in frequency or severity, but does not stop entirely.

Perceptions of police among highest risk populations

The effectiveness of the focused deterrence approach hinges, at least in part, on the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement. The negative perceptions of police in certain communities in Australia, such as among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Cunneen 2006), LGBTQI+ people (Miles-Johnson 2015) and culturally and linguistically diverse communities (Sivasubramaniam & Goodman-Delahunty 2008) have been well documented. Negative perceptions of law enforcement are also common among victims of domestic violence more generally (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017; Ragusa 2013). The reasons for these perceptions are complex and have been influenced by both historical and contemporary events. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the origins of these perceptions, which have been subjected to extensive analysis elsewhere (see, for example, Cherney 1999; Cunneen 2008).

These negative perceptions may undermine the effectiveness of interactions between police and offenders or victims from these communities. However, the focused deterrence model has been applied in largely black communities in the United States, where there is a long history of racial tensions with law enforcement (Brunson 2007). As Kennedy, Kleiman and Braga (2017) have written, even in this context it has been possible to effectively acknowledge past harms while also engaging positively with offenders in some of the most disaffected communities.

There may be challenges associated with communicating deterrence messages to certain groups. Effective implementation of focused deterrence messages in Australia will require partners—including law enforcement—to acknowledge past harms and to follow through on promises made with respect to offers of help and support, for both victims and offenders.

Tension around the use of incarceration

There is also a need to manage the risks associated with the use of incarceration, and the potential for 'net-widening'. Evidence shows that toughening policies on domestic and family violence may have contributed to the steep rise in imprisonment (Weatherburn 2018). Few would argue against holding offenders accountable, and incarceration has obvious benefits in protecting victims from persistent violent offenders. There are undoubtedly circumstances where incarceration is the only option available for protecting the safety of victims. However, it is not the only penalty available. Swift and certain are far more important than the severity of the punishment. Kennedy, Kleiman and Braga (2017) argue that strict enforcement of community-based sentences and order violations may also work effectively.

The issue of incarceration (and criminal justice sanctions more broadly) is particularly important to consider for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, who may be disproportionately targeted through focused deterrence models. This is not by design but a function of Indigenous over-representation in both domestic violence offender and victim populations (Hulme, Morgan and Boxall 2019). Indigenous people are over-represented in every stage of the criminal justice system, controlling for other factors (Douglas & Fitzgerald 2018). Any criminal justice response to domestic violence, particularly if it is led by police, requires careful planning to ensure that already marginalised communities are not disproportionately targeted and negatively impacted as a result. The same is true of focused deterrence models.

Responding to coercive controlling behaviour

The IPVI aims to reduce overall levels of recorded domestic violence by focusing on the most serious and prolific violent offenders and victims at the greatest risk of harm. Offenders are targeted on the basis of their contact with police for domestic violence offending. As a police-led multi-agency response, it is necessarily narrowly focused on the public safety outcomes it sets out to achieve. It may not—at least not directly—reduce coercive controlling behaviour by offenders who commit only non-physical forms of violence, such as psychological abuse, which is less likely to come to the attention of police (Kennedy, Kleiman & Braga 2017; Voce & Boxall 2018). But this is not to suggest that these other forms of violence are ignored when police, victim support services and other agencies come into contact with offenders and victims as part of this model. The question for practitioners is how to take these other behaviours into account when the offender hierarchy is applied and the level of intervention determined, particularly in light of recent evidence regarding the history of coercive controlling behaviour in cases of femicide (Monckton Smith 2019).

It is well recognised in Australia and internationally that physical and non-physical forms of domestic violence are harmful and have significant impacts on victims and their families (Coker et al. 2000; Lacey et al. 2013). This is reflected in the broad definitions of domestic violence included in state and territory legislation, as well as the National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and Their Children. That focused deterrence models are likely to primarily deal with physically violent domestic violence offenders and their victims should not preclude a trial in Australia.

Integration with other responses

Focused deterrence is not an alternative to other methods of reducing violence, such as primary prevention and perpetrator interventions (eg men's behaviour change programs). These programs fulfil a vital role as part of a holistic approach to preventing domestic violence. However, they operate on different time frames and at different stages. Primary prevention, focused on issues such as increasing gender equity and promoting healthy and respectful relationships during adolescence, aims to achieve generational change in attitudes towards women (Department of Social Services 2019). Similarly, perpetrator interventions have a longer term focus and can take months or even years to finalise.

Responses to domestic violence must address the different drivers of violence, the intersection between domestic violence victimisation and other vulnerabilities, and the different forms of violence and abuse that can occur. No intervention can reduce all forms of violence. Granted, focused deterrence approaches will not influence offender attitudes towards women, but this is not necessary to produce short-term behavioural change and reduce the immediate risk to victims. Interventions like focused deterrence must be delivered alongside primary, secondary and tertiary responses targeting individuals and communities, and these interventions should not be seen as being in competition with one another. Focused deterrence has the potential to fulfil an important role in preventing the recurrence of violence and abuse in the highest risk period following a report to police (Boxall & Morgan 2020).

Conclusion

A strong evidence base, derived from a growing body of Australian research, supports the adoption of a focused deterrence approach to domestic violence. The same patterns of violence and offender characteristics that motivated David Kennedy to develop the IPVI exist within Australian communities and offender populations. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that many of the characteristics of domestic violence used to inform the development of the IPVI—namely, the concentration of offending, the high rates of repeat offending, the generalist nature of prolific offenders, and the dynamic nature of risk—are not unique to the United States. Rather, contemporary research indicates that the conditions necessary to implement a focused deterrence regime are equally relevant in Australia.

This approach is not a significant departure from contemporary policing responses that have been implemented in Australia. Several police agencies have already implemented high-risk targeting teams, and partnerships between law enforcement and support services are a feature of Australian responses. The distinction between these responses and focused deterrence is the highly structured approach to targeting offenders and victims for intervention, the shared focus on both offender accountability and support for victims, the delivery of graduated responses based on the recent history of violence and risk of reoffending, and the emphasis on mobilising community voices to oppose violence by prolific offenders. Consistent with current Australian practice, all domestic violence victims and offenders are the subject of an intervention, albeit of varying intensity, not only those assessed as being at highest risk.

The strong theoretical and empirical foundation of focused deterrence approaches makes a compelling case for piloting it in Australia. Nevertheless, there are potential challenges to implementation that need to be taken into consideration when designing programs. However, they should not act as barriers to trialling this approach. None of the issues identified in this paper is insurmountable.

The evidence presented here suggests there would be benefit in testing the focused deterrence and pulling levers approach to reducing domestic violence reoffending in an Australia pilot site. This would need to be developed with a local community, supported by willing partners, implemented with fidelity to the IPVI (and principles of focused deterrence more broadly), and subject to rigorous monitoring and evaluation.

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Assessing the Impact of a Focused Deterrence Strategy to Combat Intimate Partner Domestic Violence

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Abstract

The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) represents for the first time anywhere the application of the evidence-based focused deterrence policing approach to combat intimate partner domestic violence (IPDV). Through holding offenders accountable, the strategy has resulted in 20% reductions each in IPDV-related calls for police service and arrests. Victim injuries have been significantly reduced and the 1-year IPDV offender recidivism rate is about 16-17%. The backbone of the OFDVI strategy is the multidisciplinary collaboration of law enforcement and community partners which has resulted in identification and resolving system issues which have historically allowed offenders to repeat IPDV without consequence.

Keywords

intimate partner violence, domestic violence, focused deterrence, offender-focused

Intimate partner domestic violence (IPDV) is a serious concern for law enforcement. It threatens the safety and welfare of citizens; it is typically among the most common circumstance codes for calls for service (CFS) for law enforcement agencies, and it places a huge demand on agency resources in terms of answering calls, especially to repeat residences, and making arrests (Friday, Lord, Exum, & Hartman, 2006; Klein, 2009). In addition, IPDV offenders are often recidivist offenders who rotate through the criminal justice system frequently for both domestic violence and other types of

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nondomestic offenses, which include other violent offenses (Graves et al., 2011; Kennedy, 2004; Klein, 2009).

IPDV has typically been viewed by law enforcement as a crime that law enforcement has little ability to prevent or suppress. However, beginning in 2011, the command staff at the High Point Police Department (HPPD) in High Point, North Carolina began to think differently about law enforcement's capacity to deter IPDV. Drawing upon their successes using the focused deterrence or "pulling levers" (Kennedy, 1997) model of policing to significantly reduce other types of violent crime in High Point, HPPD decided to adapt focused deterrence to combat IPDV. The High Point strategy, crafted through years of multidisciplinary planning and collaboration, became known as the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI). Focused deterrence works by concentrating law enforcement and social service resources on known offenders, presenting information to offenders and allowing offenders to use information to make a rational choice to stop offending, and providing community resources to offenders that may assist them in stopping their criminal or violent activity. After a known offender is identified, the offender is notified by law enforcement that violent behavior will no longer be tolerated and that there will be swift, certain, and potentially severe consequences for their behavior should they choose to reoffend. The notification process serves to increase an offender's estimation of risk associated with violent behavior, and therefore, reduce his or her likelihood to reoffend based on the offender making a rational choice to stop offending, or else face the consequences of their behavior.

This article will briefly explain focused deterrence and how it has evolved in High Point since the late 1990s to address new crime problems, including IPDV. Then, the operational components of the OFDVI as developed and implemented in High Point will be reviewed, including notification methods for IPDV offenders. The goals of the OFDVI strategy will be identified along with how success was defined and measured for purposes of evaluating the strategy's impact using a quasi-experimental design. Finally, the article will conclude with a discussion of the evaluation findings in terms of continued practice and replication of the OFDVI strategy to other sites will.

Foundations of Focused Deterrence and Evolution in High Point

The focused deterrence or "pulling levers" approach (Kennedy, 1997) revolutionized crime prevention and intervention in the mid-1990s ("Bucking the Trend," 2006; Kennedy, 2009; Schoofs, 2006). Beginning in Boston in 1995, Operation Ceasefire, initially known as the Boston Gun Project, combined problem-oriented policing with collaboration between law enforcement and community stakeholders to reduce gang violence in the city resulting in a 60% reduction in youth homicide, and launching several national initiatives building on the principles of focused deterrence (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl, & Waring, 2001; Kennedy, 1997, 2009). "Levers" refer to the sanctions that can be imposed upon offenders to deter them from committing future acts of violence. Levers increase the potential risks offenders perceive to be associated with committing those acts.

HPPD began implementation of the focused deterrence strategy in 1997 targeting gun violence associated with repeat offenders. In 2004, High Point began to focus on violence associated with open drug markets using call-in or face-to-face notifications with offenders. Over 4 years following focused deterrence implementation, violent crime associated with drug markets declined by 39% and drug crime declined by 30% (Kennedy, 2009). HPPD command staff has kept internal statistics on outcomes related to other iterations of focused deterrence: 12% decrease in 2008 of robberies associated with youth gangs, and a reduction in recidivism for youth notified after returning from detention centers from 86% to 36%. From 1997-2014, as a result of HPPD's continued reliance and adaptation of focused deterrence, the city's violent crime rate has decreased 64% while the city's population has grown 42%. High Point had an estimated population of 110,268 as of July 1, 2015, with a racial composition as follows: 53.6% White, 33.0% Black or African American, 8.5% Hispanic or Latino, 6.1% Asian, and 0.6% American Indian and Alaska Native (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Fifty-three percent of the population was female, 25% of the population was under the age of 18 years, 12% of the population was over the age of 65 years, the median household income was US\$43,015, and the poverty rate was 21.3% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).

The Problem of Domestic Violence in High Point

Having sustained the successful implementation of focused deterrence to deter violence in repeat offenders, open drug markets, and gangs, focused deterrence had become a way of doing business for the High Point community. Being data informed is foundational to the focused deterrence approach, and despite sustained reduction in violent crime related to previous initiatives, detailed crime analysis indicated that the remaining violent crime was largely due to domestic violence. Since 2004, there had been 16 domestic-related homicides in High Point, including three cases of murder/suicide where the suspect killed his partner and then himself.

Not only was domestic violence one of the primary causes of the remaining violent crime in High Point, but it also posed particular challenges for HPPD as it does for many law agencies worldwide. Specifically, in High Point, according to HPPD data, domestic violence disturbance calls were consistently the number one CFS. Over the 5 years preceding OFDVI implementation, HPPD had responded to an average of 5,098 calls per year, many repeat calls. Domestic violence is also personnel intensive. Because domestic disturbance calls are unpredictable, and often violent, they require a two-officer response. Patrol statistics from 2009 showed that HPPD handled 5,134 domestic disturbance calls, utilizing two officers for an average of 25 min per call. That amounted to a total of 6,295 hr committed strictly to domestic violence calls that resulted in 424 arrests. But perhaps most upsetting were the times in which the violence resulted in homicide. Between 2004 and 2008, 32% of the 52 homicides in High Point were domestic related, making it the single most prevalent circumstance code for homicide. And, it turned out that domestic violence offenders were prolific offenders of other crime types including drug offenses, larcenies, violent offenses including

nondomestic assaults and resisting arrest, and serious driving offenses (Graves et al., 2011). Their lengthy and varied criminal histories meant that there were “levers” available to pull on domestic violence offenders. For example, if the offender was a felon, they cannot possess a firearm or ammunition per federal law, and this could be used as a lever against the offender. Also, if the offender already had two misdemeanor assault on female convictions, a third conviction would be a felony per North Carolina state law and, therefore, would carry a stiffer sentence and greater consequences for the offender—also a potential lever against the offender. From 2000-2010, a total of 1,033 people in High Point were charged with a domestic-related offense. Those 1,033 offenders charged with a domestic-related offense accounted for a total of 10,328 charges, including both domestic and nondomestic charges. Thus, despite HPPD’s proarrest policy, aggressive prosecution, and the use of domestic 50B protective orders, domestic violence continued to persist in High Point.

Operationalizing the OFDVI Strategy

The OFDVI was crafted over a 10-year process using David Kennedy’s (2004) framework of focused deterrence to deter IPDV offenders. HPPD had put forth a great deal of effort to combat domestic violence, but those efforts were not having the desired impact as far as measureable decreases in incidents. Thus, HPPD was interested in adopting the OFDVI strategy. A multidisciplinary work group was formed and the strategy took root for the first time. The work group consisted of executive staff from HPPD, a command staff supervisor and investigators who would be doing police work on the ground, the district attorney, representation from the United States Attorney’s Office, HPPD’s crime analyst, the executive director of the High Point Community Against Violence, a representative from the victim resource agency, and researchers from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG).

The work group was tasked with operationalizing the strategy. A tiered approach was developed to categorize offenders based on their domestic violence offense histories. HPPD and its UNCG research partners used crime data to establish criteria for offender categorization purposes (Graves et al., 2011). The A-level offenders were the worst offenders and were prosecuted immediately. The B-level offenders would be notified in a face-to-face group meeting, given a personalized description of their criminal history and legal exposures, offered opportunities for services, and given a message from the community that IPDV would no longer be tolerated. The C-level offenders would have a face-to-face notification from detectives within 48 hr of their first IPDV arrest, and be given a thorough explanation of how IPDV would now be handled by HPPD and the OFDVI partnership. The D-level offenders were not charged with an IPDV crime, but would be notified at the scene of an IPDV disturbance call of the new approach in High Point. The tiered notification approach was adapted from the Domestic Violence Repeat Victimisation Project, also known as the Killingbeck Project, out of Yorkshire, England (Hanmer, Griffiths, & Jerwood, 1999), representing a hybrid of various notification methods that demonstrated, “. . . early intervention achieves the greatest reduction in repeat attendances [CFS]” (Hanmer et al., 1999, p. 25) for domestic violence offenders. Thus, the work group felt that identification

and notification of low-level or first-time domestic offenders could be similarly successful as an early intervention to reduce repeat CFS in High Point. In addition, the Killingbeck Project

... calls for a rational response from an offender; that is, the recognition that the actions taken in relation to him and the support given to his victim mean that it will become progressively more difficult to continue with his behavior without the likelihood of some negative consequences to himself and/or his behavior will become less effective in relation to his victim. (Hanmer et al., 1999, p. 26)

The “rational choice” model in Killingbeck’s Project is also the model relied upon for OFDVI’s effectiveness such that offenders will make the choice to stop offending due to the threat of certain and swift consequences.

The theory and procedural components of OFDVI revolved around the basic face-to-face notification method and messaging, the stripping of offender anonymity, and focus on the offender. The notification messaging given to IPDV offenders at the D, C, and B levels included that HPPD was taking a new stance against IPDV and that such violence would no longer be tolerated. Offenders were told that HPPD is taking ownership of the problem of IPDV and is driving strategy, thereby taking some burden off the victim. Also, offenders were told that the community stands in support of HPPD. Offenders were made aware of the swift, certain, and potentially severe consequences for new IPDV offenses and were offered resource assistance should they choose to accept. In addition to offender notifications, victims of notified offenders were also told of the new OFDVI strategy and how IPDV would be handled differently in High Point from that point forward. Efforts were made to notify victims prior to or at the same time that offenders were notified, so that victims would stay informed. For more details on the notification procedures and messaging, see Sechrist, Weil, and Shelton (2016) and Sechrist, Weil, Shelton, and Payne (2012). See Table 1 for identification, notification, investigative, and ongoing monitoring methods for offenders across all levels of the OFDVI strategy.

Novelty of the OFDVI Strategy

Addressing domestic violence through the OFDVI strategy was novel as compared with the traditional way of policing domestic violence. Traditionally, the thought was to provide a safe place for the victim to go and then provide some additional services and protection. Many victim advocates felt they had reached the limits to the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention if the criminal justice system continued to focus only on the victim. OFDVI was unique in that it took the next step, which was to focus on the offender and attempt to avoid revictimizing victims by alleviating systematic barriers in the judicial process. To shift the focus on the offender, the OFDVI strategy had to address issues or gaps within the criminal justice system itself that had socialized domestic violence offenders to perceive that they would receive only minor consequences for their offenses, and led offenders and victims to believe that domestic violence is not an issue of importance to the criminal justice system and the

community. Offenders had been reinforced by the system to continue their violence and escalate their behavior over time, which often resulted in serious injury or even death for victims. For example, in reviewing domestic violence offenders in High Point, one officer reported that when you

... see some [offenders] with eight or nine 50B [protective order] violations against them ... you are like how can that happen in our court system? How can someone be charged eight or nine times with different victims, not just one victim, and they are still on the street?

Domestic violence offenders had been socialized through their own experiences with the system to believe that the estimate of risk associated with domestic violence offending is low, and gaping holes in the criminal justice system had often allowed IPDV offenders to continually manipulate the system. Until the estimate of risk associated with committing domestic violence could be increased, the likelihood of offending would remain high. The OFDVI strategy was created to make the system focus on IPDV offenders, hold them accountable, and thereby increase the estimate of risk associated with domestic violence offending.

To enact change in the criminal justice system's response to domestic violence, there needed to be changes in the attitudes and behaviors of key players in the system, specifically the courts and law enforcement personnel who deal with the perpetrator. The OFDVI strategy was set up to create a partnership that would enact change at all levels of the systems involved with IPDV offenders through constant monitoring of those systems, ongoing feedback from parties involved with those systems, and a willingness of system players to be open to criticism, and be willing to change or affect change in others. Perpetrators must know what the community expectation is—i.e., domestic violence is no longer tolerated—and how the court system and law enforcement agencies are going to follow through to ensure that offenders are held accountable.

The OFDVI strategy was innovative in its ability to target offenders at earlier stages of offending, before the secrecy of offending entrenches, and the violence escalates. Over time, the offender begins to feel immune to consequences and the victim feels incapable of seeking help, as that is how they are socialized. The OFDVI strategy seeks to strip offender anonymity at all levels—from first-time offenders to those who have long criminal histories of domestic violence. With both community and law enforcement partners focused on IPDV and the offenders who perpetrate it, offenders will feel the additional scrutiny. IPDV offenders begin to understand that the strategy is in effect, the consequences are real, and the rational choice is to stop the violence.

Evaluation: Defining Success

HPPD command staff identified OFDVI's goals and the research team used the goals to develop research questions to measure specific strategy outcomes. The goals were to

1. Protect victims,
2. Change domestic violence offender behavior through deterrence, and
3. Reduce law enforcement resources needed to respond to domestic violence.

Researchers and command staff decided upon a set of desired outcomes to evaluate the success of the strategy: (a) reduction in IPDV CFS, (b) reduction in IPDV arrests, (c) reduction in victim injury in IPDV-related incidents, and (d) reduction in IPDV offender recidivism. A major challenge for the researchers in the evaluation was that there was no clear baseline IPDV data prior to implementation of OFDVI to compare pre- versus post-outcomes. Prior to OFDVI beginning in 2012, HPPD had no definitive coding scheme for IPDV arrests or CFS to separate *IPDV* data from *general domestic violence* data which may include other family members or members living in the same household, or to necessarily identify any and all arrests/calls involving intimate partners (IPs). It is expected that many law enforcement agencies may face a similar coding challenge with IPDV data. Also, there was no control group of offenders who did not receive the OFDVI intervention in High Point because HPPD operationalized the strategy at a city-wide level. Therefore, all IPDV offenders in the city received the OFDVI intervention. Given these challenges, the research team had to rely on available data and develop ways to best compare outcomes pre- versus post-OFDVI implementation. These challenges and solutions will be discussed more in the following sections.

Data Collection: Coding and Process Changes

Several data coding changes and processes were implemented by HPPD after OFDVI was initiated to more adequately and accurately capture and identify IPDV data. First, a new call code was created for CFS to the 911-emergency line to identify IPDV calls. Prior to the strategy, there was a general call code for domestic CFS, but that code aggregated general family or household violence and violence between IPs. The new call code to categorize IPDV was a first step in understanding the true volume of 911 CFS that were IPDV in nature. However, the new IPDV call code was not implemented until September 2011, which was only 5 months prior to the implementation of the OFDVI strategy, and meant that there was sparse baseline data about volume of IPDV CFS prior to OFDVI for comparison with volume CFS after strategy implementation for evaluation purposes.

A second coding change upon implementation of OFDVI was for arrests. A new code was created to classify IPDV arrests as separate from other “domestic” arrests. Although there was a “domestic” field included on arrest reports prior to OFDVI implementation, arresting officers did not always check the field when they should have, meaning that many IPDV arrests were missed in the pre-OFDVI data collection. Also, the domestic field was often checked when the arrest involved family or household members who were not necessarily IPs, similar to the challenge described with CFS. Therefore, the pre-data likely included arrests that were not truly IPDV-related and missed IPDV-related arrests that should have been included. After the OFDVI

strategy began, a new process was implemented by HPPD to ensure that IPDV arrests were accurately captured and identified. Command staff in the Domestic Violence Unit reviewed IPDV and general domestic arrests daily. In the event that the arresting officer did not appropriately code the arrest, the code was changed in the records management system and the arresting officer was notified of the error. This process assisted HPPD with more accurate understanding and tracking of IPDV-related arrests and recidivist offenders.

A general rule was agreed upon by the researchers and HPPD command staff for the crime analyst to use in pulling arrest data for analysis. Any arrests for assault on a female or any arrests with the “domestic” field checked on the report were included in the pre-OFDVI data. Given the challenges described above, some arrests captured using this rule may not have been true IP violence but may have been general domestic violence between other family members. It was also possible that not *all* IPDV arrests would be included in cases where charges other than assault on a female were not appropriately coded as domestic. However, researchers and command staff were confident that this rule would get a fairly close approximation of the true number of IPDV arrests in High Point prior to 2012. Without relying on the general rule, the narratives from the arrest reports for literally thousands of cases would have had to be manually read, reviewed, and categorized. Resources were not available for this time-intensive and tedious process. After 2012, HPPD began to more closely review all potential IPDV cases and categorize them appropriately and distinctly from general domestic violence. The challenge for evaluation purposes is that comparisons of arrests pre- and post-OFDVI implementation may not be true reflections of one another because of the difference in coding and safeguards in process that were implemented after the strategy began in High Point. It is expected that arrest data since OFDVI implementation is a much more accurate reflection of the true scope of IPDV-related arrests as compared with the pre-OFDVI data due to the way that data were coded and maintained prior to implementation of the OFDVI strategy.

Research Question 1: What is the effect of the OFDVI strategy on IPDV-related CFS?

Method

The crime analyst at HPPD provided the researchers with monthly counts for IPDV CFS beginning in September 2011 when the new call code to classify IP domestic calls distinct from general domestic calls was implemented. Given that the new IP code was implemented only 5 months before start of the OFDVI strategy in High Point, there was no baseline pre-OFDVI CFS data available to compare against the post-OFDVI implementation CFS. Therefore, a time-series analysis was conducted to examine the general trend in CFS over time. The monthly data were aggregated into 4-month totals for analysis. “Fall” consisted of months September-December, “winter” consisted of months January-April, and “summer” consisted of months May-August. A smoothing technique was used to “deseasonalize” the data to allow better examination of trends

in the data without the interference of seasonal effects. First, a seasonal index was computed using the ratio-to-moving average method as explained in Lind, Marchal, & Wathen (2012) and which is cited as the most commonly used method to compute a typical seasonal pattern. Then, the actual data points for each time period were converted into deseasonalized data points. The deseasonalized data represent the CFS trend with seasonal fluctuations removed, thereby allowing the trend over time to be studied without interference from seasonal effects. The data were used to compute the intercept (a) and slope (b) needed to solve the regression equation $y = a + b(t)$. The regression equation was then used to project a predicted or forecasted trend (Lind et al., 2012) for two additional years.

Results

The seasonal indexes for IPDV CFS computed for each of the three seasons are reported in Table 2. The seasonal index for fall was 96.88, which means that in High Point from September-December, IPDV CFS were 3.12% lower than the average season. The seasonal index for winter was 95.89, which means that in High Point from January-April, IPDV CFS were 4.11% lower than the average season. The seasonal index for summer representing months May-August indicates that IPDV CFS in High Point were 7.23% higher in the summer season as compared with the average season.

The deseasonalized and actual IPDV CFS data are plotted in Figure 2. Since the initiation of the new IP code for classifying CFS in September 2011, there has been an actual 20% reduction in IPDV CFS through year end 2014. When the deseasonalized data were used to project the expected trend for two additional years, a total of 37% reduction in IPDV CFS is expected through year end 2016.

Research Question 2: What is the effect of the OFDVI strategy on IPDV-related arrests?

Method

The crime analyst at HPPD provided the researchers with monthly counts for IPDV arrest incidents for years 2009-2014, using the general rule established by the researchers and HPPD command staff for the types of arrest that would be classified as IPDV. Years 2009-2011 would represent the pre-OFDVI arrest data. Years 2012-2014 would represent the post-OFDVI arrest data. The pre-OFDVI data were comprised of any arrest for "assault on a female" or any arrest that was coded as "domestic" by the arresting officer. Post-OFDVI data included any arrest that was coded as an IPDV arrest using the new IPDV arrest code which was only implemented after the OFDVI strategy began. The monthly arrests were then aggregated into quarterly data for purposes of analysis. The arrest data were subjected to a time-series analysis which included a smoothing technique to "deseasonalize" the data to allow better examination of the trends in the data without the interference of seasonal effects. As with the CFS data, a seasonal index was computed using the ratio-to-moving average method

Table 1. Offender Identification, Evaluation, Notification, and Monitoring.

Level A	
Identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System input • Graduation from B to A level upon third charge or violation of a DV court or protective order, have a violence record, use a weapon in a domestic offense, and/or be a convicted felon
Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear and present danger • Not amenable
Notification/deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigated for immediate prosecution • Notified when taken into custody that they are the highest level of domestic violence offender and that A-level classification led to immediate targeting for prosecution
Monitoring/investigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work group will determine quickest and most efficient way to move on the case • Spreadsheet will track date of selection and prosecution
Level B	
Identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System input • Graduation from C to B level upon second domestic charge OR violation of a domestic violence court order
Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to listen to notification messaging and make rational choice • Amenable • Appropriate levers to pull to make messaging impactful • Preferably on probation at time of notification
Notification/deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Called in for a face-to-face group notification by law enforcement, community, and resource providers • Provided with a custom legal notification letter of exposures • After notification via call-in, DV investigators will flag the offender in pistol as being a notified B-level offender
Monitoring/investigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offender is flagged in records management system and this will appear when they have any police contact • Activities will continue to be reported to law enforcement by community, criminal justice and service providers. • Any offender who reoffends will be reviewed by the Domestic Violence Unit for designation for the next level offender (A-level offender)
Level C	
Identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System input • Graduation from D to C list upon first charge
Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One domestic violence charge within past 48 hr • Must be offender's first domestic violence charge since strategy implementation
Notification/deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contacted face-to-face by Domestic Violence Unit detectives and a member of the High Point Community Against Violence, usually while in jail following arrest for domestic violence offense • Once official notification is made, Detectives will flag the offender in records management as being notified C-level offender

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Monitoring/ investigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offender is flagged in records management system, and this will appear when they have any police contact • Activities will continue to be reported to law enforcement by community, criminal justice and service providers. • Any offender who reoffends will be reviewed by the Domestic Violence Unit for designation for the next level offender (B-level offender)
Level D	
Identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System input • In most instances, patrol will respond to a domestic violence call and determine that the call involves intimate partners. • The officer will log the call as a DV/IP call, complete a field sheet, and file a report. This process will trigger an evaluation of the offender by the Domestic Violence Unit.
Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol officer responded to an intimate partner domestic violence call involving the offender, but no charges made
Notification/ deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recontacted by specially trained police officers within 48 hr • The deterrence message the offender receives will be specific to his or her situation and will warn him or her of pending police attention and sanctions if he or she reoffends • Offender will be flagged in records management system as being a notified D-level offender
Monitoring/ investigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offender is flagged in records management system, and this will appear when they have any police contact • Activities will continue to be reported to law enforcement by community, criminal justice and service providers. • Any offender who reoffends will be reviewed by the Domestic Violence Unit for designation for the next level offender (C-level offender)

Table 2. Seasonal Indexes Using IPDV Calls for Service Data in High Point.

Season	Seasonal index
Fall	96.88
Winter	95.89
Summer	107.23

Note. IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence.

as explained in Lind et al. (2012). Then, the actual data points for each quarter were converted into deseasonalized data points for each quarter. The deseasonalized data represent the pre- and post-OFDVI arrest trends over time for each quarter with the seasonal fluctuation removed. The actual pre- and post-OFDVI data and the deseasonalized pre- and post-OFDVI data were plotted on a graph as shown in figure 1. The pre-OFDVI data were plotted separately from the post-OFDVI data to visually demonstrate the difference in arrest trends pre- versus post-OFDVI implementation. The




Figure 1. IPDV CFS over time in High Point since OFDVI implementation. Note. IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence; CFS = calls for service; OFDVI = Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative.




Figure 2. Pre- and post-OFDVI quarterly arrest data in High Point. Note. OFDVI = Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative; IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence.

Table 3. Seasonal Indexes for Quarters Using High Point IPDV Arrest Data.

Quarter	Seasonal index
1. January-March	86.50
2. April-June	118.40
3. July-September	101.92
4. October-December	91.99

Note. IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence.

slopes of the pre- versus post-OFDVI arrest data were compared to determine whether there was a significant difference, which would indicate that the OFDVI intervention had an impact on arrests over time. The researchers used the data points in the pre- and post-OFDVI quarterly arrest data to compute the intercept (a) and slope (b) needed to solve the regression equation $y = a + b(t)$. The regression equation was then used to project a predicted or forecasted trend (Lind et al., 2009) for quarterly arrests for two additional years for both the pre- and post-OFDVI data.

Results

The seasonal indexes computed for each quarter in High Point are reported in Table 3. The seasonal index for Quarter 1 was 86.50, which means that in High Point in January-March, IPDV arrests were 13.5% lower than an average quarter. The seasonal index for Quarter 2 was 118.40, which means that in April-June, IPDV arrests were 18.40% higher than an average quarter. The seasonal index for Quarter 3 representing months July-September indicates that IPDV arrests for this quarter were 1.92% higher than the average quarter. Finally, the seasonal index of 91.99 for Quarter 4 indicates that IPDV arrests in months October-December were 8.01% lower than the average quarter. The seasonal indexes showed that IPDV arrests were lower than average in the colder, winter months of January-March in Quarter 1 and October-December in Quarter 4, and higher than average in warmer, spring and summer months of April-June in Quarter 2, and July-September in Quarter 3.

The pre- and post-OFDVI *actual* and *deseasonalized* quarterly arrest data in High Point are plotted in Figure 3. Quarterly arrests from Quarter 1 (January-March 2009) to Quarter 12 (October-December 2011) represented a 3-year span of pre-OFDVI data. During those 3 years, quarterly arrests showed an actual increase of 65.1% from 83 total arrests in Quarter 1 to 137 total arrests in Quarter 12. Quarterly arrests from Quarter 1 (January-March 2012) to Quarter 12 (October-December 2014) represented a 3-year span of post-OFDVI data. During those 3 years, quarterly arrests decreased 13.0% from 184 actual arrests in Quarter 1 to 160 total arrests in Quarter 12. The equation $y = a + b(t)$ was used to predict arrest data for an additional 2 years. The predicted data are shown in Figure 3 in the area of the graph with the shaded background and beginning at data point 13 along the x -axis. The coefficients for the slope and intercept for both the pre- and post-OFDVI data are presented in Table 4.




Figure 3. Percentage of IPDV arrest reports with reported victim injury across time.

Note. IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence.

Table 4. Slopes and Intercepts Obtained From Pre- and Post-OFDVI IPDV Arrest Data in High Point.

	Pre-OFDVI	Post-OFDVI
Intercept (<i>a</i>)	102.60	214.71
Slope (<i>b</i>) ^a	3.60	-4.50

Note. OFDVI = Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative; IPDV = intimate partner domestic violence.

^aThe difference between the pre- and post-OFDVI slopes was statistically significant, $t(20) = 5.70$, $p < .001$.

When looking at the forecasted post-OFDVI deseasonalized arrests, there was a projected 44.6% reduction in OFDVI arrests from the start of OFDVI implementation in Quarter 1 of 2012 to the end of the 5-year estimate in Quarter 20 (October-December 2016).

A significant difference was found between the two slopes comparing the pre- and post-OFDVI arrest data, $t(20) = 5.70$, $p < .001$, indicating that the OFDVI intervention had an effect on IPDV arrests over time. Specifically, after ODVI implementation, quarterly arrests have decreased significantly and are expected to continue to decrease as compared with the quarterly arrest data prior to OFDVI implementation. When

interpreting the slope (b), it can be stated that for every quarterly increase over time, we should expect to see a 4.5 reduction in IPDV arrests since OFDVI has been implemented. Likewise, if the OFDVI strategy was not implemented, we would have expected to see IPDV arrests increase by 3.6 for each additional quarter over time.

Research Question 3: What is the effect of the OFDVI strategy on IPDV-related victim injuries?

Method

Victim injury data were obtained from IPDV arrest reports. Victim injury was identified when the arresting officer reported that the victim had suffered injury by checking the associated box on the arrest report. The crime analyst at HPPD provided monthly counts of total IPDV arrests and total IPDV arrests with reported victim injuries to the researchers. The IPDV arrest and victim injury data were aggregated on a yearly basis for each year in 2011-2014 in High Point. Percentages of all IPDV arrests which included victim injury were calculated to determine whether victim injury declined from pre-OFDVI strategy in year 2011 to post-OFDVI strategy in years 2012, 2013, and 2014. Chi-square analyses were used to determine whether there was a significant difference between pre- and post-OFDVI injury rates.

Results

Figure 3 shows the percentage of total IPDV arrests resulting in victim injury across time for years 2011-2014. Also represented in the figure is the national estimate that 48.1% of all domestic violence incidents result in victim injury based on the *National Crime Victimization Survey* from years 2003-2012 (Truman & Morgan, 2014). The data show that since OFDVI implementation, the percentage of arrest incidents in which there was associated victim injury was lower than the national estimate. The percentage of IPDV arrests with victim injury declined from 66.8% in 2011 (pre-OFDVI) to 47.5% in 2012 and to an all-time low of 47.3% in 2014 (post-OFDVI).

When the percentage of IPDV arrests with reported victim injury in year 2011 (pre-OFDVI) was compared with subsequent years 2012-2014 (post-OFDVI) using Chi-square analyses, the reduction in victim injuries for years 2012-2014 compared with year 2011 was statistically significant for all years, $\chi^2(1) = 76.40, p < .0001$, for year 2012; $\chi^2(1) = 68.98, p < .0001$, for year 2013; and $\chi^2(1) = 71.74, p < .0001$, for year 2014.

Research Question 4: What is the effect of the OFDVI strategy on IPDV offender recidivism?

Method

IPDV arrest records were provided to the researchers by the crime analyst at HPPD for years 2009-2014, using the general rule described above to pull domestic violence

arrests records prior to 2012. For years 2012-2014, arrest records coded as IPDV using the new classification code implemented when OFDVI began were provided to the researchers. It should be noted that only arrests that occurred in High Point were available. Data about notified offenders were maintained by HPPD personnel within the Domestic Violence Unit using a notified offender tracking spreadsheet. When an offender was notified, their name was placed on the appropriate notification level (i.e., B, C, or D) in the spreadsheet along with the date they were notified and other identifying information about the offender. If an offender reoffended after notification, the reoffense was tracked in the spreadsheet along with reoffense date.

To prepare the data for analysis at the offender level, the data from the two separate data sources had to be merged so that variables in each source could be used collectively in analysis. Information about each arrest in the data provided by the HPPD crime analyst included date of arrest and type of charge. Information about the offender arrested included date of birth and sex. The researchers created a database for arrest records and restructured the arrest data by offender name so that the total number of IPDV arrests for each offender could be counted along with creation of other variables such as age of first IPDV arrest. The restructured arrest record database was merged based on offender name with data from the notified offender tracking spreadsheet which contained information about offenders who had received a notification message. Additional steps were completed by the researchers for data quality assurance purposes. For full details, see Sechrist et al. (2016).

Results

A basic description of the offenders notified at each level is provided in Table 5. Offenders across levels were mostly male, though females were more likely to appear in the lower levels than in the higher levels. The average age at time of notification was 34-36 years across notification levels, with the B-level offenders being the oldest group at age of notification. The B-notified offenders, as expected, had quite extensive domestic violence histories which included an average number of four prior IPDV offenses per offender and as many as 13 prior IPDV offenses for one offender. At the C level, most offenders did not have a domestic violence offense prior to the offense that led to their C notification. However, 36% of C-level offenders did have IPDV offenses prior to the offense that led to their C notification. Of those C-level offenders with prior IPDV offenses, the average number of prior offenses was two, with one offender having as many as 15 priors. At the D level, offenders were less likely than C-level offenders to have had a prior IPDV charge.

To track recidivism, the researchers calculated the overall recidivism rate for offenders notified since the strategy began (February 2012-December 2014). The 6-month and 1-year recidivism rates were also calculated using only those offenders who have had at least 6 months or 1 year, respectively, to reoffend since their notification date. The recidivism rates for notified offenders since OFDVI implementation are presented in Table 6, followed by the recidivism rates for IPDV offenders prior to OFDVI implementation (years 2009-2011) presented in Table 7.

Table 5. Characteristics of Notified Offenders in High Point.

	<i>n</i>	Sex	Average age	DV history
B level	62	93% male	36.3	Average of four priors; up to 13 priors
C level	1,057	77% male	33.9	64% no priors; average of two priors; up to 15 priors
D level	305	66% male	36.1	67% no priors

Note. DV = domestic violence.

Table 6. High Point Notified Offender Recidivism Rates.

	Total notified since strategy began	Total recidivism percentage	Total notified as of June 30, 2014	6-month recidivism percentage	Total notified as of December 31, 2013	1-year recidivism percentage
D level	305	16.7	230	11.3	199	16.6
C level	1,057	18.7	918	10.9	780	16.0
B level	62	21.0	55	10.9	48	16.7

High Point has experienced overall notified offender recidivism rates ranging from 13.9-21.0% across offender notification levels. An examination of the recidivism rates at certain points in time (i.e., at 6 months post-notification and 1 year post-notification) allows comparison of recidivism rates using the OFDVI strategy with recidivism rates using other types of offender interventions and potentially recidivism rates in other future replication sites. The 6-month recidivism rates for notified offenders in High Point ranged from 10.9-11.3% across levels. The 1-year recidivism rates for notified offenders ranged from 16.0-16.7% across levels. In comparison with the total 1-year IPDV recidivism rate before the OFDVI strategy was implemented (15.3%), the total notified offender 1-year recidivism rate for arrested offenders at the C and B levels (16.7%) was not statistically different, $t(2866) = .78, p = ns$. However, the caveats about differences in the pre- and post-OFDVI data in terms of coding and processes to ensure data quality should be used in interpreting data results about recidivism.

To further examine the reoffense trends of notified offenders, time to reoffend after notification was examined. Results are presented in Table 8. Across notification levels, a marked increase in recidivism likelihood occurred between the Day 1-60 mark and the Day 1-180 mark and this increase is greatest for the B-level offenders. The result suggests that the period of approximately 2-6 months post-notification may be a period of great vulnerability for notified IPDV offenders to reoffend.

Discussion

Overall, the evaluation results suggest that the OFDVI strategy has been largely successful in reaching desired goals. Specifically, in comparing pre- and post-OFDVI data, the strategy of notifying IPDV offenders in High Point has (a) reduced

Table 7. Pre-OFDVI High Point Offender Recidivism Rates.

	Total number of offenders with DV offense in year	Total recidivism percentage	6-month recidivism percentage	1-year recidivism percentage
2009	656	34.5	10.8	16.9
2010	588	24.5	8.7	13.3
2011	567	26.5	9.3	15.5
Total	1,811	28.7	9.7	15.3

Note. OFDVI = Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative; DV = domestic violence.

Table 8. Cumulative Recidivism Percentages for Notified Offenders in High Point at Various Time Points.

	D level (%)	C level (%)	B level (%)
Day 1-15	2.3	1.4	0.0
Day 1-30	4.3	2.9	1.6
Day 1-60	5.6	4.9	3.2
Day 1-180	9.5	10.5	11.3
Day 1-365	12.1	14.8	16.1
Day 1-545	14.8	16.9	17.7
Day 1-730	15.7	18.4	21.0
Day 1-935	16.7	18.7	21.0

the volume of IPDV-related CFS by approximately 20%, (b) reduced the volume of IPDV-related arrests by approximately 20%, and (c) reduced the victim injury percentage documented in IPDV arrests from 67% to 47%. The evaluation results do not appear to support the desired outcome of reducing notified offender recidivism; however, we do note that there were real challenges with identifying and collecting appropriate baseline pre-OFDVI data to serve as a comparison with the post-OFDVI data. The 1-year recidivism rate of 15.3% seen in High Point for IPDV offenders before OFDVI implementation was already low when compared with recidivism rates for IPDV offenders presented in the literature (i.e., 80% in Klein, 2009; 64% in Klein, Wilson, Crowe, & DeMichele, 2005; 30-50% in Harrell, 1991). The low pre-OFDVI recidivism rate may be attributed to poor record keeping and/or coding of IPDV-related reoffenses which may have falsely underinflated the true rate of IPDV recidivism prior to implementation of the OFDVI strategy. To HPPD's credit, they identified challenges present within the existing data coding processes, recognizing that record keeping regarding IPDV data was often vague, lacking detail about general family or household violence versus actual IP violence, and there was no agency policy in place for quality assurance of IPDV-related data. Upon recognizing the shortcomings of current data practices, HPPD implemented new coding schemes and processes at the time of OFDVI implementation and trained officers and staff on the new processes, and also instituted a quality assurance process for IPDV data to safeguard against

erroneous coding and to better capture the true nature and incidence of IPDV within the HPPD records management system. Therefore, records about IPDV-related incidents, arrests, and reoffenses became more accurate over time, but only after the OFDVI strategy was fully implemented in February 2012.

Once the OFDVI strategy was implemented, standard procedures and protocols for use across all IPDV responses were institutionalized within the police department and across partnering agencies. Within the police department, standard procedures and protocols were institutionalized through officer training, establishing a Domestic Violence Unit within the department, writing into and, therefore, formalizing the IPDV-response protocols in the department's standard operating procedures, and through consistent heavy commitment to the strategy from the top-down within the police department and across other partnering agencies. Prior to the implementation of the OFDVI strategy, there was not necessarily a consistent law enforcement response to IPDV. Consistent law enforcement responses to IPDV offenders, which ultimately hold offenders accountable and create clear, predictable consequences for continued IPDV behavior, are believed to be the driving force behind the IPDV offender behavior change seen in High Point.

We acknowledge the lack of data from the victim perspective as a limitation. For example, there is a need of further research about the reason for the reduction in CFS attributed to the OFDVI strategy. Are victims no longer calling because the offenders have actually desisted from IPDV? Or is the victim being prevented from calling by the offender through force, coercion, or otherwise? It is also possible that the victim may be choosing not to call because the victim does not want the offender to face the swift, certain consequences which have been promised through the strategy. In the original design of the OFDVI strategy, efforts were made to ensure victim safety and a protocol was established for following up with victims of notified offenders at specified time points after notification. Part of the rationale for continuing to contact victims was to ensure that no further violence was occurring. However, in practice, the victim follow-up protocol was very difficult to adhere to due to capacity issues with the victim service provider, victim confidentiality issues, safety concerns about contacting victims, and inability to collect and maintain good contact information from victims. It is strongly encouraged for sites who may seek to replicate the OFDVI strategy to include a victim follow-up protocol and a written memorandum of agreement (MOA) with an agency or personnel who would be responsible for adhering to the protocol. Furthermore, the MOA should include establishing a database to capture victim information and a method of sharing data about victims of notified offenders with researchers and other stakeholders that would also ensure victim confidentiality.

In an effort to inform the reason for the reduction in CFS over time, we conducted an exploratory follow-up analysis. Specifically, we examined repeat CFS over time. The percentage of overall CFS that were repeat calls decreased from 42.7% before OFDVI to 39.4% after OFDVI, which suggests that a large number of victims are continuing to make CFS even after their offender has been notified. Based on anecdotal feedback from officers who respond to IPDV calls, victims are continuing to make repeat CFS and report that they do so because they feel they will receive a

positive law enforcement response. Furthermore, the percentage of repeat calls that resulted in arrest has decreased from 15.3% before OFDVI to 13.5% since OFDVI implementation, suggesting that arrestable acts of violence are decreasing. Again, anecdotal feedback from officers is that couples are continuing to argue and may otherwise have unhealthy characteristics within their relationships, but that the offender is less likely to be physically violent after being notified. In other words, the offender got the message. Furthermore, officers report that victims are calling police right away when the potential for violence escalates and, as a result, when police do respond to the scene, they are less likely to have to make an arrest for assault or other IPDV-related offenses. These additional analyses were an effort to better inform the reasoning for the reduction in CFS attributed to the OFDVI strategy and to generate hypotheses moving forward. However, further research, particularly with victims of notified offenders, is needed to fully understand the underlying factors leading to the 20% reduction in CFS attributed to the OFDVI strategy.

It is interesting to note the perceived period of vulnerability to reoffend for notified offenders that occurs within 180 days after notification. Perhaps it is during this period that offenders are most likely to be released from custody if they were arrested and/or convicted for the IPDV offense for which they were notified and, therefore, have access to their victim for the first time since notification during the 2-6 month time frame. This is merely a speculative hypothesis and, therefore, further examination of this finding is warranted. However, further understanding of the factors related to subsequent reoffending during this period is warranted as other interventions may be needed with IPDV offenders during this time.

More research is needed to better understand why offenders stop IPDV. The focused deterrence strategy is based on the assumption that when offenders are presented with information to increase the offender's estimate of risk associated with their offending behavior, the offender can then make a rational decision not to continue with the offending behavior. When IPDV is the offending behavior in question, rational choice may be too simplistic to explain why the behavior occurs or desists. A literature review which examined motivations for IP violence perpetration (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, McCullars, & Misra, 2012) referred to the notion that aggression has typically been assumed to be a goal-directed behavior, wherein people are motivated to perpetrate violence with the expectation that the violent behavior will benefit them (Buss, 1961). Therefore, a strategy such as focused deterrence designed to enhance negative consequences and decrease the benefits associated with violent behavior would likely lead to less violence. However, the review by Langhinrichsen-Rohling et al. (2012) demonstrated that the most commonly studied motivators for IPDV were varied and complex and included control/dominance, self-defense, expression of negative emotions such as anger, communication/influence efforts or difficulties, retaliation, and jealousy/cheating. Other less common motivators included alcohol/drug use, sexual arousal, personality or character issues, modeling effects from family of origin, and playfulness/teasing.

The OFDVI strategy does not attempt to address the multiple motivations for IPDV, though it does attempt to decrease the excuses and justifications that offenders may

make for their IPDV behavior by ultimately holding the offender personally accountable for the violence, regardless of the circumstances that may have contributed to the violence. The B-level notification messaging for the most chronic and severe IPDV offenders does address several of the motivators of IPDV, such as the offender's desire to control the victim, the fact that some offenders may come from violent backgrounds and are modeling what they have seen in their own families, and that some offenders may have substance abuse issues. However, the clear message is that regardless of what the offender has experienced, there is no tolerance for IPDV and the offender is ultimately accountable for their own actions. The message is that there will be clear, predictable consequences for continued offending behavior. Therefore, the OFDVI strategy is not designed to change an offender's belief system about IPDV, but rather, the strategy is designed to influence the offender's decision making about whether to continue to use violence based on the threat of clear, predictable consequences for continued violence and subsequently change their IPDV behavior. In addition to the message of accountability, offenders who are notified through OFDVI are given a message of opportunity, wherein they are provided access to resources to address any issues which may somehow contribute to their violent behavior. Services would include batterer intervention treatment, substance abuse and mental health treatment, job readiness training, educational opportunities, housing needs, and others. However, unlike with violent offenders who have been notified through other iterations of focused deterrence, IPDV offenders rarely seek out and follow up with services. Future research which could include interviews with notified offenders would be helpful to understand what exactly it is about the notification message and process that may have affected the offender's decision to desist from or continue with their offending behavior.

Conclusion

Although we do acknowledge the limitations of our study, the initial findings support that the OFDVI is promising in terms of benefits to victim safety and decreased demand on law enforcement resources to respond to IPDV, without any associated costs to community safety or the law enforcement agency. One of the biggest benefits that has emerged from the OFDVI strategy, but cannot be quantified, is the formation of the multidisciplinary partner work group that continues to meet biweekly and communicates daily. The purpose of the work group initially was to operationalize the strategy and ensure that partners were accountable to one another in moving the strategy forward. What has resulted from the collaboration has been identification of major gaps in criminal justice and social service systems, and the work group has continued to modify systems ensuring the offenders can be held accountable and that the system is working collectively toward the common goals of the strategy. For further review of the composition of the work group and specific issues identified and resolved, see Sechrist et al. (2016).

We recommend the continued study of the OFDVI strategy in High Point and other communities that are seeking to replicate it. We have seen and expect

future adaptations to the OFDVI model based on research outcomes and individual replication site characteristics. Replication of the strategy will not be easy and new agencies will likely need to change data collection/coding processes as well as address systems issues through partnership to make the strategy effective. However, the OFDVI model provides a foundation for community stakeholders to begin discussing the problem of IP violence in their community and, if agreed upon by stakeholders, provides an approach to effectively reduce IPDV CFS, arrests, victim injuries, and potentially offender recidivism by holding the offender accountable.

Authors' Notes

The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

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Combatting Intimate Partner Violence Through Policing Innovations: Examining High
Point, North Carolina's Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative.

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Masters of Art in Criminal Justice

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

City University of New York

Courtney Michelle Klein

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Abstract

Since the early 1960's intimate partner violence has been a focal point of many political and grass roots agendas but, despite valiant efforts, an effective means to combat this social scourge has yet to be found. The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative in High Point, North Carolina, however, is a radical reconceptualization of intimate partner violence policing, which is based off of the wildly effective focused deterrence theory. This study examines the effectiveness of the OFDVI through re-offense rates, injury and calls for service trends, and various other measures provided by the High Point Police Department and compares the observed data against previous studies of other therapeutic and judicial interventions.

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Chapter I: Introduction

One evening in 2006 a High Point patrol officer was dispatched to a domestic disturbance call at the house of Annjanette Lloyd where her ex-boyfriend, Darin Jackson, was attempting to break in to retrieve a set of hair clippers. Without mentioning why, Jackson informed the officer that he had recently been locked up, then swore at the officer and left.

Six hours later an officer was dispatched to a nearby house where an 8-year-old boy in boxers told the police “Darin broke into our house and stabbed Momma.” Inside, investigators discovered Lloyd’s lifeless body in bed. She had succumbed to sixty three stab wounds and blunt trauma to the head. A piece of her neck was missing. Her jaw bone was protruding from her cheek.

When Jackson was located at his mother’s house and taken for questioning he confessed the killing to Detective Jerry Thompson. He showed no remorse and flexed his chest muscles for his booking photo. Upon running a background check, Detective Thompson found himself frustrated. Just five days earlier Jackson had been arrested for assaulting Lloyd. After a single night in jail he was released. Several domestic violence reports had been filed on Jackson and Lloyd during their short four month relationship, and neighbors said the couple often fought. Jackson also had a prior conviction for trespassing and attacking a man with a knife.

Though this tragedy did not immediately spark reform, it set the stage for what would eventually become a stunning re-imagination of police work. In 2010, High Point Police Chief Marty Sumner (then a Major) contacted David Kennedy, the architect of Focused Deterrence policing and the moving force behind its early successes in Boston. Chief Sumner was aware of a paper Kennedy had written and presented at the 2002 domestic violence conference at the Urban Institute in Washington, which had been met with great contempt and castigation. Sumner, however, had seen Kennedy’s methods work and when intimate partner violence became the most pressing crime in High Point he truly

believed it was the answer (Tucker, 2013).

Domestic assault, or more accurately as will be discussed, intimate partner violence is a scourge that afflicts every community in every country across the world. It annually touches the lives of 4.8 billion people worldwide and is a regular concern for police forces and legislatures across the nation (Catalano, *et al.*, 2009). Though addressing intimate partner violence has been a central political concern since, at least, the 1960's no method has been introduced which offers measurable, sustainable reductions in overall violence.

The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative, however, as first designed and implemented in High Point, North Carolina represents a dramatic reconceptualization of policing practices and offers hope for a new method of combatting this interpersonal violence. This study examines the effectiveness of the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative while measuring up how it compares to the more traditional, therapeutic forms of batterer intervention. In examining the history and theory behind intimate partner violence and domestic violence on whole this study hopes to elucidate the many practical and abstract elements which can be attributed to the problem in order to investigate an approach which not only reduces the incidence of violence and incidences of new victims, but also offers a cost-effective and sustainable means, thus resulting in long-term change.

Chapter II: Review of Related Literature

Defining Intimate Partner Violence

The oft used phrased “domestic violence” includes an amalgamation of any form of violence which takes place within the home or within the contexts of family-like relationships. This includes child and elder abuse, as well as intimate partner violence (IPV). Traditionally, terms such as “domestic abuse,” “domestic violence,” “wife beating,” and “battering” have been used in describing instances wherein one partner in an intimate relationship utilizes some kind of force to exact compliance, revenge, or another form of control over the second partner (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Such terms, however, unnecessarily narrow the scope of the problem and pose hurdles in the face of increasing knowledge.

For example, the term *wife beating* only allows for 1) a female victim in 2) a heterosexual relationship that is 3) recognized by the state through a marriage license. Such terminology, then, does not allow researchers, legislators, medical personnel or advocates to capture or treat male victims of abuse, female victims in homosexual relationships or individuals who are suffering abuse at the hands of a dating or co-habiting partner. This term, along with the slightly more inclusive *spousal abuse* implies that such acts of violence occur only within the confines of marriages, obscuring the many cases of violent behavior occurring between non-married intimates. Though terminology such as *dating violence* has been introduced, this particular phrase implies that there is a differential etiology behind acts of “spousal abuse” and “dating violence.” Current theoretical frameworks simply do not support this notion, and so this phraseology will be eschewed.

Of these terms, *domestic violence* and *intimate partner violence* appear to be the most common in the literature (Mears, 2003). Perhaps counterintuitively, in the face of recent and continued prominence of such criminal activity as a national and international policy concern, there is remarkably little congruence between interested parties (and even within parties) pertaining to the simple definition of “intimate partner violence” or even

its proper utilization (DeKeserdy & Schwarz, 2001). In many cases, these two terms are essentially interchangeable. For example, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice which aims to “provide leadership in developing the nation's capacity to reduce violence against women and administer justice for and strengthen services to victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking (Department of Justice, 2012).” This office not only funds research on sexual violence prevention policy and treatment options, but leads much of the relevant research. The OVW continues to utilize “domestic violence” as the leading definition in their major operations, defining it thusly:

...a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. Domestic violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of action that influence another person. This includes any behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure or wound someone (Department of Justice, 2013).

This robust definition covers the many sub-types of domestic violence (which the OVW further defines) and captures the wide breadth of intimate relationships.

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has recognized such criminal actions as a “serious, preventable public health problem that affects millions of Americans (Saltzman, Fanslow, McMahon, & Shelley, 2002)” and has also dedicated a level of research and prevention efforts to the subject. The CDC, however, prefers the term “intimate partner violence,” which it maintains “[describes] physical, sexual or psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse.” For clarity, the CDC's definition also declares that “[t]his type of violence can occur among heterosexual or same-sex couples and does not require sexual intimacy. IPV can vary in frequency and severity. It occurs on a continuum,

ranging from one hit that may or may not impact the victim to chronic, severe battering.” The obvious similarities in these definitions are evident and both present unique elements unseen in the other.

On state levels, utilization of the terms “domestic violence” and “intimate partner violence” are also disparate. The Colorado Bureau of Investigation, for example, utilizes *domestic violence* in its uniform definitions, citing it as “an act of violence upon a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship. Domestic violence also includes any other crime against a person or any municipal ordinance violation against a person when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship (Colorado Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).” The New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services, on the other hand, delineates “domestic violence” into two categories: Intimate Partner and Other Family, but does not appear to provide a specific definition of the umbrella term (New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.).

Generally speaking, the differences between “domestic” and “intimate partner” violence may be seen essentially as a case of specificity, with IPV acting as a sub-category of the larger domestic violence problem, sitting among parental abuse (Buzawa & Hirschel, 2009), child abuse, child sexual abuse, elder abuse, and sibling violence (Sampson, 2007). While domestic violence laws do not differentiate between IPV and other forms of familial violence (Buzawa & Hirschel, 2009), current investigations acknowledge that it is a critical problem which occurs along many dimensions, takes many forms and arises under a range of different conditions (Meares & Fisher, 2007) and is thus deserving of its own body of research.

As may be evident, the phrase “intimate partner violence” is relatively new to both the academic and colloquial realms. A brief search for the key phrase “Intimate Partner Violence” through LexisNexis Academic suggests that the earliest uses of this particular

phrase reach back only to August 12, 1996 in an article from the Daily Record which briefly discusses domestic victimization by Jewish women (“One in five,” 1996). Since then, the term has been utilized with increasing frequency.

Social Constructs of Intimate Partner Violence. IPV and sexual assaults are the most common female-focused victimization in any society, and are overwhelmingly male-on-female (Catalano, Smith, Snyder & Rand, 2009; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). These crimes are generally seen as involving psychological and sexual violence, but may also entail emotional, psychological and financial abuse. Unlike sexual assault, IPV necessitates a prior victim/offender relationship (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). The general national profile of IPV indicates that approximately 4.3 per 1,000 females age twelve or older will be victimized by a current or former intimate partner. This is five times more than males (Catalano, *et al.*, 2009).

Our social constructions of an *ideal victim* of IPV may not meet the muster of the true victim profile which, in turn, may hinder social and official responses. These constructs tend to paint a picture of a middle-age, working class white woman, a good mother and a devoted wife who has done everything in her power to appease her abuser and obtain protection from the criminal justice system. Yet, despite her gallant efforts to reduce the violence, these exact same social constructs make it nearly impossible for many victims to achieve victim status (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). They demand that the IPV victim experience heinous, extreme abuse to be truly recognized as innocent. If she dare defend herself or her children, particularly with physical aggression, she is now just as guilty. Though sexual assault is frequently involved in these cases (Belknap, 2007), victims who report rape are regularly accused of lying to get even. Unlike her abuser, the victim is guilty until proved innocent, and this is made abundantly clear to her through victim blaming. “Why didn't you leave?” “Well, what did you say to make him angry? Just don't say that again.” “Is it really that hard to keep the house clean?” She will, more than likely, be required to explain why the violence against her has occurred, why she did not stop it,

and why she remained in the relationship. In many cases, women who possess a master status will be more likely to be awarded victimhood, but the social constructs of intimate violence will trump her master status (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

In order to be an ideal, or “worthwhile” victim in the eyes of her peers, the victim must express no blame but she must've also attempted to stop the violence. Counterintuitively, she must be a “good,” passive woman – but if she does not display some level of active resistance she may be accused of liking the abuse. Resisting is required to show lack of consent, but too much resistance means she is aggressive, escalating the abuse to mutual combat (Grady, 2002; Straus, 1990; Straus & Gelles, 1986). These seemingly infinite paradoxes arising from difficult to escape social constructions make it difficult for an abused woman to seek help, but also to define *herself* as a victim.

Further complicating these barriers, cultural views of women often seem to desperately cling to archaic notions that women are subjugated to second-class citizenship in order to *protect* them from the dangers and ills of the world. Women are simply not rational enough to make difficult decisions; ruled by emotions, women are often still not afforded the same agency as men (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). While many, today, argue that, at least on a legal level, this prejudice has been erased, research simply does not support this (Belknap, 2007). Implicitly intertwined into the American judicial and legislative system is this misogynistic history, which – though it has become more egalitarian – continues to hold male gender ideologies and examine issues through a male lens (Garcia & Schweikert, 2010; Naffine, 1987).

Forms of Intimate Partner Violence. IPV is often characterized simply through physical or sexual abuse but in reality it encompasses far more, such as emotional, material, and financial forms of abuse. Generally, the behavior is part of an ongoing pattern of abuse or controlling tactics, and must occur within an intimate relationship that is legally or socially recognized (Shannon, 2009). The dynamics of intimate partner violence are complex, defying any single classification, and could easily fill the contents of copious

volumes. For this reason, here only a brief overview of the broad strokes of IPV breeds will be provided. It is important, however, to note that definitions vary greatly between the legal and social perspectives as well as according to the victimized population (Gosselin, 2007). For example, from the criminal justice perspective, IPV is “an altercation of sufficient severity to justify law enforcement intervention (Gosselin, 2007 p. 408)” while from a social perspective it is “a pattern of violent or coercive behaviors with which one intimate partner attempts to control the other (Gosselin, 2007 p. 409).” Generally speaking, however, specific kinds of abuse (not including homicide) can be categorized under one of the following types:

Physical abuse is when the abusive partner employs force (sometimes threat of force) that may result in bodily harm, physical pain or impairment (Shannon, 2009). This can include hitting, kicking, punching, biting, restraining, and so on. Often, such abuse results in broken blood vessels, bones or teeth; bruising; internal injury; burns; marks; missing or pulled hair; dislocations; sprains or death (Gosselin, 2007).

Sexual abuse is using physical force or emotional coercion to instigate a sexual act with a partner when the partner does not consent (Shannon, 2009). This can include rape, indecent touching or fondling, marital rape, forced prostitution or forced pornography (Gosselin, 2007). Recently, “reproductive coercion” wherein abusive men force their partner to become pregnant (often through sabotaging their birth control methods) has become a particular area of concern (Marcotte, 213; Miller, Jordan, Levenson & Silverman, 2010) and several attempts have been made to criminalize the behavior (Culp-Pessler, 2013).

Emotional abuse occurs when one partner willingly inflicts emotional anguish by threat, humiliation, intimidation or any other means (Shannon, 2009). Though this kind of abuse doesn’t usually escalate to the level of a criminal offense it is often used as a mitigating factor. Emotional abuse is rarely found alone as it is often coupled

with psychological abuse, and elements of it can be found in all other discussed categories (Gosselin, 2007).

Psychological abuse differs from emotional in that the goal is to render the victim psychologically unstable and thus dependent on the abuser. Elements of emotional abuse, however, are present. Examples of this abuse may include convincing the victim that his or her family and friends are out to hurt them, moving items and convincing the victim they were always that way, punishing the victim for insignificant transgressions, or threatening or staging false suicides. If the victim becomes confused or psychologically damaged enough these forms of torment may rise to the level of criminal neglect or abuse. The death ritual, a particularly poignant form of psychological abuse where escalating patterns of abuse by death threats, is the most severe. Generally this occurs when the offender talks about weapons, begins to display them, and then eventually brandishes one all while making threats to the victim. In extreme cases, the offender may even take the victim into a secluded area and threaten to kill them if they try to leave the relationship (Gosselin, 2007).

Economic abuse is the illegal or inappropriate use of an individual's funds or property by an intimate partner. This can include behavior such as taking the victim's paycheck and only providing them a small "allowance," destroying the victim's property in order to elicit control or emotional anguish, fraud, extortion or promises of care in exchange for money (Gosselin, 2007).

The Demographics of Intimate Partner Violence

Intimate Partner Violence was long thought to be a crime that largely plagued middle-class, white women at the highest rates, but this is regularly demonstrated to be untrue (Kennedy, 2009).

The Victims. The typical profile for a victim of intimate partner violence is a young, black female who has achieved only a low level of education, is unmarried and

impoverished (Karmen, 2012). Annually, we can expect nearly 4.8 million victims of physical and sexual violence annually (Catalano, *et al.*, 2009).

Over all, females are victimized at a rate of 5.9 per 1,000 females age 12 and older (Catalano, 2012) but specific rates of victimization differ based on race and ethnicity (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). As of 2010, Black or African American women were victimized at the highest rates (about 7.8 per 1,000 black women in the population), followed by white women (6.2 per 1,000), and Hispanic or Latina women (4.1 per 1,000). Women of other ethnic groups were victimized at the lowest rates (3.8 per 1,000). Women between the ages of 25 and 34-years old are victimized at the highest rates (12.1 per 1,000)

Demographic Characteristic	2010 Rate/1,000 persons age 12+	Percent Change		
		2005 – 2010	1994 – 2010	
Sex	Female	5.9	+3.3	-63.2
	Male	1.1	-39.5	-64.5
All Female				
Race/Ethnicity	White	6.2	+14.6	-60.5
	Black/African Amer.	7.8	+9.2	-61.6
	Hispanic/Latina	4.1	-30.8	-78.1
	Other	3.8	-47.2	-40.2
Age	12-17	0.9	-59.2	-88.2
	18-24	9.7	-34.2	-71.5
	25-34	12.1	+15.9	-62.0
	35-49	9.6	+34.4	-46.6
	50 or older	1.3	+44.1	-12.8

Figure 2.1. Rates of Victimization in 2010. Adapted from Catalano, 2012

populations between 2005 and 2010 (Catalano, 2012). While the rates are still nowhere near as high as in previous years, the emerging trend is still something to be aware of. Figure 2.1 summarizes these findings.

Very little consensus has been reached pertaining to the rate of victimization faced by men. At present, there is a robust debate among researchers about the level of such violence committed by women and the extent to which hit is in self-defense or fighting back (see Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003 for a discussion).

It is difficult to study economic status. Research does indicate that victims are found across all economic backgrounds but that those in poverty, especially women, are more likely to experience severe violence (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). Poor, homeless and

welfare receiving women are more likely to experience IPV (Josephson, 2005) and welfare recipients report such abuse in 15 – 20% of cases, as compared with 0.93% in the general population (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

The Offenders. Accurate and reliable information about the offending populace on whole is scant and difficult to come by. Usually, descriptive statistics focus only on the area under study which makes generalizing to the larger population a difficult process. This is likely due to a long history of focusing IPV intervention efforts on helping victims avoid patterns of abusive relationships rather than on addressing offender behaviors and characteristics. For this reason, the presented offender statistics were drawn from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) through the Easy Access to NIBRS: Victims of Domestic Violence database for 2010 (Puzzanchera, Smith, & Kang, 2012). While these statistics may be more generalizable overall, it is important to note that not all agencies or states report to NIBRS. In 2007, 6,444 agencies contributed to the data, representing only 25% of the U.S. Population and the crime statistics collected by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) (FBI, n.d.). By June 2012, thirty two states had been certified to report NIBRS data to the FBI, and three additional states plus the District of Columbia had individual agencies submitting data (Justice Research and Statistics Association, n.d.).

The NIBRS database includes all forms of domestic violence in its statistics (i.e. elder abuse, child abuse, parental abuse), but for the purposes of this present study only intimate partner statistics will be reported (this includes the categories of spouse, boyfriend/girlfriend, homosexual relationship, and ex-spouse). Of the 586,038 incidents of domestic violence reported to NIBRS in 2010, 366,186 (62.5%) of cases were perpetrated by an intimate partner. Across all IPV crimes, 32.5% of offenders were the victim's spouse, 61.4% were dating partners, 1.6% were classified as a “homosexual partner” (the database does not differentiate between common law, married, or dating in homosexual relationships), and 4.4% were ex-spouses. The offenders were male in 62.1% of all reported

incidents, female in 35.1% and unreported in the remaining 0.9%. In cases where offender age was reported, 34.9% were between the ages of 21 and 29, 28.1% between 30 and 39, 18.7% between 40 and 49, 8.6% older than 50, 7.9% between 18 and 20 and 1.3% between the ages of 12 and 17.

This analysis intended to examine offender characteristics based on race, but during analysis it became clear that the sample may not be representative in this case when the database reported no incidents of an Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander as the offender. Though there is no data indicating that these individuals offend at a high rate, there is also no reason to believe that not a single incident occurred throughout the entire 2010 reporting period. This does call all other data into question, as well, though the statistics reported match expected trends.

Ultimately, the conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that at typical offender is most likely the male dating partner of the victim and young, most likely between the ages of 21 and 39 (62.95% of cases).

The Crimes. In its domestic violence data, the NIBRS reports on ten different crimes: murder/non-negligent manslaughter, kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an object, forcible fondling, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault and criminal intimidation. Spouses were implicated in 48.4% of IPV homicides and dating partners closely following at 46.6%. 72.9% of all incidents reported were simple assaults, of which dating partners were implicated in 61.6% of, spouses in 33.8%, ex-spouses in 2.9% and homosexual partners in 1.6%. Aggravated assaults, which often lead to criminal charges, accounted for 10.8% of reported incidents. Of these, dating partners were guilty of 63.8% of cases, spouses of 30.9%, ex-spouses of 3.1% and homosexual partners of 2.2%. Dating partners were implicated in 74.8% of all reported sexual assaults (including forcible rape, forcible sodomy and rape with an object), spouses in 18.6%, ex-spouses in 4.9%, and homosexual partners in 1.6% (Puzzanchera, *et al.*, 2012)

The History of IPV in the United States

In understanding the scope of any problem, it is important to first understand its context. Unlike crimes such as murder and robbery, however, which have long been considered criminal acts, IPV has only relatively recently been acknowledged as morally reprehensible, let alone proscribed by law. In this particular situation, as well, such knowledge is necessary to understand how truly radical, profound, and avant garde the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative is, not only compared to other programs currently in practice, but in the historical context of police responses to domestic violence and IPV.

Historical perspectives of Social Constructions of Womanhood and Intimate Partner Violence. The earliest legal code to concern itself with violence against women was the Code of Hammurabi, in which there is an undeniable foundation for men's domination over women and children (Horne, 1915). This patriarchy is frequently considered by experts to be “the foundation that provides our current normative assumptions of male superiority and intimate partner violence (Garcia & McManimon, 2011, p. 66).” Because of this early legal assentation, husbands have been afforded the right to physically reprimand their intractable wives in most societies (Garcia & McManimon, 2011), and this has been the underlying rationale for brutality against women.

There is little doubt that social constructs of gender roles and womanhood are the primary culprits in obscuring IPV from the cultural spotlight for so many centuries. While this is a generally accepted notion, particularly in the academic literature, it is less commonly recognized that many of the elements which lead to such definitions are written into the American legal system, the history of which is steeped in the traditions of English common law. Under this system, the marriage of a man and woman represented their becoming one in a legal and social manner, at which point the woman's rights were subordinated by the man's, essentially suspending her legal existence during marriage (Gosselin, 2000).

Two of the most frequently cited common law references to violence against women are Lord Hale's early establishment of the marital exemption from rape (Hale, *History of Pleas of the Crown*, as cited in *People v. Liberta*, 1984), from which the "contractual consent" theory is derived, and Sir Francis Buller's *Rule of Thumb* proclamation, which allows a man to beat his wife with a stick so long it is not thicker than his thumb (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). These social constructions of a husband's rights over his wife were adopted into American legal practice, thus shaping the approach to IPV before the nation was even founded.

Rarely considered in American legal history are the laws of the earliest Puritan settlers, whose ministers vehemently denounced wife beating in England, and earned them the honorable role of being the first group to legally prohibit IPV, even providing an array of sanctions from fines to corporal punishment (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). According to the 1642 Puritan criminal code, "[e]verie married woman shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by her husband, unlesse it be in his own defense upon her assault" (Gosselin, 2000, p. 36). These laws were quickly supplanted by the more well-known codes based in common law.

By 1871, one state, Alabama, officially afforded women protection from spousal abuse (*Fulgham v. Sate*, 1871), but the criminal justice system refused to enforce the decision because the husband's violent rights to his wife were so deeply culturally ingrained (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). In 1879, North Carolina ruled that a husband may not be held criminally liable for beating his wife, unless the means are cruel or caused permanent damage (*State v. Oliver*, 1879), continuing the rule of thumb doctrine. In fact, it is not until nearly one hundred years later in the 1970's that a change will start to take place which begins to recognize women as victims of a social problem. Slowly, the courts came to reflect the growing cultural ideals of wife beating as odious, but women still experienced very little success in prosecuting their husbands for violent transgressions, and instead the problem simply continued behind closed doors (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

Maryland was the first state to actually criminalize wife beating, giving the abusive husband forty lashes or one year in jail. Shortly following, the North Carolina Supreme Court removed the final restrictions relating to the legal liability of a husband assaulting his wife, and explicitly prohibited such behavior (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). On the heels of this decision, Mississippi abolished a man's right to chastisement (*Harris v. State*, 1894), and North Carolina condemned a husband's involvement as a third party in his wife's rape (*State v. Dowell*, 1890).

The longevity of such violence is evidence that American culture, being based on social constructions of gender which result in inequalities, drive every institution within the nation, including the criminal justice system (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). The result is a deeply entrenched tradition of *gendered justice*, in which men have more rights and are afforded more agency than women. This gendered justice has incorporated cultural prescriptions and proscription and, though justice is meant to be blind, individuals who do not adhere to these rules and do not properly “do gender” may face social ostracism, increased social punishment when in violation of the law (Keitner, 2002) or decreased empathy if they fall victim.

The 1960's: The birth of Feminist advocacy and battered women's shelters.

The anti-domestic violence movement stemmed from the incredibly active feminist movement of the 1960's (Bent-Goodley, 2005), and began as a grassroots effort to establish shelters and develop victim advocacy (Goodman & Epstein, 2008) all based in the homes of survivors of such relationships (Rodriguez, 1988; Srinivasan & Davis, 1991; Saathoff & Stoffel, 1999). These early advocates for women abused by their husbands established feminism as a cornerstone of the anti-domestic violence movement by incorporating elements of social change, survivor-defined practices and collaborative shelter structures (Bent-Goodley, 2005). This collaborative structure was seen as key in providing victims with the strength and self-confidence they needed in order to begin their healing process. The bureaucratic model was seen as patriarchal and oppressive to women (Ferguson 1984;

Rodriguez, 1988; Srinivasan & Davis, 1991; Saathoff & Stoffel, 1999), specifically promoting patriarchy through hierarchical client-professional relationships. Early advocates maintained that such structures returned abused women to the position of reduced power which they had experienced in their violent relationships (Rodriguez, 1988; Srinivasan & Davis, 1991; Saathoff & Stoffel, 1999). The collaborative shelters resisted all forms of hierarchy (Gelb & Hart, 1999) and endeavored to include all residents in the decision making process (Rodriguez, 1988).

Survivor-defined advocacy was another key element in the feminist founding of the anti-domestic violence movement. As with modern feminism, the roots of this violence were seen to be in cultural inequalities, most specifically the unequal distribution of household and social power, education, work place and wage opportunities (Tong, 1998; hooks, 2000). Thus, survivor-defined advocacy focused on counteracting these conditions by empowering women and facilitating decision making, economic and social independence (Rodriguez, 1988; Srinivasan & Davis, 1991; Saathoff & Stoffel, 1999). Beyond offering this immediate support, the feminist grassroots phase of this movement focused on changing the social conditions which perpetuated the violence with the goal of ultimately reducing violence against women overall (Nichols, 2011).

Despite these best efforts, however, IPV continued regardless of not being officially sanctioned. The criminal justice system's initial response to the concerns raised by feminist advocates was to train police officers as counselors and mediators and instructed the officers to separate the parties and allow them to cool down. Couples could be referred to social and psychological services, and in extreme cases victims may have been referred to the court to file a private complaint (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). Non-intervention still prevailed when it came to taking further action, however, because most of the laws on the books categorized spousal abuse as a misdemeanor assault, which police officers legally needed to witness in order to make an arrest (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

In 1968, the federal government established the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration (LEAA), which would provide states with revenue to address a growing crime problem (Matchette & Danis, 1996). In response to this, many states began to modify their sentencing structure and took a harsher stance against crime. These changes not only allowed for better chances of prosecution within the courts, but also enabled the public to re-conceptualize IPV as a criminal act and focus on the needed relevant legislation. The public, police and courts became more aware of the previously eschewed legal liability of police departments to provide women equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Around this time, an increasing number of police departments and officers fell under scrutiny of civil rights claims and large damage awards (Melton, 1999).

The LEAA also provided for criminal justice as an academic discipline, which further resulted in more studies of crime and delinquency and a systematic response to them (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). Around this time, too, the first national study concerning familial violence was conducted, and revealed that IPV was present in one out of every six American households (Gosselin, 2000). In 1966, a Chicago study found that 46% of major, violent crimes against women were perpetrated in the home (presumably by a family member) and that police spent more time on IPV-related calls than on murder, rape and aggravated assaults, with subsequent studies finding similar results (Martin, 1983).

The 1970's. Along with a general cultural dissatisfaction over women's oppression, the studies of the late 1960's helped to usher in a new wave of the battered women's movement. A 1973 landmark study of the LEAA intervention in family violence proclaimed that, if executed properly, the police could have a considerable impact on combatting IPV (Bard, 1973, as cited in Melton, 1999 – BOOK).

Up until this point, public awareness, political interest and funding for domestic violence was limited (Strauss & Gelles, 1986; Saathoff & Stoffel, 1999; Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld, 2003). What was known about its existence largely relegated it to a “hands-off” realm, with police working to limit their involvement in any incidences which did arise. This was not considered a failure on behalf of the police or society. Rather, it reflected the

inherent cultural assumption that family disputes were private and occurred behind closed doors for a reason (Buzawa & Hirschel, 2009). Because of this intentional blindness, the feminist advocates of the 1970's sought to recognize and raise awareness about women's social and economic inequalities as a structural flaw which required addressing. (Goodman & Epstein, 2008). In working to expand support services for victims, the first regional hotline was established in 1972 in St. Paul, Minnesota. In 1974, the first domestic violence shelter *outside* of a personal abode was also established in St. Paul, and a second eventually arose two years later in Pasadena, California (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

Transpiring alongside these social services changes, several key court decisions also unfolded during the 1970's. In 1976 the Oakland Police Department settled a lawsuit which required that the department no longer instruct its officers to avoid potential domestic calls (Schetcher, 1982). The following year, Oregon became the first state to legally require mandatory arrest policies for all departments (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

In 1978 the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) was founded (Nichols, 2011). The NCADV has been a strong, centralized organization since its inception by working with other national and state coalitions to provide education and training to advocates, and has been a cornerstone in innovative legislative initiatives such as VAWA, the Family Violence Prevention and Services act, and the International Violence Against Women Act (NCADV, 2011). The following year, President Carter opened the Office of Domestic Violence; shortly thereafter Nebraska made marital rape a crime, and California followed suit (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

The early 1980s– The Duluth Model and Social Awareness are born. At the dawn of the decade, a seed was planted which would soon grow into the predominant model for addressing IPV. The Duluth Minnesota Domestic Abuse Intervention Project would be the first – and a very long lived – foray into the idea of collaborative efforts between advocates and criminal justice officials (Shepard & Pence, 1999). This project involved an element of coordination and cross training between victim advocates, the police,

prosecutors, judges, and social service providers (Nichols, 2011). This ultimately led to advocate-informed police and court policies and procedures which held the offender accountable and reduced victim blaming. This project also resulted in the widely practiced Duluth Model of offender treatment (Shepard & Pence, 1999).

Further, the 1980's saw an expansive growth in the public awareness surrounding domestic violence shelters and services (Nichols, 2011). This began with the first Day of Unity in 1981, which promoted public awareness of women living in abusive relationships and their children (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, n.d.a). In 1982, NCADV developed the first national hotline to provide anonymous support and service referrals to women in crisis (Schechter, 1982). As advocates worked to become even more involved in exacting change, the 1984 National Task Force on Family Violence was created, (Gelles & Straus, 1986; Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld, 2003; Goodman & Epstein, 2008). In October of 1987, NCADV organized the first Domestic Violence Month, which would gain commemorative legislation two years later in 1989 (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, n.d.b).

The landmark legal case which demanded the large-scale legal reform of intimate partner violence handling was *Thurman v. City of Torrington* (1984). At the time of this case, all states had legal sanctions related to domestic violence or IPV in place, but police practices still dictate non-intervention in family matters. The story of Tracey Thurman's battle with her violent ex-husband, Charles, and the City of Torrington Police Department spanned over two years, and culminated when Charles stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the neck, throat and chest and continued to threaten and beat the bleeding woman, going so far as to drop their infant son on her – and all in full view of three police officers.

Remarkably, Tracey survived the attack. She sued the City of Torrington and the police, alleging violation of her constitutional rights by the nonperformance or malperformance of official duties. The department defended that police were given discretion in deciding how to best respond to an alleged crime and were immune from suits

challenging resulting actions. The United States District court disagreed, citing that although the police were afforded discretion this did not extend to permitting discrimination against certain groups of citizens and permitted the case to move forward. At trial, the court found that the department had a policy of non-intervention in domestic violence cases, and that it was tantamount to “an administrative classification used to implement the law in a discriminatory fashion, violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution (Klein, 2004, p. 94).” The court continued that the notion that men were allowed to physically discipline their wives was outdated, archaic and unconstitutional, and that the police had an obligation to intervene in these situations.

The court noted that other departments may have similar policies and, regardless of how common it may have been, the police have an “affirmative responsibility to act to protect the safety of citizens. Failure to perform this duty constituted a denial of equal protection under the law and was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).” Torrington settled the suit for \$2.3 million and Charles Thurman was convicted of felony assault and sent to prison. Immediately after the case was settled, the state passed mandatory arrest laws.

Though widely recognized in his community as one of the nation’s “most notorious wife beaters,” Charles has continued to make papers over the decades since his release (he served about seven years [Gottlieb, 1996]) (Canfield & Springer, 1999).

The 1980's post *Thurman*. The first controlled, randomized experiment to test police responses to IPV was conducted in 1984. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment showed that arrest was the more effective deterrent to repeat intimate partner offending than previous practices of separation and mediation (Sherman & Berk, 1984). In light of these results (though over the caution of Sherman and Berk, the study’s authors) and the *Thurman* decision, most states implemented mandatory arrest laws. While replica studies found that such deterrent effects were only valid for the first six months following a violent incident, most large city police departments adopted pro-arrest policies (Sherman,

1992). Over the next several years, six replica studies funded by the NIJ were conducted in an attempt to tease out the internal and external validity issues in the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. There was little support for the Minneapolis findings, but consistent proof that arrest does not significantly reduce the rate or intensity of violence (Pate & Hamilton, 1992).

Also in 1984, New York State struck the marital exemption from its books when Mario Liberta appealed his conviction of the non-marital rape of his former wife, Denise Liberta (*People v. Liberta*, 1984). Liberta had argued that were it not for the restraining order against him there would have been no separation, and the rape would have fallen under the marital exemption. “The defendant then argued that New York law violated equal protection by punishing rape by 'unmarried' men but not by married men with respect to their wives” (*People v. Liberta*, 1984). The appellate court denied Liberta's appeal, finding that there was no legal citation to this claim and thus it could not be considered (Judge Wachtler in *People v. Liberta*, 1984). In agreeance with Liberta, the court recognized the violation of equal protection and removed the exemption from the statues. This also sparked a recognition that judges needed to be sensitized to the complexities of IPV, along with the “archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage” (*People v. Liberta*, 1984).

Such reforms quickly lead to the establishment of domestic violence courts in many jurisdictions. These courts held the punishment of the offender and the protection of the victim as the highest goal (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). Because of these courts, many others began to issue orders of protection which prohibited contact between the parties involved. These orders ranged from emergency orders which were issued by the police with judicial approval, to temporary orders, issued by *ex parte* judges (Fagan, 1996). Final orders would only be issued after a court hearing.

During this time, the police commonly cited FBI statistics that evidenced the dangers that domestic disturbance calls posed to police officers (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003;

Garcia, 1995 – BOOK). Statistics revealed that one third of police deaths between 1960 and 1984 resulted while responding to a domestic disturbance call (Garner & Clemmer – BOOK). When the FBI first released these statistics, it caused an utter panic among police officers and caused them to begin screening domestic violence calls.

Garner and Clemmer later revealed that the FBI definition of a *domestic disturbance* was far more broad than those used by many police precincts and included “bar fights, gang calls, general disturbances (short of riots and civil disorders), and incidents where a citizen is brandishing fire arm – in addition to disputes or assaults among family members (Garner & Clemmer, 1986, p.2). When the FBI separated “family quarrels” from the others in their list, they found that between 1973 and 1982 just under 6% of officer deaths (62 out of 1,085) occurred as a result of IPV (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

Like the police, prosecutors began to adopt more victim-centered policies. Of note, in 1986 the Los Angeles District Attorney's office established the first domestic violence prosecution unit. The city attorney, Burt Pines, strongly believed that directed prosecution would stop the “revolving-door cycle of violence that characterized intimate partner violence” (Garcia & McManimon, 2011, p. 77). The policy involved frequent contact with victims to advise them about what to expect and prosecutorial procedures. Victim assistance programs grew in popularity throughout the 1980s and showed further promise in encouraging prosecutors to take on IPV cases. This decade further saw the uptake of evidence based prosecution, wherein the police and investigators attempted to build cases on evidence *other than* the victim's testimony (Garcia & McManimon, 2011).

The early 1990's. Prior to this, the justice system (as well as most of society) conceptualized IPV as a private, family matter and not a criminal justice or public health issue (Goodman & Epstein, 2008). During the early years of the 1990's, advocates lobbied for policy changes which would lead to increased prosecution of batterers and better protection for women and children. The results included mandatory or pro-arrest policies,

protective orders, no-drop prosecution, and collaboration between the justice system and advocates (Hart, 1995; Goodman & Epstein, 2008).

Advocates of the period resisted professionalization of their efforts (Rodriguez, 1988), but it became a necessity in order for organizations to gain external (generally governmental) funding. Social service programs dealing with any cultural ill are largely shaped by their funders' requirements. For these services, then, such requirements were molded by the passage of VAWA in 1994, which provided \$1.6 billion in grants to various stakeholders in the movement on top of establishing the Office on Violence Against Women within the Department of Justice (Klein, 1996). Two main funding streams were provided: the first through the Department of Justice for criminal justice purposes, such as implementing mandatory arrest policies or the prosecution of domestic violence and child abuse; the second through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for the social service programs popularized by the feminist movement (Boba & Lilley, 2009). Quickly becoming dependent on such funding, the already established grassroots shelters were compelled to conform to outlined expectations and professionalize. Resultantly, the collaborative structure of most feminist organizations altered to embrace the previously eschewed hierarchical bureaucratic model (Miller, 2008).

Late 1990's to 2000's: The Development of Community Based Responses.

While up until this point, the various elements the fight against IPV generally worked in mutually exclusive realms, the late 1990's saw a social reorganization which allowed advocates, social services and the criminal justice system to work in concert. Today this is generally referred to as a Community Based Response (CBR) or Coordinated Community Response (Nichols, 2011). Though the first CBR efforts began in the 1980's, it was not until the following decade that the ideology began to take hold. Prior to this period, members of the justice system were largely uninvolved with IPV, let alone the efforts of advocates and social services (Goodman & Epstein, 2008), but this reconceptualization began to involve the justice system based on the assumption that it would increase the

prosecution of batterers, consequently reducing subsequent violence (Daly, 1994; Ferraro, 2011).

The number of CBR efforts exploded throughout the second half of the 1990's and the early 2000s, largely due to the availability of federal funding for such collaborative initiatives (Boba & Lilley, 2009). Upon reauthorization in 2000, the primary focus of VAWA shifted toward strengthening victim services through coordinated, multi-agency responses (Zweig & Burt, 2007 – I.4). This reauthorization involved new grant programs which had a special focus on encouraging arrest policies, enforcement of protection orders, and the STOP (Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors) Program (Boba & Lilley, 2009). Not only did this increase the likelihood of community collaboration, but also lead to a trend of regular employment of advocates by police departments and the courts (Nichols, 2011).

By the beginning of the 21st century, every state and the District of Colombia had adopted laws which permitted warrantless arrests in cases of domestic assaults, even when of misdemeanor status (Klein, 2004). Most states, however, went further. The majority required arrest be made in such situations, thirty states passed legislation which required arrest for violations of orders of protection, eight made arrest the presumptive, or preferred, response to IPV calls, and thirty adopted primary physical aggressor laws to streamline the distinguishing of abuser from the abused (Klein, 2004).

By the early 2000s, crime scene investigation became an important component in responding to IPV cases and many departments added special training for personnel. Most of these reports are categorized as misdemeanors, so the case largely rests on the responding officer's ability to gather corroborating evidence at the scene. Prosecutors tend to rely on the victim's cooperation, and unless there is further evidence supporting the facts, a victim's redaction of testimony is often fatal to continuance of the case (Garcia & McManimon, 2011). A defining difference of IPV compared to other misdemeanors is the care given to evidence gathering; however, it still does not typically elicit the follow-up of

a support detective (Klein, 2004).

Examining Therapeutic Treatment Programs

Since the inception of the feminist based shelters of the 1960's, the means by which Intimate Partner Violence offenders have been handled have taken many forms, though throughout the decades therapeutic interventions have been, by far, the most common (Saunders, 2009). At the time of this writing, there are several ascribed to methods for addressing IPV offenders, each of which can be classified on several different dimensions. In this section, these will be examined, starting with the means by which individuals are referred to their specific mode of intervention. As therapeutic intervention programs are the most typical form of treatment, this section will continue to consider the benefits of individual versus group treatment, and the specific kind of therapeutic intervention.

Means of referral. IPV offenders tend to find themselves involved with a treatment or intervention program either as a means of a court-mandated referral (particularly as a condition of probation) or on a voluntary basis. Approximately 80% of participants are ordered to attend their program by the court. Some states require treatment or intervention programs as a matter of law. California has imposed the most stringent of requirements which mandate that anyone found guilty of an IPV-related offense attends a 52-week program, supervised by the local probation department (Rempel, 2009).

After the policy changes of the late 1970's the courts saw an intense influx of IPV cases, but due to the general classification of the offense as a misdemeanor there were very few cases in which a jail sentence was justifiable. Advocacy groups pressured the courts to develop new responses, as they found the "do nothing" and small fines responses to be utterly inadequate. As such, treatment and intervention programs were quickly taken up by the courts who initially envisioned them as a single-prong in a more comprehensive approach focused on rehabilitation (Rempel, 2009). Compared to traditional approaches such as a fine or community service, which can generally be completed within a short period of time after sentencing, program mandates also allow the courts a longer

opportunity to watch over offenders.

No studies could be found which focused on evaluating or discussing voluntary treatment or intervention programs. It can be reasonably assumed, however, that individuals who *seek* the help will have significantly lower rates of re-offense as they are, by nature, more motivated to change their behavior.

Individual or Group therapy? Throughout the therapeutic world, individual and group therapies are implemented in many different situations. Support groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous helped provide evidence of the benefits behind camaraderie while seeking change. Along these lines, men's groups are the most common therapeutic format being used today (Saunders, 2009). It is believed to have several advantages, including providing opportunities for feedback from one's peers, an increased likelihood of supervised (therapeutic) confrontation, and more realistic role-play. Further, providing group programs is a more efficient way to treat the large number of individuals needing services (Saunders, 2009).

Concerns have been raised, however, about the group format having unintentional, negative outcomes. A primary fear is that when collected in a group, the men may reinforce negative attitudes and views of women while being supportive of one another's violence. Some have also pointed out that variations among abusers do not necessarily lead themselves to group therapy, where the participants do not receive one-on-one attention, but individualized treatment does allow for such a targeted approach (Saunders, 2009). More recently, the lack of individual options has posed an issue for *women* who are identified as being in need of treatment for IPV. A growing body of literature is examining cases of women as the primary aggressors and is quickly coming to realize a marked lack of therapy for such offenders (Bogaerts, 1997).

Couples therapy – though considered outdated and inappropriate – is still periodically suggested as a mode of treatment (Garcia & McManimon, 2011), and is offered to approximately 15% of men who participate in groups (Saunders, 2009). These

attempts often inappropriately assign blame to the abused party and assumes them as having equal part in creating the disturbance (Quann, 2006). Because of an overwhelming discontent with this side effect, however, couples therapy is ever increasingly rare as a condition of court-mandated treatment, and is generally only sought on a voluntary basis. No reliable studies which examine the effects of couple's treatment on reducing repeat violence in abusive relationships could be located for evaluation.

Different Approaches to Therapeutic Intervention. The earliest IPV intervention programs, at the time referred to as Batterer Intervention Programs (BIP) or Spousal Abuse Abatement Programs, were often based on offender typologies or profiles (Quann, 2006). They were, generally, championed by pro-feminist men who helped to raise awareness of intimate partner violence (Saunders, 2009). Though initially, pro-feminist men were looked on with a bit of derision by their female counterparts, this mentality changed once advocates realized that many abused women would return to their violent partners, seeking their change through counseling. Early therapeutic interventions preferred employing sympathetic men, assuming that the client-abusers would feel less emasculated, and thus more likely to participate (Saunders, 2009).

Unrelated to the men who developed them, many of these programs placed an element of blame for the harm on the victim and excused offender behavior based on some kind of psychological diagnosis (Karmen, 2012). Since these early days, this has largely become a thing of the past, and present programs focus on enlightening offenders to the social harms caused by their actions, taking accountability for their actions, and deconstructing culturally engrained ideals of gender differences (Garcia & McManimon, 2012). A typical program will proceed through three main phases as the treatment progresses: 1) expanding the meaning of "abuse" to encompass more than just physical violence; 2) helping the offenders accept responsibility for the way they behaved; and 3) teaching them behaviors and reactions to replace their aggressive tendencies (Saunders, 2009). Despite these common threads, however, there are still several approaches to

therapeutic IPV treatment programs, each of which offer evaluations of effectiveness. There are three prevailing paradigmatic approaches to domestic violence programs: pro-feminist, cognitive-behavioral, and psychodynamic (Gondolf, 2002).

Pro-feminist Models. Pro-feminist models of treatment are among the most popular and are implemented across the world (Akoensi, Koehler, Lösel, & Humphreys, 2012). These programs are modeled off of the same ideals as the initiating movements of the 1960's (Nichols, 2011) and focus specifically on addressing an offender's view of gender roles. The underlying assumption is that IPV originates from ingrained patriarchal values which relegate women to specific social roles, and thus the aim is typically to reorient the batterer's assumed need to exert power and control over a partner (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012)

Cognitive-behavioral Models. Cognitive-behavioral models appear to be the most common, and are estimated to represent approximately 70% of current programs (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012), though this number varies across cities, counties, nations and continents. This may be due largely in part to the success of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment modalities in changing problem behavior in other populations, particularly the ever-difficult to treat sexual offender (Terry, 2006). Such programs trace the origins of violence back to learned behaviors that the individual learns will provide an expressive, instrumental function in getting what they want (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012). Desistance, then, must also be learned by identifying cognitive errors (that is, errors in thinking), which lead to frustration, aggression, violence, and so on (Quann, 2006).

Psychodynamic Models. The psychodynamic approach can be most easily likened to the oft imagined talk therapy. This model asserts an offender's violent behavior is linked to personality and emotional dispositions, and addressing these problems are key to desistance (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012). By facilitating the offender's recognition and acceptance of latent feelings of emasculation which precipitate abusive impulses, psychodynamic models aim to protect against future violence.

There has been an extensive debate surrounding whether or not these categories are more different in theory than in practice (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012). In reality, many programs which are currently in practice overlap and coalesce around the primary goal of reducing recidivism and repeat abusive behavior (Dalton, 2007; Scourfield & Dobash, 1999). A survey of treatment modalities across the European continent found that a 53.7% majority of programs reported utilizing elements of multiple theories as part of their program, the most common being a cognitive-behavioral/pro-feminist mix (Hamilton, Koehler, & Lösel, 2012). As a result of this debate, much of the more recent literature advocates for treatment differentiation which focuses more closely on situational, cultural, and psychological dimensions – particularly gender roles and comorbid disorders – in lieu of the, currently, more common “one-size-fits-all” models (Gilchrist & Kebbel, 2010; Graham-Kevan, 2007; McMurrin & Gilchrist, 2008).

Furthering this mixed-approach reality, almost every program today straddles different dimension related to the assumptions it make about domestic violence (Saunders, 2009). While these elements are less often discussed in the literature, they appear more complete and place batterer programs along a continuum instead of attempting to relegate them to mutually exclusive theories. Briefly, these methods are: skills training, cognitive restructuring, sex role resocialization, awareness of control tactics, family systems, and trauma therapy (For a complete discussion of these methods, see: Saunders, 2009).

Though in the interest of space, this current writing will not delve too deeply into this typological categorization, using the above ascribed methods, three different treatment paradigms can be identified. It is important to raise at least some awareness of this different model, as it is becoming increasingly more utilized as more research is done on batterer intervention. These nascent categories are: 1) “therapeutic programs,” which focus on the treatment of emotional pain and childhood traumas, similar to the aforementioned psychodynamic models; 2) “psychoeducational models,” which present instruction and training in cognitive and social skills, similar to the cognitive-behavioral methods, but to a

greater extent; and 3) “didactic-confrontational programs,” which raise the offender's awareness about their consequences and responsibility for the abuse, similar to the pro-feminist model, but with a lesser focus on cultural patriarchy, which allows for a broader implementation (i.e. with female abusers) (Saunders, 2009).

Various Sectors for Intervention. Beyond mean therapeutic treatment, some initiatives have been launched in different sectors of the criminal justice system. For example, specialized probation (George, 2012) and monitoring (Labriola, Rempel & Davis, 2008) have been implemented in some jurisdictions. Basic social services are often offered to offenders, while extensive help is offered to victims. Some classical studies were performed to assess the effectiveness of police response to domestic violence, such as in the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman & Berk, 1984), but subsequent studies fail to return positive results. Unfortunately, aside from one or two government-funded studies there has been little to no academic examinations pertaining to the effectiveness of such measures (Pate & Hamilton, 1992). As they are so sparse, the relevant results will be discussed in more depth in later sections.

Intervention programs are widely implemented as the primary form of treatment *as well as punishment* for most IPV cases which are brought to court. Many studies of these programs' effectiveness exist, but very few have rigorous enough designs to allow for any firm conclusions to be made. While study rigor is increasing due to a growing consensus of *how* assessments should be performed, there are relatively few examples of program meta-analyses. As such, though not a primary focus of the study at hand, a general review of some of the well-known programs and theories which have provided a basis for the majority of today's programs will be had.

How effective are interventions?

Analyses of program effectiveness are relatively diverse but largely fall under therapeutic and judicial interventions. These designations are meant only to specify the

nature of the intervention, not the realm of the justice system wherein it takes place. Therapeutic treatment, for example, is most often a condition imposed on an offender by the supervising court. Regardless, such therapeutic treatment would not constitute a judicial intervention.

Therapeutic Intervention and Recidivism. There are now over 2,265 therapeutic intervention programs in the United States alone (Labriola, Rempel, O'Sullivan, Frank, McDowell & Finkelstein, 2007), of which approximately 15% are part of a shelter program. Half are private for-profit programs, 43% are private non-profit, and the small remaining percentage is governmental (Dalton, 1993). The sector in which the program has its genesis does not seem to make a difference in the approach that is used, though one study did find that shelter programs, perhaps counter intuitively, focused less on patriarchal norms than programs from other sectors. A recent multi-national study indicates that programs are most likely to be nested within victim advocacy or psychological counseling programs (Rothman, Butchart & Cerda, 2003); 5% are in criminal justice settings and 4% are in men's programs (Saunders, 2009).

Early studies showed promise for changing attitudes about gender roles, reducing anger toward the abused partner, and decreasing child abuse (Saunders, 2009), though these findings are based on abuser self-reports, and should be regarded with a healthy skepticism. Several studies have compared recidivism between individuals who complete treatment programs to those who do not, and found that recidivism rates are generally higher for those who did not complete their program, but only barely. As discussed, however, it is possible that there are fundamental differences between these two groups, which make interpreting such findings difficult (Saunders, 2009). Generally speaking, quazi-experimental evaluations which utilize victim reports as a primary measure of success have offered disappointingly inconclusive results.

While total cessation of abuse is the optimal outcome of interventions and treatments, some practitioners have focused on utilizing programs as a strategy for ensuring

accountability instead of a method of rehabilitation. Notably, the New York model of batterer programs accepts that offenders can change, but maintains that programs cannot be relied upon to produce change. This model views programs “as a service to the courts,” an appropriate sanction that can be imposed when an offense is not such that it can elicit a jail sentence. A primary tenant of the New York model is that referrals to a program should only be accepted from courts which are prepared to impose further criminal sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Since the court is the only legal authority which may enforce non-compliance through imposing additional sanctions, the New York model holds that the responsibility for accomplishing the primary purpose of programs should rest with the courts, not the individual programs (Rempel, 2009).

In an extensive meta-analysis of various therapeutic treatment programs, Babcock, Green and Robie (2004) found very little difference between the recidivism rates in various applications of the widely used Duluth Model. In their analysis of quasi-experimental reviews of different programs, victim reports of reabuse ranged from 10% to 43%. The lower bounds of the reabuse statistics were found among cognitive behavioral and psychoeducational models, while the higher rates were detected almost completely among programs aligning themselves with the Duluth Model. Lacking random assignment, all but two of the sixteen quasi-experiments compared individuals who completed treatment to those who did not (Babcock, *et al.*, 2004). The inherent flaws are evident. Lower recidivism rates exhibited by program completers by no means indicates the effectiveness of the program, and may instead just lend credit to the offenders themselves, suggesting that those who do complete their program are more motivated to initiate substantial and sustainable change.

Beyond the quasi-experiments, Babcock *et al.* also examined several randomized experiments which employed a lottery mechanism to assign offenders to a treatment condition or a control condition. The reviewed experiments spanned over a decade, from 1992 to 2008, so data gathering methods were not always terribly uniform, and draw from

a variety of official, offender and victim-report sources from quazi-experimental and experimental reviews, but provide a fantastic base from which to launch a comparison.

Within these randomized experiments, partner reports of recidivism ranged between 14% and 32%. Both the high and low bounds in this case were from Duluth programs. In each of these cases, however, the control groups which received no treatment recidivated at similar rates; 18% and 31.6%, respectively.

This analysis also includes statistics gleaned from official and police sources. In the random assignment experiments, police records indicated treated offenders recidivated at rates between 4.3% and 17.5% and their non-treatment counterparts between 4% and 31%. None of these treatment methods reached any threshold of significance in recidivism rates between treatment and control group offenders (Babcock, *et al.*, 2004).

Table 5.2 and Table A1 of Appendix I summarize some of the relevant results from Babcock, *et al.*, as well as other notable studies. Overall, these analyses offer relatively dismal results. Of these randomized trials, only Davis and Taylor's (1999) Brooklyn experiment yielded positive, promising conclusions. In doing so, however, it also raised many perplexing questions which have yet to be studied. While the average effect size is slightly positive when relying solely on police records for new offenses, it is zero when victim reports of abuse are used as the defining measure (Feder & Wilson, 2005). It remains unclear, however, what it is that drives these offenders to assume the right to exert violent control over another human life. "Several studies indicate that batterers hold more traditional views than non-batterers about women and their proper roles. Batterer intervention programs are based on the premise that teaching men that it is wrong to exert verbal, physical or sexual control over their partners will lead to changes in their beliefs that will ultimately change their behavior (Feder & Dugan, 2002, p. 9)." The results of these experiments, however, do not support this notion.

Many suggestions about why these programs do not work abound. It is possible, for example, that the attempt to facilitate productive discussions between men who are

already prone to violent anger and lack the internal motivation to change are fruitless attempts, or perhaps even counterproductive (Rempel, 2009). Further, it may simply be that high turnover rates, which are inherent to any social service field, compounded with poor supervision of group leaders and imperfect model implementation are the primary culprits, and a perfectly executed cognitive-behavioral approach might proffer more positive results.

In a comprehensive review of intimate partner violence intervention techniques in Washington State, Thomas George (2012) found similar rates among all amalgamated therapeutic treatments. In considering anger management treatment and domestic violence interventions such as those discussed above, George concluded that their rates of intimate partner-related recidivism were virtually indistinguishable from offenders only assigned fines and judicial proscriptions, with five-year recidivism rates for offenders assigned anger management counseling rested at 21%, IPV treatment (such as the Duluth Model) at 29% and fines and proscriptions at 26%. Interestingly, he found that victim-oriented treatment actually produced lower recidivism rates than traditional batterer intervention programs, approximately 12% across such all interventions. Research on these programs is limited, but George hypothesizes that this effectiveness may be due to a shift in focus away from blame, judgment and the personal deficits of offenders to an interest in the harm caused to society and victims.

These findings are consistent with other such studies (Lee, Aos, Drake, Pennucci, Miller & Anderson, 2012; Feder & Wilson, 2005)

Judicial Intervention and Recidivism. Surprisingly few studies have been conducted which examine the effectiveness of judicial interventions (i.e. jail, probation and fines) on intimate partner violence recidivism rates. Those that have tend to focus on comparing one form of judicial monitoring with another. One example of this kind of analysis is Klein, Wilson, Crowe and DeMichele's (2008) evaluation of the Rhode Island Specialized Domestic Supervision Unit (or DVU). Similar to domestic violence courts, the Rhode Island DVU aimed to increase oversight on offenders and hold them more

accountable through increased judicial contact. Compared to a control group of offenders who were supervised under a traditional probation model, the DVU offenders were rearrested on one, two and three domestic charges at lower rates (40.7% versus 37.6%, 15.4% versus 10.5%, and 3.8% versus 56.2%, respectively). Though these numbers are by no means impressive or statistically significant, it is important to note that in every case the specialized, increased probation supervision was more effective than traditional. Some previous research on traditional therapeutic models has suggested that it is actually increased judicial oversight that reduces recidivism (at least during the monitoring period) rather than therapeutic or other interventions (Labriola et al., 2008).

George (2012) studied the effects of various judicial sanctions including jail, probation, treatment and combinations of the three, utilizing court-based documentation to gather his statistics. Of these, jail time alone was the least effective with recidivism at an alarming 55%, and the addition of treatment to this sentenced reduced recidivism only to 47%. Interestingly, the addition of probation to offender terms seemed to have the most profound effect. Probation alone elicited recidivism in only 14% of offenders, treatment and probation in 18%, jail and probation in 42% and all three terms in 10%. Of note is that in combination with jail, probation was more effective than treatment.

Focused Deterrence: How Theory Leads to Practice

The focused deterrence method is more frequently implemented in order to reduce gun-related homicides and open air markets. Focused deterrence originated in Boston in 1996 and regularly produces 50 to 75% reductions in violence within the first year (National Network for Safe Communities, n.d.). Currently, Focused Deterrence is being implemented in over 50 jurisdictions across the nation, including New York City, NY; Detroit, MI; Cincinnati, OH; Baltimore, MD; New Orleans, LA; the state of California, particularly Los Angeles, Sacramento and Stockton; the state of Connecticut, with a focus in New Haven, Bridgeport and Hartford; Boston, MA; and Pittsburgh, PA (National Network for Safe Communities, 2014). Further, it has been utilized in South Australia and

parts of the United Kingdom. High Point is the only jurisdiction so far to have applied Focused Deterrence to domestic violence (though the jurisdiction is also using it to combat gun- and drug-related violence).

Multiple evaluations have been done on Focused Deterrence (Braga, 2008; Braga, 2011; Braga & Weisburd, 2012a; Braga & Weisburd, 2012b) and its effects in specific cities including Boston (Braga, & Winship, 2005; Braga & Kennedy, 2002), Detroit (Bynum, & McCluskey, 2007), Nashville (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009), Cincinnati (Engel, Baker, Tilyer, Eck & Dunham, 2008; Engel, Corsaro, & Tilyer, 2010) and Minneapolis (Kennedy & Braga, 2008). The results consistently demonstrate that the method is effective – and incredibly so.

Focused deterrence theory is comprised of several important elements. First, and understandably, it takes root in criminological Deterrence theory with a unique focus on Rational Choice. As the name suggests, the deterrent focus is directed toward a particular group of offenders – high-risk, highly recidivistic individuals. In order to “help” the targeted offenders' rational choices lead them away from crime, a carrot and stick method is implemented by providing each individual with an offer of help and a clear promise of the consequences if they are to offend again. This last element is the practical key: the focused deterrence team must deliver the offers and promises they make.

The Theoretical Basis: Deterrence and Rationality. Criminological theory is laden with attempted explanations of criminal behavior. Beyond the previously discussed theories related to the etiology of intimate partner violence, deterrence theory is particularly relevant to the study at hand. At its core, deterrence theory embodies the implicit notion of common sense and rationality, implying, via rational choice theory, that when faced with a criminal (or any opportunity) an actor will first weigh the expected consequences of his or her actions and perform a cost-benefit analysis. If the potential costs outweigh the potential benefits, the individual will not commit the crime; if, on the other hand, the analysis results in the reverse judgment, then the criminal act will be pursued (Clark &

Felson, 1993). Deterrence, then, is achieved when an individual has sufficient enough information about potential consequences that he or she will consider the risks and costs too great. This is generally achieved through the person's indirect experiences with crime, punishment and punishment avoidance, such as hearing, reading, seeing or being otherwise aware of someone else's punishment (i.e. general deterrence or vicarious deterrence) or through direct and personal experiences with crime, punishment and punishment avoidance (i.e. specific deterrence or direct deterrence) (Stafford & Warr, 1993).

Rediscovering and Redefining Rationality. The utter power of this framework is rooted in the common sense embodied in its very foundation. Zimring and Hawkins (1973 p. 5) write “it is a matter of common observation that men seek to avoid unpleasant consequences, and that the threat of unpleasant consequences tends to be deterrent.” Simply put, harm is something we seek to avoid, and benefit to gain. Piliavin, Thornton, Gartner, and Matsueda (1986) provide a very sophisticated mathematical equation which they purport can explain an actor's utility under conditions of risk, certainly making this process seem highly intelligent.

This, however, is not how we tend to treat criminals in common or academic discourse. Instead, we to acknowledge that people are offered choices, the possible outcomes of which are many. Between the arrays of options an individual will make the choices most beneficial for them based on the elements of their personal reality. For example, money, a widely accepted benefit, can be obtained through a variety of methods including through legitimate work and crime. While we may not always agree with some means of obtaining money, it is understandable why some may resort to “bad” criminal methods in order to obtain it. Without money it is nearly impossible to merely function in modern western society. We can understand the financial motivation of a drug dealer or bank robber even if we, ourselves, would rationally consider the costs of incarceration and/or moral conflict to outweigh potential gains.

Some benefits, however, do not pose such evident and understandable risk taking.

Thrills, social standing, and other “psychic” rewards tend to number amongst these. The thrill of pulling off a robbery may be absolutely enticing to some, but there are extensive costs as well. If apprehended, robbery will lead to incarceration and loss of the stolen money or goods. Present actions will be met with future reactions, such as a criminal history, which could make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to gain desired employment. Speaking from pure deterrence, then, the high costs may remove any desire to take the risk. The problem here is that nobody actually thinks like this (Kennedy, 2009)! Not only will such calculations not cross the mind of an armed robber, it is not clear if criminals are ever “rational” in this implied sense required by Deterrence Theory.

To aid in explaining this theoretical disconnect, some have posited a class of “nondeterrables” (Michael & Wechsler, 1937), overwhelmingly devoid of reason and ruled by deep impulse. Sutherland and Cressey (1958, p. 156) wrote of pathological traits existing before and giving rise to criminal behavior vis-à-vis mental defect or a disordered personality. Still others, such as Decker and Kohfeld (1985), have hypothesized undeterrable “crimes of passion,” such as homicide, where extreme emotional states suspend all rationality. By this logic, some people or crimes are impossible to defend against. How utterly pessimistic this is.

In reality, it is fascinatingly rare to encounter situations in which literally no rationality or control is used. “Burglars avoid occupied homes, robbers seek out dark alleys, wife beaters control themselves in supermarkets and close the door when they get home. Drunks drive more carefully when they see a patrol car in the rear-view mirror. Schizophrenic street people keep their bottles in brown paper bags. Even psychopaths avoid killing in the direct view of the police (Kennedy, 2009 p. 17).” Operating, as we do, within the definitions of our own reality, we are then compelled to accept that reason only matters as much as it matters to the reasoner. Perfect rationality is not within reach of everyday life. “Choices are made constantly; whether they are made sensibly is quite another question (Kennedy, 2009 p. 17).”

Rationality can be better understood as a subjective measure rather than objective. Biological, neuroanatomical and sociocultural differences in every individual will mold their decision-making abilities (Raine, 2013), thus leading them to perform their “rational calculations” on the pretense of whatever is most important to them, in their own mind, at that very point in time (Stover & Brown, 1977). Yes, this may result in “faulty” assessments but the key operation is what matters to the specific offender. The accuracy or reasons behind the beliefs are not important. This redefinition results in a bit of a transformation of the definition of “rationality” into a more technical and convoluted term, *estranged from its ordinary meaning*. What one may typically consider to be a “crazy” action may come to satisfy this technical idea of rationality so long as the new standards are met. If, in the objective reality of a situation, the subjective reasoning makes sense and the matter was raised, considered, examined and resolved, then it satisfies the current definition of rational.

Most important to understand, this re-operationalization of “rationality” does not preclude the possibility of effective deterrence and may even provide to enhance it. If, for example, in an enraged state a person commits homicide, the connotative definition of “rational” would assume this to be an irrational decision: after all, murder rarely goes overlooked, and will very likely lead to a trial, incarceration and even possible capital punishment. In the heat of the moment, however, and under great duress, perhaps homicide seemed like the most preferable means of alleviating the situation – whatever it may be. Further, as discussed, it is rare to encounter a situation wherein absolutely no rationality is exercised, even if only implicitly. “It would take much greater provocation to lead a man to kill his wife if he knew that, as in England in the 1930s, committing murder meant a two-out-of-three chance of meeting the public executioner within about two months than if – as is currently true in South Africa – there were only about a one-in-100 chance of being executed after about a year’s delay (Tulloch, 1974).”

Rationality and Subjectivity as Central Themes to Deterrence. In order for deterrence as we understand it to be effective it must actively appeal to rationality. For this

to happen, we must understand that our deterrent sanctions must exceed the subjective gains of the criminally inclined individual. *Radical subjectivity* is “a core, irreducible element in deterrence; it is well established theoretically; it gets virtually no attention in practice; it is a central theme in what follows... (Kennedy, 2009, p 23).” What matters is only what matters to offenders and potential offenders. If deterrence is not being effective, it does not implicate fault in the theory, only fault in the practice. The options being presented to offenders are weighing heavily in one direction and by fixing this we may begin to address the problem.

Generally, in so doing, we turn to the system. We examine rates of offending, the processes of the criminal justice system, which of our current sanctions are most or least effective, policy, practice, or academia. Focused Deterrence, however, has explored the set of issues that govern, instead, the subjective responses of offenders to the objective facts (Kennedy, 2009).

The Vital Few. The Pareto principle is a business-management principle which states that 80% of the effects in any situation comes from 20% of the causes (Tullock, 1974). In criminology and criminal justice, this is most often called the 80-20 Rule. This universal principle can be more practically understood to mean that a large percentage of the target of analysis (in criminology, crime) is concentrated in a small percentage of people or environments (Kennedy, 2009). This theory has been consistently supported with studies on repeat offenders (Wolfgang, 1958), repeat victims (Cook, 1980), hotspots, hot products (Carroll, 1978), and risky facilities (Carroll, 1982 p. 60).

This principle has been observed in the previously mentioned focused deterrence jurisdictions. For example in 1996, approximately 1,500 Boston residents were responsible for 60% of the city's homicides. In a city of over 550,000 this constitutes less than one percent of the population (Kennedy, Braga and Piehl, 1997). Similar percentages were found in Cincinnati (2008). Logic follows, then, that by focusing on this small percentage of criminal offenders major reductions in the target crime can be expected. This is the

expectation laid forward by and delivered on by focused deterrence theory.

The Practice: Putting Focused Deterrence into Action. These very same principles – high rate offending with frequent criminal justice contact – can also be used to “persuade” offenders to decide against criminal offending. By making use of these characteristics and constructing a response pattern that utilizes the population's pattern of repeat offending, draws from their extensive criminal history and their non-specialized offending behaviors to increase *effective*, rather than reactive, contact with law enforcement it may be possible to shape the behavior of target offenders.

Constructing a Community Based Response. In order to effectively do so, however, it is important to acknowledge an unnecessary weakness with current criminal justice practices. In most jurisdictions different units within police departments tend to work in isolation (McDavid, 1974) and interdepartmental cooperation is rare (Herrington, 2012). Even rarer is the cooperation of police departments with other areas of the criminal justice system (Dammer & Albanese, 2013). Tensions between the police, prosecutors and attorneys often run high (McIntyre, 1976). Police frequently feel that the lawyers who handle the cases they put together disregard their efforts, minimize the evidence, throw out solid leads, undervalue the police instinct and unfairly cut them out of case proceedings (Skolnick, 1998) whereas lawyers become exasperated when the police fail to follow procedure to the letter, compromise their case, or become unwilling to work with them too easily or too early (McIntire, 1976). Even rarer than cooperation between justice groups is further inclusion of social service personnel.

This is an unfortunate reality, and one that focused deterrence demands the dissolution of (National Network for Safe Communities, 2012). In order to effectively handle a violent offender is it necessary that all of the involved professionals have access to the whole story (and this is particularly so in IPV cases [Snyder, 2013]). In most situations, a unit responding to an intimate partner violence call for service is likely to be unaware that there are detectives investigating a prior assault at the same address. If the

case goes to court the department may not communicate these two situations with the prosecuting attorney who will thus be unaware that the incident actually represents a continuance or escalation of previous behaviors. Since probation and parole have little to no contact with other criminal justice agencies, neither the police nor the courts will be aware that the offender is going through a stressful situation with circumstances similar to previous escalations in violence, and there is nothing in place to ensure that the offender's probation officer is made aware of the new complaint (Kennedy, 2009).

Constructing such partnerships is possible. There are many such instances among the jurisdictions listed at the beginning of this section! Outside of Focused Deterrence, too, are several examples which have resulted in substantial reductions in violence. One of these, an IPV initiative in Westminster California, cross-trained patrol officers with an in-house team of prosecutors and victim advocates to make use of all possible skill sets. An evaluation demonstrated that successful prosecution of IPV cases increased 47% and average sentence length by 37% following this cooperation (Westminster Police Department, 1998).

As will be discussed shortly, focused deterrence relies on increasing the legal exposure of individual offenders in order to maximize sentences. If police units do not work together, exposure cannot be increased. If prosecutors do not follow up on these efforts sentences will not be maximized. If these two groups cannot work with probation and parole, then offenders may not be held to the contingencies of their supervision as strictly as is necessary. Cooperation is key.

Beyond the immediate criminal justice players Focused Deterrence also incorporates two more elements: social services and the community. The social services are necessary in order to provide help to offenders and their victims and, importantly, to consolidate where they can go to receive this help (Braga & Weisburd, 2012b). Many areas do not house social services in one place and there is no central location where information on what's available can be obtained (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013a). The

vast majority of the target population will be of the lower socioeconomic classes and may not have ample access to transportation (Kennedy, 2009), so requiring them to visit multiple locations just to figure out how to obtain help is simply setting them up for failure. Offering offenders the help they need is not only an ethical obligation, it is a strategic decision (Braga, 2008; Crime Solutions, n.d.).

Finally, a “community moral voice” element is incorporated to activate informal social controls. Whom this group is comprised of varies based on the target population and the crime, but generally four “voices” are represented: 1) the voice of redemption, such as ex-offenders who have made the desired change, 2) the voice of victimization, often survivors of the target crime, 3) the voice of pain, usually family members of victims who were not so lucky, and 4) the voice of aspiration, best delivered by authentic faith and community leaders. Often, “influentials,” individuals close to the offender such as their mother, father, faith leader, loved one or a friend, will also be incorporated into this group. Many communities already have these voices available in churches, victim advocates, outreach workers, grass roots leaders, or self-help groups, such as mothers of murdered children organizations (National Network for Safe Communities, 2010).

Pulling Levers. Past the practiced lack of communication, focused deterrence targets another weakness within the criminal justice system via the “pulling levers” method. Since Hobbes, Beccaria, and Bentham first began their early work severity, certainty and celerity have been central themes in predicting whether or not deterrence will be successful. The more immediate a punishment is after a crime, the more certain an individual is that they will receive the punishment and the more severe it seems without exceeding the harm done by the crime the more likely an individual is to exercise their rational choice and not commit the crime. This, however, is not how the criminal justice system works in practice. Quite the contrary, criminals often learn over time that they are capable of committing a great many crimes without being punished. On the rare occasions that they *are* punished, too, the time between their act and receiving (what is often a very mild) punishment is

anything but swift. In reality the criminal justice system operates on a low-severity, low-certainty and low-celerity framework.

Focused deterrence offers simple, reliable ways to improve on this practice with a pulling-levers approach. Knowing, as we now do, that the perceived severity of a punishment as it relates to any particular crime has no significant deterrent effect (Bryjak, 1980; Klepper & Nagin, 2006; Paternoster, 1987) Kennedy (1997) and Kleiman (1997) both argue that swift and certain punishment, even if mild, will be significantly more effective. Drug offenders, for example, who are subjected to frequent tests and receive an automatic, but mild sanction – such as two days confinement for the first failure, with increasing time for each subsequent failure – would still labor under the prospect of full revocation of probation or parole, thus serving one's full sentence if these milder punishments fail to produce an effect. This new high-certainty, high-celerity, and mixed low- and high-severity system would, Kleiman believes, result in many drug abusers finding a way to control their own drug use, particularly if offered formal treatment which they could enter of their own accord (Kleiman, 1997). Those who do not modify their behaviors are essentially self-selecting for long-term incarceration (Kennedy, 2009). Though it may be hard to internally reconcile, as previously discussed there are very few, if any, decisions which are made in complete absence of all rationality. If a drug addict can choose to modify her behavior, then so too can the perpetrator of intimate partner violence.

The rationale behind pulling levers, once again theoretically grounded and supported, is quite simple and, many would argue, quite progressive. Criminals, as discussed, are rarely, if ever, specialists; their offending behavior runs the gamut. Though previously thought to be the exception to this rule, it has been made clear that IPV offenders are no different (Klein, 1996). In studying the High Point offenders, Herman, Kennedy, Sumner, Ellenberger, Shelton, Sechrist and Weil (2013) noted that this group had a long criminal history, both violent and not. While average arrest rates for an IPV crime are relatively low for the population, total average arrests are much higher (10.6 on average),

with simple assaults being the most prominent reason for an arrest. Since we know that the grand majority of crimes go unreported (Biderman & Reiss, 1967; Coleman & Moynihan, 1996; Skogan, 1977) and crimes of sexual violence particularly so (Buzawa & Buzawa 2003; Garcia & McManimon, 2011; Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network, 2009; Terry, 2013; Watts & Zimmerman, 2002) it makes sense to use those which *are* as a means to increase sanction. IPV offenses are prosecuted at alarmingly low rates (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014), though some jurisdictions have recently implemented various strategies to combat this – High Point among them. This is due to the nature of the crime; cases often being based on anecdotal evidence and victim, offender or witness statements; its usual classification as a misdemeanor and, one could argue, continued cultural conceptions of gender roles and socialization. This being the harsh reality with which we must contend, it is necessary to note that (in lieu of programs such as this) it is incredibly unlikely that previous IPV convictions (or prosecutions or arrests) will be used as mitigating factors in court.

For every one IPV arrest it can be expected that an offender will have many others of which the police will be aware. By considering these other crimes while deciding whether or not to prosecute or in determining sentencing we can increase the sanctions lobbied against an individual. Increasing communication between the many agencies which comprise the criminal justice system (specifically by maintaining a strong interagency working group) will allow for better communication within and between departments. If an individual is arrested for a barroom brawl this behavior can be better communicated next time a call is placed for a domestic disturbance. Later, when the case goes to court the prosecutor can be aware of *both* violent acts rather than just the one currently in question and use it as a mitigating factor in sentencing by demonstrating that the defendant is an increased risk to public and individual safety (Kennedy, 2009)

This technique can also lead to increased sanctions by charging an offender with every available offense. There is no reason that a perpetrator of IPV can only be addressed

through IPV related charges such as new incidences of violence or violation of restraining orders. Legally and logically any actionable offense will do. Since these offenders are generalists, this provides many opportunities for criminal justice officials to deal with these offenders. As Kennedy (2009) points out: “A drug trafficking or possession offense, a violation of probation or parole (for instance, for drug use, noncompliance with reporting requirements, or address and association violations), a drunk driving offense, a weapons charge, a nondomestic assault: any of these, and other, offenses could serve.”

Pulling levers, then, is all about increasing individual exposure to repercussions whenever possible. If someone knows they will face three years’ incarceration instead of thirty hours of community service next time they allow their tempers to flare while drinking, they will, very likely, make the rational decision to check their anger without police intervention. If not then, as described, they have self-selected for a lengthy sentence and more specialized treatment.

Providing offenders with the necessary knowledge to make these decisions is the next crucial element of this method.

Activating choice through knowledge. If we expect to activate offenders’ rational choice we must ensure that they are armed with this knowledge. Many attempts have been made over the years to publically announce anti-crime initiatives, and they often fall short (see, for example, Hogan, Shelley, Unnithan, Naday & Wilson [2011]). What is unarguably most effective is handing target populations the information directly. Focused deterrence initiatives do this in two literal manners.

One of these methods, custom notifications, utilizes advanced social network analyses to identify which individuals are most at risk to become victims and perpetrators of a category of violence (Papachristos, 2009) and hand delivers them a personalized message which puts them on alert (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013b). These notifications do not imply that the individual is in any way guilty of committing a crime; does not implicate them in illegal activity; and can serve no grounds for initiating,

increasing, or in any way affecting the outcome of a later prosecution. They simply inform the individual that they are at risk, should be aware, and offer them a variety of methods to seek help and reduce their risk (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013a).

More common, however, is a method known as a Call-in. Since the implantation of a focused deterrence method necessitates a dramatic reconceptualization for all participants (willing and compelled), it is important that anybody who is in any way involved with the new method understand how it works. Call-ins are designed to communicate this as well as all the key messages including the new “rules of the game,” a clear community message, and that help is and will continue to be available.

Intuitively we understand that the most effective way to deliver information is directly; this minimizes the chance of miscommunication as the message passes between speakers. Further, the message can be delivered only to the core “primary target” population of the approach. Specific offenders are invited to attend a Call-in meeting so that they may hear what the justice system has to say. In reality, many of these individuals are compelled to attend as a condition of probation, but unsupervised offenders are also welcomed and encouraged to attend (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013a).

At the call in, offenders are sat in a comfortable, unthreatening room either in an audience configuration facing presenters or, sometimes, in a circle intermingled with them. Frequently they are offered refreshments. The setting is meant to be pleasant and to allow officials, community members and offenders to feel like they are on common ground (National Network for Safe Communities, 2012). Systematically, the presenters, representatives from each category of the interdisciplinary working group, will speak to the offenders and deliver their message.

Generally reserved for last, as it is quite often the most powerful message delivered to offenders (National Network for Safe Communities, 2012) is the Community Moral Voice arm of the interagency working group. The Moral Voice activates informal social controls by speaking to the offenders, their own, and the entire community’s moral,

personal, emotional, religious and logical convictions, imploring offenders to realize the damage they're causing, the lives they're destroying, the people they're hurting and the city they're embarrassing. The message they deliver is always clear: We will no longer tolerate the violence; it must stop.

The second group to go is the social service providers. They deliver the same message that is indicative of an intolerance for violence, then extend an offer of help to those who are interested. Job placement or training services, alcohol and drug treatment, anger management or other counseling, GED classes, or whatever the system currently has to offer. They must be careful not to promise anything they can't deliver. For example, there may never be a promise of employment since this unrealistic, but a "help me help you" message is always the goal. Offenders are not compelled to seek help, but instead allowed to choose for themselves.

The first and presently most relevant group to speak is almost always the law enforcement officials. This includes the police, court, probation and parole arms or the interdisciplinary working group, so the message can sometimes be complicated to construct. When done properly, though, it can be immensely powerful. The key objective is to communicate to the target population that new enforcement rules are now in place; specifically that an identified act of violence is going to receive special attention. This is best exemplified through real-life demonstration, that is utilizing the method against extremely concerning high-violence offenders prior to a call-in (in the lingo of focused deterrence, this is referred to as a "demonstration enforcement action." For an in-depth discussion, refer to National Network for Safe Communities, 2013a). In so doing, incredibly dangerous individuals are immediately removed from the community *and* serve a demonstrative purpose to lower-risk offenders.

In a Call-in the law enforcement officials may directly show the attendees just what they're capable of. "Mr. Doe here, had a lengthy record with our department. His first arrest, a felony B&E was at the age of 17. Since then he's managed to collect eight intimate partner

violence arrests, seven other assaults, a robbery, driving and disorderly conduct offenses...[etc. etc.]...so the last time we caught him beating his girlfriend we made sure to take these into account. As well as his outstanding warrant. And two recent drug arrests. Normally he maybe would have been looking at thirty hours of community service, but now he's serving ten years." To some, this record might appear outstanding, but many offenders will recognize this as being similar to their own (Stallings, 2009). It will be clear what law enforcement can achieve, and if enough attention is given the group will find itself convinced that things have actually changed.

Another common practice at Call-ins is providing each and every offender with a personalized jacket which examines their own arrest record, details what they have and have not been charged with, what they can be charged with, and what the ultimate result will be. If law enforcement adequately explains that the police and prosecutors are working together, and that prosecution has agreed to pursue each new case with gusto, to not drop any offenses, to use all police evidence, gather their own, and ensure to the best of their ability that all sentences will reflect what is in the offender's jacket then they will take notice.

As with the promises made by the social service representatives, it is imperative that law enforcement not promise something they cannot deliver. Such empty promises are the hallmark of the criminal justice system (refer, if you will, to the "click-it or ticket" campaign or multiple drunk driving campaigns such as "Driving hammered will get you nailed" or "Over the limit. Under arrest" which all suggest an undeliverable level of certainty for the targeted offense), and will be detrimental to the legitimacy of the initiative.

The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative

Focused deterrence methods are being implemented across the nation with great effectiveness. The majority of these programs, however, focus on reducing and preventing gun-related homicide and open air drug markets (National Network for Safe Communities, 2014). The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) is unique in that it

targets intimate partner violence. Among IPV interventions, too, it is unique in that it does not directly incorporate any of the previously discussed offender treatment methods. There are no classes, there is no therapy, no lengthy cognitive behavioral training, just a meeting, some reasoning, and a declaration that the violence is over.

OFDVI as a Focused Deterrence Method. Like all focused deterrence methods, and as the name would suggest, OFDVI focuses on offenders, rather than the victims (Sumner, 2012). Historically, attempts to address intimate partner violence have focused on helping the victim avoid patterns of violent intimacy (Garcia & McManimon, 2011), but do not hold the offender accountable for his or her actions. Focused Deterrence methods aim to prevent future violence and the literature is largely supportive of the notion that increasing accountability is a more effective means to avoid creating future victims (Herman, *et al.*, 2013). OFDVI specifically challenges the wide-spread notion that IPV perpetrators are somehow fundamentally different than other violent offenders and maps the same logic used with other interpersonal crimes onto the problem.

Implementing OFDVI requires that a jurisdiction differentiate between intimate partner violence and other forms of domestic abuse or violence such as child, elder, or parental abuse (Herman, *et al.*, 2013). Ideally, this would be common practice but unless a jurisdiction has previously or is currently implementing an IPV (or sometimes a domestic violence) initiative, this is rarely the case (Sampson, 2007). This often confounds data when obtaining an accurate baseline against which to test an initiative's effect but is nonetheless imperative in order to accurately address the issue. In High Point, this problem was addressed by adding an "intimate partner" qualification to any "domestic violence" calls for service (so that any cases which are eligible for intervention receive a "domestic violence – intimate partner" [DVIP] flag). Identifying offenders is a theoretically simple task which requires an extensive amount of effort. By tracking and examining calls for service it is possible to identify repeat offenders, repeat locations and repeat victims, but the nuances of this effort will be wholly dependent on the specific jurisdiction's systems

and practices pertaining to domestic violence calls.

Where OFDVI differentiates from other focused deterrence methods is in the utilization of series of graded categories which offenders are placed into (Sumner, 2012). This system allows for incremental notification and sanctioning of offenders (Herman, *et al.*, 2013), so that the truly chronic and most violent individuals can be addressed more quickly, while those who are less likely to re-offend are given the chance to exercise their rational choice.

Offenders are divided in to one of four categories. The lowest level, or D-List, offenders are those who have no previous DVIP charges. Since not every call for service is met with charges, repeat calls involving the same aggressor also constitute early inclusion as D-List offender. In order to qualify it is also necessary that the responding officer believes there is the potential for violence and that an intimate partner relationship is validated. The next level of offenders, the C-List, are those individuals who meet D-List criteria but have one DVIP related charge. B-List offenders include all of the above criteria, plus a second charge for a DVIP offense *or* violation of a prohibited behavior for which the offender received notice as a C-List offender, such as violating pretrial conditions, contacting the victim, etc. Finally, A-list offenders are those who have three or more DVIP charges, as well as (though not necessarily including) a record of violent offending, a violation of an order of protection, a history of utilizing weapons in domestic or intimate partner violence, or is a convicted felon (Sumner, 2012).

Each offender level is exposed to different kinds of notifications, based on the severity of their offenses. D-List offenders receive a hand delivered letter from a trained patrol officer during a follow up visit (within 48 hours of the offense) which puts the offender on official notice that they have been added to the watch list. Victims (of all levels) will also receive letters which explain that the department is placing a special focus on the perpetrators of such crime; provide a single, central number the victim may call for help locating services; and explaining the department's mandatory arrest policy (For examples

of these letters, see Appendix II). C-List offenders receive a specially crafted, face-to-face deterrent message from a Violent Crime Detective at the time of arrest, before pretrial release, during a probation visit, or during a follow up visit by detectives (Sumner, 2012).

B-List offenders are invited to attend a Call-in. As mentioned, many of these “invitees” are compelled to attend as a condition of supervision. They are exposed to all the messages that law enforcement, social service providers and the community have to offer. In best practice, these offenders are called in to a notification on a regular basis, perhaps quarterly, perhaps more often. A-List offenders receive their notification at the time of arrest and become the focus of the department’s demonstration enforcement action prior to the first call-in. Their cases are used as examples at the first and future Call-ins to unequivocally establish the police department’s dedication to ending the violence. Since these offenders are the most likely to be involved in future violence and homicide it is imperative that they be removed from the community as quickly as possible (Herman, *et al.*, 2013).

Each individual in each level is tracked along with the responses they receive from and give to police (Sumner, 2012). For example, some offenders refuse to attend Call-ins or accept the hand-delivered notifications. While police may not be able to immediately act on these refusals they can be aware of them and share the information with prosecutors for use in court, and probation or parole officers to be properly addressed.

What do victims say? The present study was unable to obtain victim reports. A previous evaluation, however, found that victims who remained with offenders who were summoned to a Call-in felt that the offender had heard and understood the message and, more importantly, they did not feel that it produced any violence as a direct result of the message. An initial concern when drafting the approach was that offenders would blame victims for the efforts and misplace their violent aggression, creating more instead of less violence. Because of this, special attention is given to ensure that offenders are repeatedly told that the community and police are driving the strategy, not victims. The same

evaluation found that victims expressed appreciation for making this clear (Herman, *et al.*, 2013).

The Setting: High Point, North Carolina. According to the 2012 census, High Point hosts a population of approximately 107,000. Like much of the state of North Carolina, the city is predominantly white (53.6%) but also hosts a sizeable Black and African American population (33.0%). A relatively small portion of the city is comprised of Hispanic or Latino (8.5%) and Asian persons (6.1%). Median household income in the city is below the national average at \$44,367 as are home ownership rates (59.1%). The city exceeds state rates for education, with 85.1% of the population twenty five or older holding at least a high school degree, and 29.3% of residents of the same age possessing a bachelor's degree or higher. The city rests primarily in Guilford County, though parts of it also spill into Davidson, Forsyth and Randolph Counties (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).

OFDVI's Timeline of Implementation. The research phase of OFDVI development was reportedly long. This was necessary in order to ensure the most accuracy possible. Between 2008 and early 2011, data was gathered and compiled on all DVIP offenders within the jurisdiction of the High Point Police Department. The department officially counts the end of its research phase as being on January 30th, 2011. By August of that year, it became evident that the HPPD needed to differentiate between intimate partner violence calls and those pertaining to other forms of domestic violence. On August 24th, the Domestic Violence – Intimate Partner (DVIP) call was created for clarifying purposes. This addition interrupted but ultimately streamlined information gathering for the department. On February 21st, 2012 the first B-List call-in was held to deliver the anti-violence message the HPPD wished to relay. On April 1st of that year, the notification measures for the other levels (i.e. the customized notifications) were implemented. July 31st, 2012 and April 9th 2013 marked the dates of the 2nd and 3rd OFDVI Call-in.

Chapter III: Design & Methodology

The study at hand investigates various indicators of effectiveness of the OFDVI program based on six separate measures: (1) intimate partner violence-related calls-for-service trends; (2) re-offense rates among all involved offenders, between the four identified lists, and based on several demographic variables; (3) trends in newly identified offenders; (4) victim injury-related trends reported to the police, and (5) “promotion” rates of offenders to higher lists.. These results will then be compared to similar statistics from previous, therapeutic studies. From these variables six hypotheses have been derived. The first hypothesis tested was that DVIP calls for service will demonstrate an annual downward trend downward as. Second, it is hypothesized that the offenders exposed to the OFDVI will, much like previous focused deterrence initiatives, recidivate at low rates and that these rates will show no statistical difference between the independent variables (i.e. list and various demographic variables). A third hypothesis is that the initiative will exert a preventative effect over the High Point community, and fewer newly identified offenders will be added to the lists as time wears on. The fourth hypothesis is that data will show a decrease the number and severity of victim injuries in the years after implementation. A fifth hypothesis is that promotion rates of offenders from the lower lists (i.e. D and C) will be higher than for the offenders from the higher lists (i.e. B and A). Finally, the sixth hypothesis is that recidivism rates for the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative will be lower than those reported by previous evaluations of IPV initiatives and treatment programs.

Participants

The data for this study was graciously provided by the officers and crime analyst of the High Point Police Department. As part of the department’s OFDVI efforts, data is regularly and systematically collected pertaining to every DVIP-related call-for-service, the implicated individuals, their history of DVIP contact, and injuries to victims.

Data was provided on 1,165 offenders ranging in age from fifteen to eighty five

years old. Race was known for all but four offenders, which were predominantly black (63.9%) and white (34.8%), though other races were represented including Middle Eastern (0.2%), Latino/a and Hispanic (0.6%), and Asian, Indian or Pacific Islander (0.4%). The majority of offenders were male (75.5%) but females were represented in the population (24%). Sex was unknown for five offenders. The majority of offenders were not under some form of court supervision (60.4%). 21.2% of offenders were either on probation or incarcerated. Supervision status was unknown for 18.4% of offenders. 29.8% of the sample had been previously convicted of a felony, and felon status was unknown for 28.7% of offenders. Because High Point has also implemented several focused deterrence initiatives

Table 3.1. Offender Characteristics		%	
Race	Black	63.7	to combat other criminal behaviors (notably open-air drug markets and gun-related homicide) the department collects data on offender street group affiliation.
	White	34.8	
	Hispanic	0.6	
	Asian / Indian / Pac.Is.	0.4	
	Middle Eastern	0.2	
	Unknown	0.3	
Sex	Male	75.5	4.1% of the included offenders were identified as being members of a criminal street group, but a high percentage (39.2%) were neither identified as being affiliated or non-affiliated. The majority of offenders were classified on the C-List (69.4%), with D-List offenders being second most plentiful (23.5%), followed by B-List (4.6%) then A-List (2.5%).
	Female	24	
	Unknown	0.5	
Court supervised	No	60.4	
	Yes	21.2	
	Unknown	18.4	
Convicted felon	No	41.5	
	Yes	29.8	
	Unknown	28.7	
Street group involved	No	56.7	
	Yes	4.1	
	Unknown	39.2	
List	A	2.5	These demographic variables are
	B	4.6	
	C	69.4	
	D	23.5	

summarized in table 3.1 Previous studies on intimate partner violence have examined characteristics such as socioeconomic class, marital status and employment as possible risk factors for re-offense. The provided data did not capture such information.

Research Design

As is typical of much evaluative research (Ekblom & Pease, 1995), the study at hand does not utilize a randomized control sample, as the OFDVI is implemented in all areas of High Point in order to address what is a very serious problem of violence. As such, a series of basic one-group time series designs were utilized to examine the variables under study. In a quasi-experiment, OFDVI offender recidivism rates are compared to the rates observed by previous examinations of IPV programs and interventions.

Measures

The data used in the evaluation is the records kept by the officers and crime analyst of the High Point Police Department in order to maintain their focused deterrence efforts. The original database is maintained and updated daily. The data was predominantly provided in its original, record-kept form though it was de-identified in cases involving juveniles. Injury-related data was de-identified and included only the victim's age, race and gender.

Procedure

As explained, a total of six hypotheses were constructed for testing, each of which required different data, analyses and procedure.

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis one looked to examine the trends in calls for service for DVIP-related offenses to the High Point Police Department. The department tracks these trends on its own accord and provided it in its original format. Calls for service were plotted by month of the year so that a total sum could be derived for each year. Differences were calculated between these yearly sums. In 2011, the department redefined its method of handling intimate partner related calls compared to domestic violence calls over all, and as such accurate IPV-specific information only reached back until 2012. In order to extend the knowledge obtained through this study, the calls for service for the months of the first quarter of 2014 were compared to 2013 and examined for percent change.

Hypothesis 2. While hypothesis 2 specifically aimed to consider the difference in re-offense rates between various groupings it was necessary to apply a survival period to the call-in “treatment” so that later comparisons could be made to previous evaluations of other initiatives and treatment programs. Based on what was found to be most common during the literature search, a six month and twelve month survival period was applied. In order to do this, each offender was initially coded as either having re-offended or not. After this, offenders who had been identified as having re-abused since being added to one of the OFDVI lists were examined. The individual’s re-offense date was compared to the date of their (nearest) call-in, and they were further coded into two new variables, one indicating that they had re-offended within six months of attending a call-in, and one indicating such within twelve months. Each of these re-offense qualifications resulted in a dichotomously coded variable. Since notifications happen regularly within this population, some individuals had to be removed from this analysis, as they had not yet reached the requisite survival period. 138 offenders had been notified within six months of receiving the data, of which only four had reoffended. 349 offenders had been notified within twelve months, of which 18 had reoffended. Thus, in examining six month recidivism rates, $N = 1,033$ and twelve month recidivism rates, $N = 835$. During this process, the number of days between offenses was also calculated.

The data provided by the high point police department initially catalogued offenders separately by list. As the provided data was compiled into one database for analysis, then, a new variable was added which qualified the offenders based on their HPPD assigned list. In order to maintain statistical integrity and streamline analysis, offender ages were collapsed into several categories based on sociologically accepted spans: 1) 15 – 17-years old, 2) 18 – 24-years old, 3) 25 – 34-years old, 4) 35 – 44-years old, 5) 45 – 54-years old, 6) 55 – 64-years old and 7) 64-years old and older. Other demographic variables were cleaned up and unknown or missing data was recoded to “system missing” so that analyses could be performed specifically between the variables of interest.

Once all of the data was thusly prepared, cross tabulations were run comparing the six and twelve month re-offense rates across the independent variables and a Cramer's V statistic calculated to examine for significant differences and strength of effect.

Hypothesis 3. Given that High Point is a community of steady growth (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012) additions of new offenders in the overall population can be assumed to remain at relatively similar rates over relatively similar periods. If, then, the rates of offender notification change over time this may provide evidence of the OFDVI having an effect on the larger community – hypothesized to be a deterrent effect (thus, reduced rates of notification). To examine this, offenders who have received official notification (N = 395) were separated into annual quarters and plotted against each other. A quarter system was decided to be most effective so as to expand data to include the completed months of 2014. Rates were compared on this basis though the results remain largely anecdotal, as will be discussed presently.

Hypothesis 4. In studying injury-related data this study hoped to examine any statistically significant annual changes in rates of various injury types. The provided data categorized injury into seven different types: (1) apparent broken bones, (2) severe lacerations, (3) lost teeth, (4) broken bones, (5) possible internal injury, (6) unconsciousness, and other (7) other major injury and death. During the literature search evidence was found that since the implementation of OFDVI in 2011 only one DVIP homicide has occurred within HPPD's jurisdiction (Herman, *et al.*, 2013). Using public records and newspaper reports (Kimbrough, 2013) the single homicide was identified, removed from the variable and given its own, thus resulting in variable (7) above becoming two separate variables: ... (7) other major injury, and (8) death. It was deemed important to maintain the date of the homicide for the analysis so as to allow for a quarter-by-quarter comparison, and including the available 2014 data in the analysis.

In running a chi-square analysis to examine the nominal differences in means of the annual injury trends it became evident that the injury data was irregularly distributed with

an incredible majority of incidents being apparent minor injuries (92.2%). As such, over 75% of the cells in the initial chi-square analysis had fewer than five entries and thus the results were useless. To remedy this, injuries were collapsed into three categories: Minor (apparent minor injuries), medium (severe lacerations, lost teeth and broken bones), and major (possible internal injury, unconsciousness, other major injury, and death). The chi-square was re-run with much less dismal results. These data were also divided into annual quarters and graphed.

Hypothesis 5. By examining promotion rates this study hoped to examine where the key effective element lies and maybe provide grounds for further research. Essentially, the hypothesis is that if promotion rates are different between the lower (D and C) and higher (B and A) list classifications then this may provide evidence that the different kinds of notification are disparately effective. For example, if a much higher number of D-List offenders are promoted to the C-List than C-List offenders to the B-List, this may be evidence that a face-to-face conversation with a violent crimes detective is measurably more effective than a hand-delivered letter. If, on the other hand, rates are not statistically different or remain somewhat steady it can be asserted that the individuals who are promoted are generally more recalcitrant and naturally more likely to offend.

Offenders who were promoted between lists after receiving official notification were previously identified in the HPPD dataset as note in the file. A new variable was created to record this information separately and was coded as a binary “yes” or “no” variable. A cross tabulation was then run and a Cramer's V statistic calculated to examine rates of promotion within groups and compare for statistical significance.

Hypothesis 6. During the literature review a table was compiled containing important information about the reviewed studies, including survival and follow-up periods and general recidivism rates. To examine the recidivism rates of OFDVI-exposed offenders compared to offenders from previous evaluations, the relevant OFDVI results were plotted in this chart to facilitate discussion.

Chapter IV: Results

Hypothesis 1

In examining the trends in calls for service since the beginning of OFDVI's design phase in 2008, domestic violence calls for service have demonstrated the hypothesized trend. Between 2008 and 2010 the number of calls for service increased by measurable percentages. Between 2010 and 2011, after the implementation of OFDVI in 2011 the DV

		Total Annual Calls	Rate of Change	% of Total Calls
Domestic Disturbance	2008	4,983		
	2009	5,205	4%	
	2010	5,319	2%	
	2011	4,520	-15%	83.8%
	2012	1,960	-57%	44.4%
	2013	1,944	-1%	46.7%
	2014td	483		47.4%
Intimate Partner	2011	873		
	2012	2,452		55.6%
	2013	2,218	-10%	53.3%
	2014td	537		52.6%
All Domestic calls post 2011	2011	5,393	1%	
	2012	4,412	-18%	
	2013	4,162	-6%	
	2014td	1,020		

Table 4.1 Calls for service Trends

calls for service dropped by 15%. By 2012, the DVIP calls had been removed from overall domestic disturbance calls. Thus, the indicated 57% reduction does not necessarily indicate such a drastic decrease in calls for service, but instead demonstrates that the majority of these calls are intimate partner-related. Since the present study is specifically addressing intimate partner violence rather than domestic violence as a whole, the “intimate partner” (or IP) category calls were of most interest.

As previously discussed, part way through 2011, the HPPD specified the crime type that they wished to address and included an “intimate partner” (or IP) category as part of their record keeping. As this is the program's present focus, the department deemed it important to examine these calls separately and provided the broken-out data as well. Unfortunately this change convolutes some of the analyses, and as such is generally omitted during this discussion.

In examining DVIP calls a 10% reduction was observed between 2012 and 2013. The 873 calls represented in 2011 only cover those calls from August 24 and December 31, 2011, as per the addition of the IP flag, so rate of change was not calculated during this

time. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the DV and DVIP calls for service data provided by HPPD, as well as an additional comparison wherein DVIP calls for 2011 through 2014 are not separately classified.

In order to expand the analysis, the number of calls for service for the first quarter of 2013 were compared to the numbers of calls for service to the first quarter of 2014. Table 4.1 displays these results. Thus far through the year a 6.37% reduction in calls for service has been observed, suggesting further reductions violence as the year continues.

Month	Year		% change
	2013	2014	
January	184	173	-5.97
February	164	146	-10.97
March	186	181	-2.69
Total	534	500	-6.37

Table 4.1 First Quarter Calls for Service 2013 compared to 2014

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis two states that the observed rates of re-offense overall as well as within variable categories would be low. The first crosstabulation calculated examined overall recidivism rates within six and twelve months, where N = 1,033 at six months and N = 835 at twelve months. For this study, recidivism was defined solely as abusing one's intimate partner after being notified. It was not necessary for the offender to recidivate on the same victim, as violence is violence regardless, and the ultimate goal of intervention is total cessation of abuse across all potential victims. While this hypothesis sought to examine recidivism rates among offenders it was also designed to test the initiative's effectiveness within different demographics and characteristics. Much of the previous literature has suggested that it is necessary to tailor intervention programs to specific populations, but many jurisdictions do not have the resources available to do this. As such, an effective program which works equally within and among groups is important.

Overall, re-offense rates were remarkably low. Within six months of notification only 3.9% of all offenders had reoffended, and within twelve months this number had only increased to 5.8%. As is evident, the majority of offenders did not re-offend after their initial contact with the program, but *among those who did reoffend* individuals averaged

1.2 re-offenses each, with the highest recorded number of re-offenses being three.

Of particular interest was the re-offense rate between OFDVI lists. In examining the rates between these lists it is clear that at C-List offenders recidivate at higher rates (6.3% of all C-List offenders). These offenders have not been invited to or attended a call-in so the statistic is of theoretical note, as well. The next group most likely to reoffend is the A-List offenders with a 3.6% likelihood. The differences in offending were found to be significant, though the association is weak (Cramer's $V = .142, p < .001$). At twelve month post-notification the same pattern is observed with C-List offenders recidivating at a rate of 12.5% and A-List offenders at a 7.1%. Also similarly, these differences were found to be significant but weak (Cramer's $V = .212, p < .001$).

In examining age-related re-offenses the data showed that within six months of exposure adults between the ages of 45 and 54 recidivated at the highest frequencies (6.2%), followed by individuals ages 18-24 (5.9%), 25-34 (4.2%), and 35-44 (3.2%). Juveniles between the ages of 15 and 17 as well as adults over the age of 55 reoffended at a 0% rate within six months of exposure. The differences here are not significant, however (Cramer's $V = .079, p = .381$). When the exposure period is expanded to one year, a slightly different pattern emerges, with offenders between the ages of 18 and 24 offending at the highest rates (11.3%), followed by adults between the ages of 45-54 (9.0%), 35-44 (8.5%), 64 and older (8.3%), and offenders between 25-34 reoffending at the lowest rates (6.8%). Once again, juveniles between the ages of 15 and 17 did not recidivate, nor did adults between the ages of 55 and 64, and these differences remain insignificant (Cramer's $V = .086, p = .404$).

Some previous studies have hypothesized that the extensive court oversight in IPV cases may actually be what prevents individuals from reoffending, not the treatment they receive. For this reason, re-offense rates based on probation and whether the individual was a convicted felon were examined. In comparing recidivism among court supervised and unsupervised offenders no significant differences were found at six months (Cramer's V

= .013, $p = .700$) or twelve months (Cramer's $V = .007$, $p = .857$). In comparing between Convicted felons and non-felons no differences were found at six months (Cramer's $V = .023$, $p = .541$) or at twelve months (Cramer's $V = .002$, $p = .954$). In fact, both felons and non-felons recidivated at approximately the same rates by twelve months (11.0% and 11.2% respectively).

When examining race it was necessary to perform the analysis only between black and white offenders. While information was provided on offenders of other races, only fourteen of the 1,165 were neither black nor white, so a single instance of recidivism among any of these individuals was considered significant. Between black and white offenders, there was no significant difference in recidivism at six months (Cramer's $V = .018$, $p = .573$) or at twelve months (Cramer's $V = .026$, $p = .452$). The final demographic variables examined were street

	% reoffended	Six	Twelve
HPPD List	D-List	0.0	0.0
	C-List	6.3	12.5
	B-List	0.0	2.2
	A-List	3.6	7.1
Sex	Male	4.8	8.7
	Female	3.2	6.4
Race	Black	4.2	7.7
	White	4.9	9.2
Age	15-17	0.0	0.0
	18-24	5.9	11.3
	25-34	4.2	6.8
	35-44	3.2	8.5
	45-54	6.2	9.0
	55-64	0.0	0.0
64+		0.0	8.3
Probation	Yes	6.0	10.8
	No	5.3	10.3
Felon	Yes	6.3	11.2
	No	5.3	11.0
Street Group	Yes	4.9	8.3
	No	6.3	12.2

Table 4.3 Reoffend within x months (%)

group affiliation and sex. Significant differences were not detected between the sexes at six (Cramer's $V = .032$, $p = .306$) or twelve months (Cramer's $V = .036$, $p = .300$) nor for street group affiliation at six (Cramer's $V = .015$, $p = .722$) nor twelve months (Cramer's $V = .032$, $p = .487$). The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 4.3.

Some studies have examined the amount of time between therapeutic completion and first re-offense, so for comparison purposes the same statistic was computed. From the point of notification, the average offender who reoffends will go 218 days before recidivating.

Hypothesis 3

Due to the addition of the DVIP classifications in mid-2011, the information




Figure 4.1 New notification annually by quarter

available to examine this question was somewhat sparse, and thus any resultant conclusions are largely anecdotal. Between 2012 and 2013 there was a 21.8%

decrease in newly notified offenders, from 571 to 428. These numbers were plotted quarterly in order to compare the 2014 numbers to previous years (Figure 4.1). As previously discussed, C-List and D-List notifications did not begin until April of 2012, and the first B-List notification occurred in February, 2012. As such, only eighteen offenders were contacted during this

quarter, so it is not terribly useful for comparison purposes. In plotting the continuous percent reductions a regular downward trend is observed, with an overall 71.9%




Figure 4.2 Continuous quarterly trends

reduction observed between the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2014. These trends are represented in Figure 4.2.

Hypothesis 4

The provided data had not yet been categorized to account only for DVIP-related injuries, and instead represented injuries from all domestic disturbance calls. Because any identifying information (e.g. name, case number, address) which could have been used to




Figure 4.3 All Injuries (By Quarter and Year)

discern the victim's involvement in a DVIP case based on offender information was removed in order to protect the victim's identity, the examined numbers are relevant to domestic disturbance

calls as a whole. However, as was evidenced in Table 4.1, DVIP calls for service comprise the majority of all DV-related police contacts.

A chi-square analysis was run to test for statistically significant differences in the rates of injuries (by minor, medium and major) by year. This analysis showed no significant difference, $\chi^2(8, N = 1783) = 7.47, p = .486$. Because minor injuries account for the overwhelming

majority of observed injuries (92.2%) a second analysis was run between medium and major injuries alone, which also showed no significant difference, $\chi^2(4, N =$




Figure 4.4 Medium & Major Injuries (By Quarter & Year)

139) = 1.54, $p = .819$. These results may be due to the low rates of some forms of major injuries.

In order to look for any visual trends, the number of injuries per annual quarter (including the first quarter of 2014) were plotted (Figure 4.3). An evident increase in overall injuries is observed in the years preceding implementation of notification, but beginning in 2012 (the peak year for all injuries as well as the year that notification began) a steady decline is noted. Compared to the first quarter of 2013, the beginning of 2014 does appear to have slightly more injuries (99 and 111, respectively). A plot representing the medium and major injuries by quarter can be seen in Figure 4.4. In comparing these numbers against the previous year, 2014 has experienced a 40% reduction in medium and major injuries (from 10 to 6).

What can be said is that minor injuries overwhelmingly account for the majority of overall injuries every year. Though the actual rates fluctuate, the difference between the rate of minor injuries and medium combined with major never drops below 88.7%. Figure 4.5 displays the percent of injury-type by year.

Hypothesis 5

Of 1,165 offender only 27 (2.31%) were promoted from a lower list to a higher one, suggesting that among all offenders a very small number commit a new offense which is worthy of promotion. It is important to note that the offenders who were promoted represent the list directly below where they are presently classified (and, as such, are indicated in the original crosstabulation). Thus, offenders who were classified as C-List offenders in the data actually represent D-List offenders who were promoted, B-List offenders represent promoted C-List offenders, and so on.

Table 4.4 displays the data for the number of offenders in each list and the rates at which they were promoted. As it is configured, D-List offenders appear in the data on the C-List, but, as discussed, have been re-classified back to the list they were on when they were promoted. A list offenders are not displayed, since they are unable to be promoted,

but at the time of analysis there were 29 offenders on the A-List. These 29 are included in the total count in calculating percentages.

As previously observed, C-List offenders comprise the greatest proportion of all




Figure 4.5 Percent of Total Injuries

from the B-List. This trend demonstrates what was hypothesized; that the lower-list offenders are promoted at higher rates than higher-list offenders. Further, these differences were found to be significant, though the association was, admittedly, weak (Cramer's $V = .252, p < .001$).

Hypothesis 6

The results of this study's second hypothesis were compared against the re-offense rates found in previous program evaluations. Many of these analyses had the ability to include the generally more reliable victim reports instead of just official statistics, and these were included when gathering the archival evidence. In comparing the discovered statistics against those of the older studies a general trend quickly becomes evident. Recidivism rates in the majority of other studies are significantly higher, ranging from 14% to 50% when considering victim reports. Even against most official statistics, such as those observed in the Brooklyn and Bronx studies (the two most methodologically rigorous) the overall observed 5.8% recidivism in the present study is nearly half of these statistics.

In two studies which examined official statistics, the Broward Experiment (Feder

offenders (69.4%), yet only account for 33.3% of all promoted offenders. 51.9% of all promoted offenders were from the D-List, and 14.8% were

& Forde, 1999) and the San Diego Naval Experiment (Dunford, 2000) the officially observed recidivism rates were also in the single digits. These two studies, however, pose methodological concerns which complicate these comparisons. Of particular note, the San Diego Naval Experiment was, as implied, concerned only with men presently serving in the Navy. This not only reduces generalizability, but also activates recently cited concerns

Representation within...	N	%
D offending population	274	23.5
promoted	14	51.9
C offending population	808	69.4
promoted	9	33.3
B offending population	54	4.6
promoted	4	14.8

Table 4.4. Rates of Promotion to Higher List

about “discretionary record keeping” that is inherent to the military, both in cases of intimate partner violence (Hickman & Davis, 2004; Murdoch & Nichol, 1995) and other gendered violence such as sexual assault (Ziering, Barklow & Dick, 2012). Though the current study cannot assert that poor record keeping was necessarily an issue in this particular study, it is a concern to keep in mind. Further, the official statistics for both the Broward and San Diego experiment only counted an IPV-related arrest as official recidivism, whereas the present data includes any DVIP call for service, whether or not an arrest was made.

Chapter V: Discussion and Limitations

On whole, these data demonstrate the effectiveness and power behind the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative currently being implemented in High Point, North Carolina. A powerful but rarely used measure of an intervention's success is to examine the trends in calls for service post-implementation. While the ultimate aim of the present study is to compare the OFDVI to other intervention techniques, this isn't possible on this particular measure. Nonetheless, the drastic reduction in domestic violence calls overall as well as domestic violence-intimate partner calls (DVIP) is noteworthy. The implications in these data are positive not only for victims directly affected by these crimes of violence (in suggesting a reduction in city wide abuse) but for the residents of High Point on whole. This reduction in police contact is indicative of police resources saved and time earned.

Of course, the low recidivism rates observed are indicative of the model's effectiveness. When considered against the observed recidivism rates among other programs, it becomes evident that the OFDVI model is measurably more effective than the most commonly used interventions. In a previous study of intervention modalities in Washington State, George (2012) compiled the mean rates of recidivism by intervention style. Table 5.1 provides these statistics along with the addition of the present study's observations. These statistics are particularly striking because George employed only official measures of recidivism in his study, just like the current one. Thus, there is no reason to assume the differences are due to data gathering techniques. In comparing these statistics, it becomes apparent that recidivism among OFDVI offenders is much lower than those exposed to more traditional forms of treatment.

Study Group	%
Fines/proscriptions only	26
Treatment	
Anger Management	21
Domestic Violence	29
Victim-Oriented	12
Probation	14
Jail	55
Any treatment & probation	18
Any treatment & jail	47
Jail & probation	42
Jail, probation and any treatment	10
OFDVI	5.8

Figure 5.1 Any Intimate Partner Recidivism adapted from George, (2012)

These recidivism rates can be further compared against the results reported by Babcock *et al.* (2004). Table A2 in Appendix I summarizes the quazi-experimental meta-analysis performed, and only displays the data obtained from official source. The final entry in this list summarizes the results from the current investigation. In all but one study the officially reported rates of recidivism are higher than in the present. In the one examination where this is not the case, only ten of 235 offenders who entered treatment completed it. It is not beyond reason to expect that ten offenders have the ability to keep from recidivating, so the reported 0% recidivism rates are unimpressive (though the incredibly high dropout rates are alarming).

It was, unfortunately, too early in data gathering to be able to determine if there is any sort of preventative effect exerted by the model insomuch as reducing new notifications is concerned. With only two full years of data there was simply no way to make this comparison anything beyond speculative. When the data was plotted, however, the beginning of a visual trend may be implied. The difference of 119 new notifications between 2012 and 2013 certainly seem to suggest that fewer individuals are initiating offending behaviors. This is further supported by an overall 71.9% reduction in new notifications (refer to Figure 4.2)

Perhaps most importantly, however, there is reason to believe that the severity of violence effected by offenders is also seeing a downward trend. While the chi-square analysis showed no statistical differences between the years preceding and following the launch, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 clearly indicate a downward trend in violence since the implementation of OFDVI.

To examine focused deterrence theory in a bit more depth, promotion rates within the lists were examined. It was hypothesized that offenders on the lower lists would recidivate and be promoted at higher rates than offenders on the higher lists, as D- and C-Listers had not yet been exposed to a call-in, the key element of focused deterrence. This hypothesis is supported by the data, wherein C- and D-List offenders recidivated at over

twice and three times (respectively) the rates of B-Listers. This could have policy implications for future focused deterrence models, but such notions should be approached with caution. The Call-in is practically and theoretically designed to be implemented with chronic offenders (National Network for Safe Communities, 2012) and the means by which the important anti-violence messages are delivered rest on increasing an individual's legal exposure (Kennedy, 2009). Being armed with this knowledge as it relates to the OFDVI is nonetheless important. Future applications of the model will be able to better understand the necessity of providing targeted offenders with the information to exercise their own rational choice.

Previously undiscussed, too, is the financial cost associated with implementing various programs and interventions. Though it is sometimes unsavory to consider placing a financial cost on a victim's wellbeing, it is a practical matter which must be considered. Ultimately, reports which contend specifically with the regular cost to the public or government in simply running and maintaining typical domestic violence programs are nonexistent, however, two reports for the Washington State Institute for Public Policy determined that the cost per individual is approximately \$1,360 (Miller, Drake & Nafziger, 2013; Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2012), and that the cost benefit ratio is negative (Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2012). Hiring and training employees to run the courses, obtaining teaching materials, reporting issues to the proper authorities, and many more costs come with implementing traditional therapeutic treatment programs.

Focused deterrence implementation, however, requires none of this. In fact, the only thing that is required is a restructuring of groups and organizations already in place. No additional personnel were hired in High Point to contend with implementation and accomplish the work and no new funding was needed (Kenneth Shultz, personal communications). This, then, represents an impressive savings in not only money and manpower, but lives as well.

In light of these results, however, it is important to acknowledge some of the limitations of this research. The primary concern, of course, is the use of official statistics. Though far less labor intensive to obtain, police records rarely capture, with complete accuracy, the entire scope of a problem. This is particularly so in cases of sexually motivated crimes, and intimate partner violence certainly is one of these. This does, however, open a fascinating avenue for future research. Many of the aforementioned studies implemented victim reports of new abuse as their primary measure. The process is often difficult, but the results are significantly more reliable. As the OFDVI model is still in its relative infancy, gathering this information early in the process would be beneficial to future evaluations as well as for police record keeping reasons.

A second limitation to this study is simply that the intervention has only recently been embarked upon. Though data gathering goes back much farther, it has only been since 2012 that tracking the reduction in violence, injuries, calls for service – or any number of measures of success – has been viable in testing the model's effects. Were this study to have taken place several years from now, many more solid conclusions could be drawn.

Nonetheless, intimate partner violence has been the focus of at least some attention for over half a century (Bent-Goodley, 2005). Though the rate of intimate partner victimization is on a steady decline (Karmen, 2012) it is impossible to argue that the problem is under control. Whether it's the \$8.3 billion annual cost (Pearl, 2013) or the 4.8 million new victims annually (Catalano, *et al.*, 2009), it is clear that it is not a problem we have well contended with. In the Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative, however, we find a renewed hope in an effective (both for victims and by cost values) method which demonstrably reduces the rates of violence. While the initiative itself has not been widely implemented, the basic theory and logic behind it has been shown to reduce other extreme forms of violence over the past eighteen years (Braga & Weisburd, 2011; Braga & Weisburd, 2012a). Thus, it certainly warrants further research and special attention from policy makers who are seeking a solid, reliable method to reduce intimate partner violence

in their community.

What might it be, though, that makes the OFDVI so effective? Much of the current research on therapeutic intimate partner violence intervention has suggested that treatment may be effective for some individuals and ineffective (or counter-effective) for others. Specifically, it has been surmised that more socially bonded offenders with a greater stake in conformity through marriage, employment, education and so on may be more amenable to such treatment (Sherman, Smith, Schmidt & Rogan, 1992; Wooldredge & Thistlethwaite, 2005). While many of these variables were not discussed in the current study, those that were, such as sex, age, and supervision status, strongly suggest that the OFDVI would be equally effective with these populations.

Another often cited explanation as to why some offenders respond better to intervention and why therapy completers recidivate at lower rates than therapy drop outs, is that offender motivation to change will vary amongst individuals, and those who do not wish to change will simply do what is necessary to move on with their time (Theodosi, 2006; McMurrin, Tyler, Hogue, Cooper, Dunseath & McDaid, 1998). Many intervention programs base their curriculum on instilling a desire to change within an offender (George, 2012), but when motivation is being activated simply based on empathy an assumption is being made that the offender believes his or her behavior is wrong. Feminist theory, however, posits that the etiology in this form of offending is rooted in deeply held cultural beliefs about gender social and power roles (Brownmiller, 1975; Valenti, 2013). Some individuals, and indeed many of which would be these offenders, will not be easily dissuaded of these convictions so it is unlikely that empathetic motivation will be effective. If, however, motivation is rooted in the offender's own wellbeing and continued freedom, as is the case under the OFDVI model, the internal motivation to change will likely be much stronger. In addressing the often posted "individual needs" problem, then, OFDVI has an immediate advantage, for it addresses the simple, natural "need for freedom."

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Commonwealth v. Fogerty. 1857. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 491.

Fulgham v. State. 1905. 86 S.W. 754 Tex. Crim. App.

Harris v. State. 1894. 71 Miss. 462.

People v. Liberta. 1984. 64 N.Y.2d 152.

State v. Dowell. 1890. 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525.

State v. Oliver. 1879. In 70 N.C. 60, 61-62.

Thurman v. City of Torrington. 1984. In 595 *F.Supp* 1521 (D.Conn. 1984).

Table A1. Random-Assignment Experimental Studies (Babcock et al. 2004)

Experiment	Study Authors	Population Size	Treatment Type	Follow up Period	% reoffended
Broward	Feder & Forde (1999)	Treatment = 174 Control = 230 (T=404)	Duluth & Probation vs. Probation only	1 year	Tx = 4.8%, control = 5.7%
Brooklyn	Davis, Taylor & Maxwell (2001)	Tx1(long) = 129. Tx2(brief) = 61. Control=186 (T= 376)	Duluth Model vs. Community Service	6 months & 1 year	Tx1 = 10%, Tx2 = 25%, control = 26%.
Family Violence Response Team	Hovell, Seid & Liles (2006)	Tx = 307. Control = 498	Pro-feminist, on-scene services	6 months and 12 months.	* Tx = approx. 34% control = unreported (noted as lower than Tx group)
Bronx	Labriola, Rempel & Davis (2008)	V1Tx1(Batterer Program) = 202 V1Tx2(No program) = 218 V2T1(Monthly) = 211, V2Tx2(Graduated) = 209 (T=420)	V1: Psycho-educational vs. no program V2: traditional monthly vs. graduated monitoring	12 months and 18 months post sentence and 12 months post-monitoring	** V1Tx1 = 17.5%, V1Tx1 = 13%, V2Tx1 = 13.5%, V2Tx2 = 16.5%
San Diego	Dunford (2000)	Tx1(CBT) = 168 Tx2(couples) = 153 Tx3(monitored) = 173, Control = 150 (T=644)	CBT men's group vs. couple's counseling vs. rigorous monitoring vs. safety planning control	12 months.	Tx1 = 4%, Tx2 = 3%, Tx3 = 6%, control = 4%
Canada	Palmer, Brown & Barrera (1992)	Tx = 30 Control=26 (T=56)	Psychoeducational vs. probation only	12 months and 24 months	Tx = 10%, control = 31%

* General statistics on overall re-offending were not provided. This approximation was derived by averaging the recidivism rates across provided demographic variables (See: Hovel, Seid & Liles, 2006, p. 149). Recidivism rates were not reported for control participants, but the authors noted (on page 147) that recidivism rates were higher among program participants than controls.

** Only % Reoffended for IPV charge. Authors did not provide an overall statistic for official rates, so reported data indicates average of post-sentence recidivism rates. Victim reports statistics are for "any new abuse" only.

Table A2. Quazi-Experimental Studies

Study Author	Population Size	Treatment Type	Follow Up Period	% reoffend
* Gondolf (2000)	Completers = 578, dropouts = 266	Duluth Model	15 months	Completers = 18.3%, dropouts = 37%
* Murphy <i>et al.</i> (1998)	Completers = 10, dropouts = 225	Duluth Model	police records between 12 and 18 months	Completers = 0%, dropouts = 16%
* Dutton <i>et al.</i> (1997)	Completers = 156, dropouts and rejected = 290	Clinical Anger Management	Range up to 11 years (mean 5.2 years)	Completers = 18%, dropouts = 21%
* Harrell (1991)	Treatment t= 81, control = 112	CBT group	Police records between 15 and 29 months	Treatment = 50%, control = 30%
Bowen (2004)	N = 120	Duluth Model	Intake and 11 months	Treatment = 15%, control = 33%
Klein (present study)	N = 1,165	Focused Deterrence	6 months and 12 months	overall at 12 months = 5.8%

* As summarized in Babcock *et al.* (2004)

Appendix II

Figure B1. OFDVI D-List Offender Notification Sample






		PHONE (336) 887- FAX (336) 887- TDD (336) 883-
<p><i>High Point Police Department</i></p> <p>1009 Leonard Avenue • High Point, North Carolina 27260</p>		
<p>OFFENDER FOCUSED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INITIATIVE</p>		
<p>[date of letter]</p>		
<p>Dear Mr. [Subject],</p>		
<p>Because of the domestic related call involving you on [Date] I am writing to let you know that members of the High Point Police Department are taking a new focused approach in preventing future acts of domestic violence. This letter is your official notice that your name has been added to a watch list. The watch list will be reviewed daily by detectives assigned to the Domestic Violence Task Force who will be looking for any complaints about domestic violence related activity involving you. Domestic Violence Task Force detectives will consider complaints from any source; officers, neighbors, family members, a witness, a friend or the victim.</p>		
<p>Domestic violence related crimes are threats, trespassing, damage to property, assaults, harassment, stalking, sexual assault, assaults inflicting injury and homicide. [Redacted] as ordered that our number one priority be to focus on domestic violence offenders. Unannounced police checks on your residence may be conducted. Further incidents involving you will be documented, reviewed and acted upon.</p>		
<p>You need to know our policy is to arrest domestic violence offenders whenever possible. Officers who believe probable cause exists that an offense took place must arrest the offender. We consider this fair warning so you can avoid charges, court appearances and possible imprisonment.</p>		
<p>Sincerely,</p>		
		
<p><u>DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE</u></p> <p>High Point Police • Guilford Co. District Attorney • US Attorney • NC Probation • ATF • DEA • FBI • US Marshall • High Point Community Against Violence • Family Service of Piedmont • UNCG</p>		

Figure B2. OFDVI C-List Victim Notification Sample

	OFFENDER FOCUSED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INITIATIVE	
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NOTICE TO VICTIM

[Date of Letter]

Dear Ms. [Woman's Name],

After the domestic related call involving you on [Date] I am writing to let you know that members of the High Point Police Department are taking a new focused approach in preventing future acts of domestic violence. Chief Marty A. Sumner has ordered that our number one priority be to focus on domestic violence offenders.

Domestic violence related crimes include threats, trespassing, damage to property, assaults, harassment, stalking, sexual assault, assaults inflicting injury and homicide. If you would like to speak with someone at the police department about your incident or about further action you can contact D [redacted] your call will be treated as confidential.

There are many organizations which provide help to victims of domestic violence in the form of advice, counseling, and risk assessment. If you would like to talk with a victim service provider the police department has partnered with Family Service of the Piedmont, you may contact [redacted] 336-[redacted], ext. [redacted]. The victim services are free to you.

Mr. [Man's Name] will be given written notice of our policy to arrest domestic violence offenders whenever possible. Officers who believe probable cause exists that an offense took place must arrest the **offender**. Mr. [Man's Name] has been added to a watch list reviewed daily looking for any complaints about domestic violence related activity involving him from any source; officers, neighbors, family members, a witness, a friend or the victim.

Sincerely,

[redacted] [redacted]

Family Service of the Piedmont • 24 hr Domestic Violence Crisis Line • 336-889-7273
High Point Police Department • Nonemergency Number • 336-[redacted]

Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative: The First Two Years

August 1

2014

The High Point Police Department in partnership with High Point Community Against Violence, Guilford County District Attorney's Office, Family Service of the Piedmont, and University of North Carolina-Greensboro researchers have implemented a strategy to combat domestic violence known as, Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI). OFDVI has resulted in re-offense rates of 9% across 1,000+ offenders. The recidivism rates for DV offenders after OFDVI implementation are staggering given the rates for DV offenders in the literature, which range from 20-34%. The strategy applies the evidence-based focused deterrence approach to the problem of DV and shifts to an offender focus in combatting DV. One of the strategy's critical features is the ability to focus on offenders at earlier stages of offending, before the secrecy of offending entrenches and violence escalates. Research suggests that early intervention is key in stopping the cycle of DV.

“It is not
JUST
domestic
violence; it is
Violence”


Contact Information



A DIFFERENT RESPONSE TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is a community crime problem that costs the US over \$5.8 billion every year. IPV is a major drain on law enforcement resources involving a high volume of calls, repeating calls to the same location, consuming large amounts of time and often resulting in injuries or death. In the US nearly 1 out of 5 homicide victims are killed by an intimate partner, 16.3% of all homicides (FBI Uniform Crime Report). Women who have experienced a history of IPV report more health problems than other women; they have a greater risk for substance abuse, unemployment, alcoholism, and suicide attempts (CDC). So how could a national problem, so costly and harmful to families and children, persist year after year? Are these offenders resisting “our best efforts”?

For the community of High Point, North Carolina our answer was no, it was time for an innovative approach to this problem. Now, two years after full implementation of a completely different approach designed to hold the offender accountable, we offer hope that we have found what “our best efforts” look like. The strategy applies the evidence-based focused deterrence approach to the problem of IPV and shifts to an offender focus in combatting domestic related violence. One of the strategy’s critical features is the ability to focus on offenders at earlier stages of offending before the secrecy of offending entrenches and violence escalates. Research suggests that early intervention is key in stopping the cycle of IPV. The first two years of implementation resulted in re-offense rates of only 9% across 1,000+ offenders. These rates for IPV offenders are significant given the rates for IPV offenders in the literature, which range from 20-34%.



The idea for our approach came from Professor David M. Kennedy, the Director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. Professor Kennedy believes the focused deterrence approach that has proven effective at controlling gang, gun and drug related violence likewise can be adapted to control IPV offenders. Kennedy suggests that not enough attention has been paid to controlling the offender. Traditional approaches have been victim-focused with heavy emphasis on helping the victim avoid patterns of abuse, on disengaging from abusers and on physically removing themselves from abusive settings. What if in addition to providing services for the victim we used very focused formal and informal sanctions against the offender? Can the IPV offender be held accountable with real predictable consequences without creating additional harm for the victims?

The High Point Police Department formed a partnership early in 2009 with researchers, practitioners, prosecutors and community to develop, implement and evaluate a focused deterrence initiative targeted at the chronic IPV offender.

The goals for the initiative are:

- 1) Protect most vulnerable women from most dangerous abusers
- 2) Take the burden of addressing abusers from women and move it to state/police
- 3) Focus deterrence, community standards, outreach and support on most dangerous abusers
- 4) Counter/avoid “experiential effect” (right or wrong lessons learned from experience of other offenders)
- 5) Take advantage of opportunities provided by offender’s variety of offenses and 6) avoid putting women at additional risk.

Despite the widespread belief that IPV is qualitatively different from other types of violence our research shows it is not. Our analysis of ten years of arrest data tells us the repeat IPV offender in High Point has a lengthy criminal history beyond intimate partner violence. In fact, their criminal histories were similar to the gang and drug offenders the focused deterrence approach had proven so effective at controlling. The IPV offenders studied averaged 10 arrests, assaults were the predominant charge but all included assaults other than for IPV and 93% were unemployed. Since these offenders have rich criminal histories and are known to the criminal justice system they can be identified based on past behavior.


A new discovery came when research pointed out there are four very different levels of offenders, which led the team to develop a specific notification and sanction regime for each level. They range from the most violent, who have extensive criminal records, to those contacted on the first call who have never been charged with an IPV offense. The table on the next page shows the criteria established to properly match the offender to the response. It also shows the safety planning and support for a victim that is provided.

OFFENDER CRITERIA / RESPONSE / VICTIM'S SERVICES


Level of Offender	Criteria / One or More Apply	Offender Notification Type & Response	Safety Planning & Support for Victims
"A" List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 3rd or more previous IPV related charges – Offender has violent criminal record including IPV – Violated a protective order – Used weapon in the past when committing IPV – Convicted felon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – NO Notice Given – Most Violent – Selected for immediate prosecution as example to lower levels of offenders – Addressed by any legal means available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All services offered at any level – Referral to the Victim's Justice Center where all the services listed under "B" are co-located in one building – Services offered for children who witnessed violence or experienced trauma, also located in Victim's Justice Center
"B" List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 2nd charge of IPV OR – Violation of prohibited behavior for which offender received notice as a C List offender (for example: violating pretrial release condition, no contact order, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Face-to-Face law enforcement and community message – Framing of intervention as from state and community – Offenders required to attend a notification as a group – Receive individual custom legal notification letter detailing presumptive sentences for future acts of violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Victim receives prior notice the offender is being called in – Message reviewed with her first – Offer of cocooning or proximity informant – Direct contact post call-in for victims still in relationship with offender – (Dedicated prosecutor, Civil Attorney services, Victim Advocate)
"C" List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 1st Charge for an IPV offense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Face-to-face individual deterrent message delivered by detective – At the time of arrest or before pretrial release 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Victim receives letter of services at VJC – Direct contact with Safety Planner – Follow up with Detective
"D" List	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Identified when police are called to a domestic disturbance call – An intimate partner relationship exists – Aggressor has no previous charges for IPV – No violence occurred on this incident requiring charges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Receives letter from police putting them on official notice they are now on a "watch list" – Delivered by a uniform patrol officer the next day or within 48 hours on a follow up visit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Victim receives letter of services offered at Victim's Justice Center – Explanation of the incremental approach to prohibited acts for holding the offender accountable

The measurable impact of this strategy so far includes a dramatic reduction in IPV-related homicides, lower recidivism rates for IPV offenders notified, reduction in IPV arrests, reduction in victim harm reported in IPV assaults, and fewer repeat calls for service. In the five years since the shift to this strategy (2009 – 2013), only 1 of the 16 homicides in High Point was IPV; as compared to 17 of 52 (2004 – 2008) before. In other words prior to 2009, 33% of homicides were IPV compared to 6% since. It should be noted the “A” list offenders, the most violent, were initially identified in 2009 and targeted for examples before notification began to the B – D levels of offenders. For context in 2013, Guilford Co. (the county containing almost all of High Point) experienced 13 IPV of 26 homicides or 50%. As stated earlier the average recidivism rate for all levels of offenders is 9%. A look at the break down between levels shows even the “B” list offenders can be deterred at a high rate. In comparing years 2012 and 2013, IPV arrests are down 17%, IPV arrests with reported victim injuries are down 19%, and IPV-related calls for service are down 10%.

Homicides in High Point / DV Related?



Is Victim Harm Decreasing?



Evaluation

A 2014-15 Community Oriented Policing Office grant is funding a formal evaluation conducted by our research partner, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, led by Stacy Sechrist, Ph.D. and John Weil. The Lexington, NC Police Department became the first agency to replicate the OFDVI with an implementation date of July 1, 2014. The COPS grant will also evaluate the first year for Lexington PD.



Reducing Domestic Violence in Chula Vista, CA

Herman Goldstein Award Submission 2018

Reducing Domestic Violence in Chula Vista, CA: Summary

Scanning

In 2013, domestic violence (both non-crime domestic disputes between intimate partners and physical violence) was Chula Vista's second most common call for service (CFS) type, exceeded only by false burglar alarms. While non-DV CFS fell 10% from 2007-2014, the yearly number of DV CFS had remained steady. The Chula Vista Police Department (CVPD) had partnered with the DV-advocacy organization South Bay Community Services (SBCS) to provide 24/7 on-scene services for DV victims for more than 15 years, but had not seen a reduction in DV CFS. DV incidents were negatively affecting the involved parties, their children, their neighbors.

Analysis

The DV problem was analyzed and researched in a variety of ways, including a comprehensive literature review; an analysis of CFS, crime, arrest, jail, district attorney, and officer survey data; and the collection of partner perspectives and expert field advice. The primary findings of the problem analysis included: DV had been successfully addressed in at least three other cities through tiered, focused deterrence; non-crime intimate partner disturbances far outnumbered physical violence incidents; few suspects spent more than a day or two in jail and few could be prosecuted. The vast majority of repeat DV incidents occurred three days after the initial CFS incident.

Response

Working together, police, SBCS, probation, child welfare services, and the district attorney's office implemented a 3-level, tiered focused deterrence model for responding to DV CFS in just one geographic area of the city (Sector 1):

- Non-crime DV CFS: consistent, verbal in-person educational message from officer
- First DV crime incident after start of project: verbal and written warning of suspect; and an in-person unannounced officer follow-up with victims and suspects three days after the initial DV CFS
- Chronic suspects/verbal abuse – customized problem-solving plan

Assessment

- Following a 1-year implementation period, DV crime dropped 24% in the experimental sector (Sector 1) and increased 3% in a matched comparison sector (Sector 2)
- Following a 1-year implementation period, DV CFS went down 3% in Sector 1 and increased 10% in Sector 2
- 97% of DV victims in Sector 1 were satisfied with the police response compared to 81% of DV victims in Sector 2

- Only 8% of DV subjects said they would not be willing to call police again; 88% said things had gotten better since the police response
- 77% of project officers said the initiative was effective
- 67% of project officers said the initiative should be expanded citywide

Project Description

Reducing Domestic Violence in Chula Vista, California

SCANNING

Chula Vista is a very diverse city of 267,000¹, located seven miles south of San Diego and seven miles north of the Mexican border. Chula Vista is not a high-crime city, but like many communities across the country, domestic violence (DV) dominates the call for service (CFS) landscape. In 2013, with 3,886 CFS, DV was the second most common call type in Chula Vista; that year, DV CFS exceeded the combined total of all robbery, residential burglary, vehicle theft, and vehicle burglary calls.

The same year, false burglar alarms was the top call type and homeless-related calls was the third most common. In 2013, the Chula Vista Police Department (CVPD) passed an ordinance aimed at reducing false alarms and initiated a special project to address homeless-related concerns. DV had not yet been systematically addressed, however, despite the fact that more patrol hours were spent responding to DV CFS than to both false alarms and homeless-related calls together.

For more than 15 years, South Bay Community Services (SBCS), which provides DV victims with resources on a 24/7 basis, has been an active partner with the CVPD in efforts to reduce DV. South Bay advocates provide crisis intervention services to victims and their children, helping plan their immediate and long-term safety. SBCS staff are housed in the CVPD building, and patrol officers routinely call advocates to the scene of DV crimes to assist victims face-to-face during the aftermath of incidents. This high functioning SBCS-CVPD partnership had helped thousands of victims over the years, but together we had not been able to reduce DV CFS levels. In fact, DV CFS levels remained

¹ Chula Vista is 59% Hispanic; 19% white; 15% Asian; 5% African American; and 2% other races.

steady from 2007 through 2014, while non-DV CFS went down 10% throughout the city of Chula Vista during the same period. Given the long-standing efforts between SBCS and the CVPD to address the problem of DV, we were disappointed, to say the least, that DV calls did not also go down 10% between 2007 and 2014. SBCS staff were interested in working with the CVPD to try a new approach to reduce this problem.

Finally, DV incidents negatively affect not just the two parties, but children who are present, involved relatives and friends, and neighbors who may be concerned and frightened by loud arguments. Focusing on DV was an opportunity for us to positively impact the broader Chula Vista community. It was also important to us to focus on officer safety. Domestic violence calls are among the most dangerous types of incidents officers respond to, and the most likely to result in an officer fatality.

ANALYSIS

Literature Review. We conducted an extensive review of the existing literature, starting with the POP guide on domestic violence, which served as a guiding document for the problem analysis. The project analyst team attempted to answer as many analysis questions as possible that were listed in the guidebook. However, only findings pertinent to the development of the CVPD response are described in the pages that follow.

As part of the literature review, the project team identified three communities that had measurably reduced DV or its severity: Fremont, CA; West Yorkshire, England; and High Point, NC. In the mid-1990s, Fremont patrol officers began conducting several unannounced follow-up visits with couples at addresses where police had been dispatched on DV CFS at least three times. Fremont was able to reduce repeat CFS to these locations by 67%. In the late 1990s, West Yorkshire officers implemented a tiered response to DV

couples based on whether officers had been dispatched to their address once, twice, or three times or more in the past. Although the West Yorkshire response did not reduce CFS, it reduced the number of couples who “graduated” to higher levels due to repeat incidents. Finally, in 2009, High Point personnel began using a focused deterrence model, mixed with some elements of West Yorkshire’s tiered response initiative, in an effort to reduce DV. The High Point project reduced DV CFS, injuries, and homicides. We thought elements of all three models might be applicable to the problem of DV in Chula Vista. Through our problem analysis, we sought to identify which aspects of the different responses implemented in the three cities might be most effective for us.

Officer Focus Groups and Surveys. In March of 2014, [REDACTED] our external research partner, conducted two focus groups of approximately five CVPD officers each. The focus group questions were based on several themes that had emerged in the academic literature about police officer attitudes towards DV. Based on the results of the focus groups, Weisel developed a written survey that was administered at all six patrol roll calls and at a monthly investigative meeting. A total of 82 sworn personnel completed the written survey, which respondents placed in a sealed ballot box². Eighty-seven percent of respondents expressed frustration with responding repeatedly to the same couples involved in non-crime intimate partner disturbances. A large segment of officers were skeptical about traditional criminal justice responses to DV. Approximately 70% said they did not think restraining orders or mandatory treatment for batterers was effective; almost 50% said arresting DV offenders seldom prevented future DV.

² The 82 respondents represented 46% of all sworn personnel assigned to patrol and investigations; however, more than three quarters of the respondents were patrol officers.

CFS and Crime Data. To identify call patterns, a team of three CVPD analysts ([REDACTED]) reviewed 10,180 DV-related calls for service received by the department from January 2012 through June 2014. An analysis of CFS data indicated that non-crime intimate partner disturbance calls were more common than calls involving physical violence. In fact, more than 70% of DV CFS in Chula Vista did not result in a crime report, and this subset of DV calls – non-crime intimate partner disturbances – had increased 18% between 2007 and 2014.

We also found that repeat DV was a problem. The call and crime analysis showed that just 6% of unique residential DV addresses in one geographic sector – only 23 unique residential addresses – accounted for 19% of unique residential DV CFS over a six-month period. Although most residential addresses did not experience repeat DV calls, when repeat calls did occur, the vast majority (86%) reoccurred after three days had elapsed.

From a review of a sample (N=97) of the 2,612 DV-related crime cases logged from January 2012 through June 2014, Miggans estimated that children were present during 33% of DV crimes, and 56% of couples had children under 18 (either in common or not in common) who could potentially be present in future DV incidents. Miggans also found that the offender was under the influence of alcohol in about 30% of cases. About half the time, offenders fled the scene of DV crimes and were not subsequently arrested. The police department did not have the resources to track down low-level DV offenders. More than half of all DV incidents were misdemeanor batteries without injuries, and the majority of felony DV assaults did not involve serious injuries³.

³ In California, a DV assault is considered a felony with an injury as long as the injury is visible, which may include such injuries as scratches and redness.

Plouffe mapped the home addresses of victims and suspects to see if follow-up contacts, similar to Fremont's efforts, would be feasible. She found that 83% of victims lived in Chula Vista and 64% of suspects lived in Chula Vista, but most of the remainder of victims and suspects lived within easy driving distance of the city. More than half of couples lived together all the time, or least some of the time. Most victims and suspects were on the young side; more than 75% were aged 40 or under.

Jail Data. The San Diego County Sheriff's Department shared approximately 2.5 years of jail data with Chula Vista analysts to enhance the problem analysis. The analysts found that the median time in jail was just 1.5 days for misdemeanor DV offenses and 3.7 days for felony offenses; 42% of DV offenders bonded out of jail, and 80% of those who posted bond were out of custody within 24 hours.

District Attorney Data. The San Diego County District Attorney's Office shared 2.5 years of their data to help round out the picture on the final outcomes of DV cases. Linking crime, arrest and district attorney data enabled the analyst team to determine that only about 20% of DV crimes resulted in a guilty plea or finding. Fewer than 2% of offenders arrested on DV charges went to prison; 21% or fewer were believed to have been sentenced to local custody, with a median sentence of 180 days. Because so few of the people involved in DV CFS received any formal sanctions, it was clear we needed to focus the bulk of our efforts on the police response (see Appendix 1).

Expert Field Experience. One of the original architects of the project, Agent [REDACTED], had conducted in-person 3-day follow-ups with DV victims and suspects when he worked patrol as a K-9 officer a decade earlier. He had conducted these follow-ups on his own initiative when he was particularly concerned about a specific victim. At

first, he tried conducting follow-ups the day after the DV incident, but if the suspect fled, he or she was typically still in hiding. ■■■ found that the second day after the incident, the suspect was sometimes still not welcome at the residence and/or was in the process of trying to make up with the victim. But by the third day, the suspect had often reconciled with the victim and was back at the home. DV suspects were unhappily surprised to see ■■■ again at the 3-day point, particularly since no one had called police. Suspects were unnerved by ongoing police interest in the violence, the victims and themselves. Victims seemed to appreciate ■■■'s unannounced follow-ups to check on their safety.

Partner Perspectives. We worked with four formal partner organizations – SBCS, child welfare services (CWS), probation, and the district attorney's office – to help us understand the problem and enhance the way the criminal justice system handled DV in Chula Vista. The CVPD convened several large-scale meetings with representatives from all four formal partnership agencies during the analysis phase of the project, as well as 1-on-1 meetings with each partner agency, to discuss their perspectives and ideas. These meetings were invaluable in terms of gaining additional knowledge about each agency's needs, frame of reference and recommendations on ways of reducing DV. For example, CWS personnel explained that loud arguments (not just physical assaults) between adult intimate partners caused real damage to children in the vicinity. Further, CWS shared research indicating that the youngest children are the most vulnerable to fear/trauma caused by intense arguments because their brains are still in critical stages of development.

RESPONSES

Based on the problem analysis findings, we developed a new tiered response model that drew on the three successful prior initiatives identified, but was customized to the

specific dynamics of the DV problem in Chula Vista. The goal of the response model was to reduce domestic violence by changing social norms and behavior – without traditional legal interventions – unless repeated, customized, and increasingly intensive police contacts were not effective. Our problem analysis indicated that suspects were relatively unlikely to be arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to jail or prison, so we needed to employ interventions that did not rely in large part on any of these three traditional consequences.

CVPD command staff decided to test the new response model in just one of four geographic areas of the city (Sector 1) and compare the results with a similar area of the city (Sector 2) (see Appendix 2). (Initially, the plan was for 6 patrol officers to staff a special assignment, 24/7 “DV car,” but it quickly became clear that a DV car approach would not be feasible from a staffing perspective and would not be scalable citywide if the project were to be successful. We also considered implementing classic focused deterrence call-ins, but concluded we did not have the resources to do so (also, few DV offenders were on probation, so formal leverage over them was limited.)

Based on the focus groups and survey results that indicated officers were frustrated with repeat verbal-only DV incidents and skeptical of the effectiveness of traditional criminal justice responses, command staff anticipated there would be enough interest among patrol officers to form a special team (dubbed the Domestic Abuse Response Team (DART)) to test the new response model. A captain sent out a department-wide email seeking sworn personnel who would be willing to test the new response model and approximately 30 sworn officers (about 1/3 of all officers assigned to patrol) volunteered⁴. Several sworn personnel also competed to serve as the project’s coordinator. Agent [REDACTED] was selected for this position and transferred from patrol to investigations to help

⁴A second wave of about 30 additional patrol officers volunteered to join the DART team about six months after the field test began.

bridge enhanced suspect-focused efforts in both divisions. No new personnel were hired to work on the DART project.

The DART officers began implementing the tiered response protocol in Sector 1 only in August 2015. However, DART officers were regularly rotated by their supervisors throughout the city, to all four sectors. When DART officers were assigned to Sector 1, they followed the new response protocol for DV CFS, but when they were assigned to any of the other three sectors, they provided the standard, traditional response to DV CFS. Below is a description of the experimental response model, which essentially had three non-emergency levels⁵.

LEVEL 1 (Non-Crime DV Calls): Consistent, In-Person Educational Message at Time of Response. Because more than 65% of DV CFS did not result in a crime report, we knew it was critical to develop a specific response to these types of calls. In the test area, if officers responded to a non-crime intimate partner disturbance call, they provided both parties with a consistent verbal message and a professionally designed educational brochure to reinforce the message (see Appendix 3)⁶. Chula Vista officers told both parties in the dispute that police take these disturbances seriously. They said everyone has disagreements, but not ones so loud that police are called for help. Based on the research CWS shared with us regarding the negative impact of intense intimate partner arguments on kids, officers explained that children of all ages are scared when they hear adults yelling at each other. The educational brochure also included a link to a video: “First Impressions: Exposure to Violence and a Child’s Developing Brain,” as well as advice related to avoiding arguments when either party is under the influence of alcohol.

⁵ Initially, non-crime DV CFS were separated into two levels, but these were ultimately collapsed into one.

⁶ All printed DART project documents were in both English and Spanish.

Finally, officers said that police would be back in touch in the future to check in on everyone's welfare. Since the target population was predominantly under 40, a civilian police employee later sent both parties a follow-up text with a short survey to make sure they were okay. The follow-up text message was a novel response to DV subjects. The consistent in-person, verbal educational message delivered during every non-crime DV call response was not tried by other police departments identified in our literature review⁷.

LEVEL 3: (First DV Crime After Start of Project) DV Suspects: Written Warning. If officers responded to a domestic violence-related crime, they dialed the response up a notch, delivering a stern 8-point warning to the suspect. Officers told suspects that they could expect future unannounced visits from police, and would receive a great deal of attention from a special task force of police, probation, prosecutors, and child welfare if they did not stop the abuse. Officers told suspects they would be tracked down if they committed future DV offenses and fled the scene (see Appendix 4). [REDACTED], the project coordinator, also directly involved a CWS social worker assigned to the project if children were present during the DV crime. If either subject was on probation, CVPD requested an in-person follow up visit be conducted by probation officers⁸.

LEVEL 3: DV Victims and Suspects: 3-Day Follow Up. [REDACTED] field experience coupled with the findings about the typical length of time suspects spent in jail, and the data that demonstrated most repeat calls occurred after three days, led us to believe a 3-day follow-up with victims and suspects would be ideal. [REDACTED] coordinated the assignment of

⁷ West Yorkshire sent follow up letters to people involved in non-crime DV CFS; High Point delivered follow up-letters in person to the dominant aggressor and victim in non-crime DV incidents, if a dominant aggressor could be identified (approximately 10% of non-crime DV incidents).

⁸ All DV CFS involving probationers – whether a crime had occurred or not – triggered a request for a follow up by probation officers.

3-day follow-ups with specific patrol officers through dispatch⁹. If enough officers weren't available to conduct the follow-ups, Rosario conducted them with an investigator or a patrol officer; she ended up personally conducting about 20% of the 3-day follow ups. The 3-day follow up attempt was different from the Fremont project in that the target follow-up date was based on an analysis of the time between repeat incidents. The 3-day follow up was also different from the High Point project in that it was a standard unannounced appearance by police officers at the couples' home, in addition to a warning administered to the suspect in jail.

If no one was home during the 3-day follow up attempt, officers left a colorful, eye-catching card on the door that said "We stopped by to check on your safety," along with their contact information. This card let the victim, suspect, and concerned neighbors know the police were actively working to prevent problems at the home (see Appendix 5). The follow-up attempt card was a new response, not tried by other police departments.

LEVEL 4: Chronic Suspects/Ongoing Verbal Abuse Situations. Finally, for those suspects who did not listen to the offender warning and continued to abuse their partners, Rosario implemented a customized problem-solving plan for the suspect and victim or subjects. In some cases the plan involved working with the district attorney to prioritize a suspect for prosecution. In other situations (ongoing verbal abuse, or crime cases with little evidence), ██████ met with the subjects, victims, suspects, and people with influence over the parties, such as parents, siblings, employers, neighbors, and landlords, to try to stop the behavior. On one occasion, Agent ██████ worked with a severely disabled suspect who was confined to a wheelchair, but physically abused his wife. To remind the suspect that police would continue to check on her safety, his wife

⁹ Two patrol officers were required to conduct 3-day follow ups.

taped a Chula Vista project flier to their bathroom wall with a note that said the detective would continue to come by until the violence stopped (see Appendix 6). The victim told Agent [REDACTED] that the situation eventually improved to the point that she was able to take the flier down.

ASSESSMENT

During the full 18-month implementation period (September 2015-February 2017), officers administered more than 450 in-person Level 1 messages to people involved in non-crime DV calls; gave 287 formal warnings to DV suspects; and made more than 280 three-day follow-up attempts in Sector 1. [REDACTED] worked on more than 60 customized problem solving plans with victims, suspects, and subjects involved in repeat crimes or chronic verbal abuse situations.

Crime Reduction. Following a 1-year implementation period, DV crime dropped 24% in the experimental sector (Sector 1), and increased 3% in the matched comparison sector (Sector 2). DV crimes initially increased in Sector 1, but showed a clear drop after the project was fully implemented. The impact of the project on DV crime did not occur abruptly, but was a gradual impact with a cumulative effect. This is logical because officers implementing the DART protocol did so over a year, making contact with new subjects, victims, and offenders only as each new call occurred. The reduction in DV crime was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level¹⁰. In terms of displacement, the drop in DV crime in Sector 1 did not cause a statistically significant rise in DV crime in Sector 2. The experimental and comparison sectors were very closely matched. Both had between 50,000 and 69,000 people and were about 70% Hispanic, and

¹⁰ 269 weekly DV crime means for both sectors were calculated for the period from January 2012 through February 2017, to provide a more sensitive measure of impact.

the two sectors had almost identical trends in the number of DV calls and DV crimes during the 15-year period before the problem solving effort was launched.

CFS Reduction. Following a 1-year implementation period, DV CFS went down 3% in the experimental sector (Sector 1), and increased 10% in the matched comparison sector (Sector 2); the 3% reduction in calls in Sector 1 was not statistically significant, but the 10% increase in calls in Sector 2 was statistically significant ($p=.041$). DV calls initially increased in Sector 1, but showed a clear drop after the project was fully implemented. Notably, the non-crime intimate partner disturbances in Sector 1 had essentially flattened out since 2014, while the same types of calls had increased 13% in Sector 2.

Harm Reduction. While the DART project did not have a statistically significant impact on DV calls in Sector 1, the more important reduction in DV crime suggests a reduction in the harm associated with calls. Stability of DV calls levels also provides evidence that the initiative did not suppress DV calls. That interpretation is also supported by evidence from two additional sources of data – feedback from DV call subjects and DV victims.

DV Subjects Reported Positive Outcomes. As noted earlier, people involved in non-crime intimate partner DV disturbances were sent follow-up texts after 30 days had elapsed. Text recipients were asked to complete a 3-question online survey. Overall, 88% of subjects who responded said things had gotten better since the incident, and 81% said police had helped the problem. A relatively low percentage of subjects – 8% – said they would not call police again for help. This provided more evidence that the DART project

reduced DV crime and did not have the unintended consequence of suppressing calls to police.

DV Victims More Satisfied with Police. Because the text survey was limited to Sector 1 – and since the responses solicited by the police department may not have been candid – an independent survey was conducted with all DV crime victims in the city. This survey also consisted of a limited number of questions but was administered not by police but by DV advocates working for SBCS. The survey questions were “add-ons” to the victim contacts made by DVRT advocates after DV crimes occurred. Based on the DVRT survey, 97% of victims in Sector 1 reported being “satisfied” with the police response compared to 81% of victims in Sector 2. While there were a limited number of surveys completed, the administration of the surveys by DV advocates increased the validity associated with the findings and provided further evidence that the DART initiative did not suppress calls to police or reporting of crime.

DART Officers Supportive. Late in the project, DART officers were surveyed about their perception of the initiative. A large majority (77%) thought the project was effective in reducing repeat DV, and most (67%), said the project should be expanded in patrol.

Agency and Officer Information


Key Project Team Members

[Redacted]

Project Contact Person

[Redacted]

Appendix 1




Appendix 2

Test/Comparison Areas



City of Chula Vista

Sector 1 (test area) about 430 DV crimes per year; 50,000 pop.



Sector 2 (comparison area) about 400 DV crimes per year; 69,000 pop

Domestic Disturbances & Loud Arguments

The police were called because of a domestic disturbance. Everyone has disagreements, but not ones so intense that the police are called for help. What happened today is not okay.

The Chula Vista Police Department is taking new actions when responding to domestic violence. We will be checking in with you both in the future to make sure everyone is okay. If you ever need immediate help, CALL 911. The safety and well-being of everyone involved is our priority.

Police take this seriously.



Advice from Police:

Take a Time Out: If you are upset, step away from the situation and take as much time as you need. Leave the room or home and allow your partner to do the same. Don't continue a heated conversation!

Avoid Alcohol and Drugs: Avoid arguments when either of you have been drinking or are under the influence of drugs. Things can quickly get out of hand!

Impact of Domestic Abuse on Children

Just hearing adults yelling is very scary for children of all ages. Babies and young children are affected the most. The fear caused by these arguments is bad for the development of their brains.

For more information, please watch "First Impressions: Exposure to Violence and a Child's Developing Brain."



English:

[www.youtube.com/
watch?v=brVOYtNMmKk](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brVOYtNMmKk)



Español:

[www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IC23ysdsh4E#t=82](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IC23ysdsh4E#t=82)

Police Department
315 Fourth Avenue
Chula Vista, CA 91910
www.chulavistapd.org



Need immediate help?
Call 911

Appendix 4

WARNING to Domestic Violence Offenders



1. We will not tolerate domestic violence. It's a crime against the family and community.
2. The Chula Vista Police Department, District Attorney's Office, and Probation Department are working together to prevent domestic violence.
3. Unless you stop abusing your partner, you'll receive a great deal of attention from the Chula Vista Police Department.
4. You're now subject to future unannounced police visits.
5. Any future incident involving you will be a priority for us. We'll track you down if you flee the scene of a crime.
6. We'll see what else you can be prosecuted for, including old cases that were dismissed.
7. This new approach is being driven by us, the POLICE—not the victim.
8. You have been admonished and warned.

ARRESTEE / SUSPECT

Sign to acknowledge warning:

Print name: _____

Date: _____

WARNING SUSPECT ADVISEMENT [POLICE OFFICER ONLY]


On ____/____/____, I spoke with _____ in this

NAME OF SUSPECT

case about our Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative. I advised the suspect that I was there to only talk about the initiative, not the suspect's case. The suspect was given a copy of this warning.

The officer should explain to the suspect this is not a Miranda rights admonishment.

Officer ID#: _____ Initials: _____ Case #: _____



Need immediate help?
Call 911

Appendix 5



We stopped by to check on your safety.

Chula Vista Police Officers _____
and _____ were here to check on
you at _____ AM / PM on _____.

The Chula Vista Police Department will continue to check on you to make sure you are okay. If you wish to talk to us about a non-emergency, we've included our business cards.

If you need immediate assistance, call 911.




Pasamos a ver que se encuentre bien.

Oficiales de Policía de Chula Vista
_____ y _____
pasamos a verlo a _____ AM / PM el
_____.

El Departamento de Policía seguirá visitándolo para asegurarnos que se encuentre bien. Si usted desea hablar con nosotros sobre un asunto que no sea de emergencia, le hemos dejado nuestra tarjeta de presentación.

Si necesita ayuda inmediata, llame al 911.

Appendix 6



David M. Kennedy
Biography

David M. Kennedy is a [professor of criminal justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City](#) and the faculty chair of the [National Network for Safe Communities](#) at John Jay. Mr. Kennedy and the National Network support cities implementing strategic interventions to reduce violence, minimize arrest and incarceration, enhance police legitimacy, and strengthen relationships between law enforcement and communities. These interventions have been proven effective in a variety of settings, have amassed a robust evaluation record, and are widely employed nationally and internationally.

Mr. Kennedy was a principal in the Boston Gun Project in the mid-1990s, which pioneered a high-level action-research approach to public safety and the groundbreaking “Operation Ceasefire” homicide prevention strategy, and from which Kennedy developed the “focused deterrence” intervention framework. He has developed interventions focused on group and gang violence, individual violent offenders, intimate partner violence, street drug markets, opioid markets, prison safety, and other public safety issues. He has worked with numerous cities and states, and with the federal government to design and implement the Treasury Department’s Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative and the Department of Justice’s Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative; Drug Market Intervention Program; and National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice. He launched John Jay’s Institute for Innovation in Prosecution, now a stand-alone entity at the college. Mr. Kennedy’s work has won two Ford Foundation Innovations in Government awards, two Webber Seavey Awards from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and two Herman Goldstein Awards for Problem-Oriented Policing. He was awarded the 2011 Hatfield Scholar Award for scholarship in the public interest.

He is the author of [*Don’t Shoot, One Man, a Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City America*](#), [*Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction*](#), co-author of [*Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*](#), and a wide range of articles on group and gang violence, drug markets, domestic violence, firearms trafficking, deterrence theory, crime prevention, police/community relations, and other public safety issues, as well as on action-research methodology. The monograph [*A Framework for Addressing Violence and Serious Crime: Focused Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Prevention*](#), co-authored with Anthony Braga, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2021.